235. Memorandum From Vice President Mondale to President Carter1
SUBJECT
- Objectives During Visit to Europe for Talks with Vorster and European Leaders
We are in the final preparatory stage for my forthcoming visit in your behalf to Portugal, Spain, Austria, Yugoslavia and the United Kingdom.
As currently scheduled, I will depart for Lisbon this Saturday for meetings with President Eanes and Prime Minister Soares on May 16; talks with King Juan Carlos and Prime Minister Suarez in Madrid on May 17; and with Chancellor Kreisky in Vienna on May 18.
The talks with South African Prime Minister Vorster are set for Vienna on May 19 and 20. I will then travel to Belgrade on the afternoon of May 20 for meetings on May 20–21 with President Tito and members of the Yugoslav leadership; then to London on May 22 to debrief Prime Minister Callaghan and Foreign Secretary Owen on the Vorster meetings.
There are three basic elements to the visit, each of priority importance to your foreign policy objectives. My purpose will be:
—to demonstrate in Portugal and Spain the United States’ support for their return to democracy;
—to convey to Prime Minister Vorster your policy toward Southern Africa including the United States’ views on the role South Africa must play in current efforts to resolve the Rhodesian and Namibian problems, and on the approach South Africa must take within its society if our relations are not to suffer;
—to emphasize to President Tito the importance your Administration places on Yugoslavia’s independence, political unity and territorial integrity.
I do not plan to become a negotiator on contentious issues in any of my meetings, but I do anticipate an in-depth discussion with Vorster. The following paragraphs summarize principal issues I expect to be [Page 751] raised during the visit, review the approach I plan to take, and request your guidance.
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Yugoslavia.]
Yugoslavia. I believe the Yugoslavs are looking forward to this visit because of the early restoration of high-level US-Yugoslav contacts it will bring. My primary objective in Yugoslavia will be to convince President Tito and leading members of his government of your support for Yugoslavia’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.2 I will state that the US respects Yugoslavia’s place in the non-aligned movement. At the same time, we believe Yugoslavia must respect our interests in multilateral as well as bilateral relations if our relationship is to prosper.
By the time of my visit, we hope to have negotiated a satisfactory solution to the most contentious issue in our bilateral relations—that of the impasse of an export license for the Westinghouse-supplied nuclear reactor destined for Yugoslavia. We hope the Yugoslavs will give us the assurances we require on reprocessing and disposition of fuel. I will state that we will want to assure dependable supplies of fuel and equipment while taking necessary steps to avoid nuclear weapons proliferation, and I will confirm that Yugoslavia will be welcome to join the nuclear fuel cycle evaluation effort.3
The Yugoslavs have indicated their belief that we are not forceful enough in prosecuting Yugoslav emigre terrorists. Prior to my departure, I will discuss this issue with Attorney General Bell so as to be able to assure Tito that we are determined to prevent and punish terrorists; that we are giving high priority to the bombing of Yugoslavia’s Embassy last June4 and that we will vigorously prosecute those [Page 752] who have committed terrorist activities. In this connection, I will note with satisfaction that the TWA hijacking case has been successfully prosecuted.5
Prior to my arrival in Belgrade, Admiral Holloway will have just concluded a visit to Yugoslavia for talks in the framework of our limited military cooperation and exchanges with the Yugoslavs.6 While stating your priority policy of reducing the level of international arms sales, I will inform the Yugoslavs that we are prepared to continue US-Yugoslav military exchanges and consultations, and to consider some of Yugoslavia’s proposals for military equipment purchases.
Of importance, the visit to Belgrade should give me the opportunity to talk to some of the government’s upcoming leaders, people we can expect to have increased dealings with in coming years.
I will plan to focus my discussions on international issues on the Belgrade CSCE meeting, the Middle East, and our African policy. I believe that if I am candid with Tito about the nature of my talks with Vorster,7 this may well produce a positive ripple effect in terms of Yugoslav consultations with other members of the non-aligned movement on our African policy.8 With your agreement I will base the agenda for my talks with Tito on the issues outlined above.9
I am attaching at Tab A proposed letters for your signature to President Eanes, King Juan Carlos, Chancellor Kreisky, Prime Minister Vorster and President Tito. With your approval I will plan to present the letters during my talks with each of these leaders.10
- Source: Carter Library, Donated Material, Papers of Walter F. Mondale, Overseas Assignments Trip Files, 1977–1980, Box 12, Vice President’s Trip to Portugal, Spain, Austria, Yugoslavia, and England: Objectives, 5/4–10/1977. Secret. Carter wrote at the top of the memorandum: “Fritz—Read notes. J.C.” Tabs A–E are attached but not printed.↩
- On October 16, 1976, during a campaign press conference in Kansas City, Missouri, then Governor Carter stated that he would not go to war in Yugoslavia even if the Soviet Union was to invade that country. While his statements did not generate much attention at the time, he was asked about them during the October 22 Presidential Debate. Carter defended his assertion, suggesting that he would not go to war unless U.S. security was directly threatened. The statement became a campaign issue, even eliciting the first appearance of Ford’s Secretary of State Henry Kissinger on CBS’s “Face the Nation” program on October 24, where Kissinger compared Carter’s remarks with those of Dean Acheson’s remarks about South Korea just prior to the North Korean invasion in 1950. (Don Oberdorfer, “Kissinger Assails Carter on Yugoslavia Statements,” The Washington Post, October 25, 1976, p. A6)↩
- Carter wrote in the margin below this paragraph: “Let Tito know ours is a multinational concern—we are not singling out Yugoslavia for special stringency.”↩
- The Yugoslav Embassy in Washington was bombed the night of June 9, 1976. The Washington Post reported on June 10 that an anonymous caller claimed responsibility for the attack in the name of the Pan-Epirotic Federation of America and Canada, stressing however that the bombing was not sanctioned. The organization, the Post reported, denied any involvement. (Douglas Feaver, “Yugoslavs Protest Embassy Bombing,” The Washington Post, June 10, 1976, p. C10)↩
- On September 10, 1976, Croatian nationalists hijacked a TWA flight from New York to Chicago and diverted it to Paris. The hijackers released the hostages on September 12, after discussions in Paris with U.S. officials. (“TWA Hijackers Allow Hostages to Leave Plane,” The Washington Post, September 12, 1976, p. A1) On May 5, four of the hijackers were found guilty of air piracy and conspiracy. (“Croat Nationalists Guilty in Hijacking,” Chicago Tribune, May 6, 1977, p. 7)↩
- Admiral James Holloway, Chief of Naval Operations, visited Yugoslavia May 14–16 for discussions with Yugoslav military leaders. In telegram 4634 from Athens, May 18, Holloway described his visit to Yugoslavia as “warm and cordial,” marked by consistent expressions by the Yugoslav military leadership of their desire for closer relations with the United States. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770176–0808)↩
- Mondale met with South African Prime Minister Balthazar Johannes “John” Vorster in Vienna May 19–20 for talks on Rhodesia.↩
- Carter wrote in the margin of this paragraph: “OK—I don’t know whether Tito is a racist—He may be.”↩
- Carter approved the recommendation.↩
- Carter approved the recommendation.↩