Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XX, Eastern Europe

245. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Belgrade, October 13–14, 1977

SUBJECT

• Secretary Brown’s Meetings in Limited Sessions with Yugoslav Federal Secretary of National Defense Ljubicic

PARTICIPANTS

• Yugoslavia

  • Federal Secretary of National Defense, General of the Army Ljubicic
  • Chief of the General Staff, Colonel General Potocar
  • Assistant Chief of the General Staff for Operations, Colonel General Radakovic
  • Lieutenant Colonel General Stojicic
  • Colonel Grkovic

• US

  • The Secretary
  • US Ambassador to Yugoslavia Eagleburger
  • ASD/ISA, Mr. McGiffert
  • Army Attache, Embassy Belgrade, Colonel Bartos (notetaker)

FIRST LIMITED MEETING

This initial private meeting at 0940 on 13 October immediately preceded the first plenary session.² The purpose of this meeting, limited to the principals and a few of their assistants, was to permit a free discussion of broad strategic issues and to provide General Ljubicic with an opportunity, if he chose, to be very candid with the Secretary.

General Ljubicic opened the meeting by stressing the significance the Yugoslav Government attaches to the visit of such an important individual as Secretary Brown to Yugoslavia; that he has expectations of the relationship between the two countries expanding. However, he pointed out that cooperation of one power does not exclude cooperation with another power and that such cooperation should not be directed against another power. He then continued into the standard explanation of the Yugoslav nonalignment policy. Secretary Brown replied that his influence in the USG should not be overestimated. Brown pointed out that the US military relationship was part of a general relationship which had as its objective the support of Yugoslav independence. Brown hoped that his presence in Belgrade would be the beginning of an increased military relationship. Brown invited Ljubicic to the US for a reciprocal visit. Ljubicic quickly accepted the invitation.

After stating that the time for the Ljubicic visit would be worked out, Brown pointed out that US-Yugoslav military arms negotiations have had difficulties in the past primarily because of trying to determine what procedures should be followed. Brown said that sometimes the US has had a long list of Yugoslav requests to which it has not responded promptly. However, when the US responded positively, the US has not heard from the Yugoslavs. Brown said that the US should respond “Yes” or “No” to the Yugoslav requests promptly, but when the US responds “Yes” to the Yugoslav requests, the Yugoslavs should buy. Brown emphasized the point by stating, “If you don’t want to buy, don’t ask us to sell. In return, the US will not take too much time coming up with an answer.”

Brown then turned to the subject of Yugoslav tank transfers to Ethiopia. He said that he was referring to this subject to put it behind both countries; that by law the Congress had to be notified; that every effort was made not to embarrass the Yugoslav Government in public; that the issue is closed. Ljubicic responded that the tank issue was unpleasant; that it was a Yugoslav mistake in administration; that he was glad that the tank difficulty had been overcome; that the tank issue should not affect other arms negotiations; that it was a one-time failure in thirty years. Ljubicic, however, defended the Yugoslav action as follows: He said that the tanks were ready for scrap; that the US officials were advised of this, but the GOY received no answer nor did the USG express any interest. He repeated that the Yugoslavs made a mistake on the issue and that he was not trying to justify the mistake. He pointed out, however, that when the Yugoslavs provided tanks to Ethiopia, Soviet military instructors were not in Ethiopia but only in Somalia; that at that time the Ethiopians were more involved with nonaligned countries and less with the Soviet Union. Now there are Russian tanks and Russian military instructors in Ethiopia; the country is more under Russian control. Brown interjected that the problem was solved.

At this point Ljubicic said that arms negotiations procedures could be worked out and asked Brown about SALT II. He wanted to know where the US is in SALT and where it expects to go. Brown replied that in SALT II the US was interested in reduction of the strategic forces on each side, in reducing the rate of new weapon deployment and development in equality and stability to preclude either side from being tempted to launch an attack, in precluding either side from developing systems aimed at the vulnerabilities of the other side. Brown said that this last point was probably the most difficult. Also, he pointed out that the problem of that which each side defines as a strategic system and counts in the strategic aggregate continues to complicate the negotiations. Brown said that the US is concerned over the rapid build-up of Soviet ICBM’s with MIRV’s. As a result of this Soviet build-up, the US sees US ICBM’s becoming vulnerable as Soviet ICBM numbers and accuracy increase. Brown said that the US has strategic bombers that can takeoff before the Soviet missiles land, and the US also has SLBM’s which are not vulnerable. Despite this he still considered the Soviet ICBM build-up as destabilizing. Brown said that he wonders as he views the building of new Soviet ICBM’s and the enlargement of air defense and civil defense systems whether the Soviets really plan to survive a thermonuclear war. He said he viewed such an idea as unrealistic, but if the Soviets believe they can, then it is a very dangerous situation. Brown said that from the US side, the main impediment to an agreement stems from the inability to establish agreeable limits on the Soviet buildup of ICBM number and capability and the inclusion of Soviet Backfire bombers which the US believes to be strategic because they can reach the US. The Soviet side contends the Backfire is not strategic and does not want to include it in the strategic aggregate. From the Soviet viewpoint, US cruise missiles present a serious impediment to an agreement.

Brown then proceeded to outline the cruise missile issue. He said that there were two general kinds of cruise missiles: those launched from an aircraft and those which are land-based or sea-based. He said that the air-launched cruise missile was needed to penetrate Soviet air defense. He said that, if air defenses are formidable, air-launched cruise missiles are needed to penetrate them, since it is difficult for a bomber to do so. Turning to the sea-based or land-based cruise missile, Brown said that these systems present a political-military problem because they might be based in or near Europe. The issue of the sea-based and land-based cruise missiles is further complicated by the fact that the Soviets have deployed SS–20 MRBM’s with MIRV’s opposite NATO countries. The Soviet Union does not consider this system strategic because it does not have enough range to reach the US and, therefore, believes it should not be limited in SALT; Brown then pointed out the inconsistency of Soviet arguments when attempting to limit US land-based and sea-based cruise missiles and at the same time deploying the SS–20 MRBM’s.

Brown indicated that the US and the Soviets were close to a SALT II agreement; however, in this agreement, the resolution of some issues would be postponed. Brown said at Vladivostok a strategic aggregate of 2400 was agreed upon, but now both sides have reduced their number and are negotiating at between 2160–2250. Brown emphasized that this is not a concession because the agreed number would be equal for both sides.

Brown mentioned other proposals under negotiation: (1) 1200–1250 ICBM/SCBM MIRV’s with a sub-limit of 800–850 land-based ICBM’s with MIRV’s. (2) The agreement would extend until 1985. (3) There would be a limit on the deployment of sea-based and land-based cruise missiles beyond 600 kms. All tests beyond 600 kms would be air-launched. (4) The limit on air-launched cruise missiles would be 2500 kms, but this would be for a three-year period. (5) The limits on the mobile missiles would apply to deploying and testing the missile but not to testing the launchers. (6) Some sort of assurance of limitation on Backfire bombers, possibly involving production rate, refueling and training. Ljubicic asked a question to clarify the 2500 kms limit. Brown said that it would apply for three years to air-launched cruise missiles. Ljubicic was satisfied with the explanation. Brown, continuing to comment on SALT, said that the bombers and cruise missiles are less destabilizing than ICBM’s as it takes longer for them to get on target; i.e., about eight hours. Ljubicic commented that SALT II agreement appears to protect the interests of the Soviet Union and the US; for example, a 600 kms cruise missile from [less than 1 line not declassified] would be militarily significant to Yugoslavia, so from the Yugoslav standpoint there would be no difference in the 2500 or 600 kms limits. Brown said that the 600 kms and the 2500 kms cruise missile limits make a difference to the Soviet Union.

Ljubicic then asked if there was an attempt to reduce the stock of [less than 1 line not declassified]. Brown replied that this issue is not included in SALT and explained the omission of forward-based systems as nonstrategic systems in SALT. Brown cited Soviet SS–4, SS–5, and SS–20 missile systems and US aircraft that are forward-based as excluded in all negotiations. He said that such systems could be included in a separate forum or a SALT III agreement. Ljubicic told Brown that he did not ask about systems that threaten Russia, but that he is talking about stocks of nuclear weapons that threaten Yugoslavia. He said that he would like to see detente enlarged to all countries, to make the world more secure. Brown said that he understood.

Ljubicic then asked Brown if he thought Yugoslavia could produce a 300 kms cruise missile. Brown said it could be produced in the future easily. Ljubicic (jokingly ?) asked Brown if he would provide assistance to produce such a weapon. Brown said “No.” Then Brown said that it is still not clear whether a cruise missile is a good means to deliver a nuclear weapon. Ljubicic said that he was against a monopoly of any kind. Brown retorted that proliferation is worse.

Ljubicic asked what Brown could tell him about the neutron bomb. He said that SALT as it concerns Yugoslavia is a ratio or balance between big powers; that it is concerned with strategic weapons systems and does not contribute to general disarmament in the conventional sphere; that new conventional armament is taking place: new Soviet bombers, tanks, satellite bombs, meteorological warfare. It was in this context that Ljubicic asked about neutron bombs. Brown replied that some of the things that Ljubicic mentioned are ideas and some are more than ideas. Brown said he thought that nuclear weapons should be limited at as low a level as possible but that this level must be balanced. He added that the US can compete in all areas; that the Soviets have concluded that they can compete better in military areas and the US, therefore, must be prepared to respond to this Soviet emphasis by taking appropriate action. Ljubicic said that, when Tito talked to Brezhnev, Tito concluded that Brezhnev was genuinely interested in detente. Brown then went through an explanation of the effects of neutron bombs. He talked about how the blast effect is reduced and how the radiation is increased, making a comparison with an ordinary nuclear weapon. He pointed out that the bombs were designed mainly for use against large tank columns; that the use of such bombs would force tank columns to disperse, thus reducing the effectiveness of large tank formations. Brown said that such weapons would not reduce the threshold of nuclear war and would not be used unless there was an invasion. He emphasized US political control and the impact of the weapon on the prevention of war. Ljubicic agreed that he saw the military justification for such a weapon, but added that if war started such a weapon could be used on small countries. He recalled a conversation of the subject of neutron bombs with the Soviet Minister of Defense, Ustinov, who said that now that the Americans were developing such a weapon system, Ustinov would have to assure development of such a weapon for the Soviet Union. Brown said that use of tactical nuclear weapons is a political question. Each country has to decide for itself whether such weapons increase or decrease the chances of nuclear warfare.

Brown said that because of the sensitivity of the Yugoslav-US relations, the demands of the Western press, and presence of many reporters in the city covering CSCE he planned to provide background information to the reporters at a press conference in order to make sure that the inevitable news stories were accurate. Ljubicic agreed. After an exchange of pleasantries, the meeting broke up.

SECOND LIMITED MEETING

The second private meeting between SecDef and General Ljubicic took place at 0840, 14 October in the Defense Secretariat.³

SecDef began by explaining that he requested the meeting after Mr. Bernardic expressed to Ambassador Eagleburger the concern of the Yugoslavs over the results of the first plenary session. SecDef did not want such issues to remain unanswered, nor that the US side be misunderstood. He stressed that he viewed his visit as the beginning of a process and did not plan to reach final agreements during the visit. He repeated his exposition of the previous day concerning the recent decision by President Carter to increase military sales to Yugoslavia of defensive weapons but not to transfer sensitive technology. This decision was taken concurrently with the President’s decision to reduce arms sales worldwide, and the significance of these two decisions should not be overlooked. He explained that the purpose of this visit was to describe the new Presidential decision and to begin the process of putting it into effect. It will be a lengthy process requiring more meetings, probably at a lower level. The Secretary said that he hoped to see General Ljubicic in the United States when such a trip would be convenient.

Brown said that further staff meetings will be necessary and the specifics of individual weapons will result from such meetings. That will take time. Concerning the new procedures, there must be full understanding on both sides in order to overcome past problems. We must understand Yugoslav needs for equipment in order for US to meet the needs. The Secretary explained that the Yugoslav Embassy in Washington will still play an important role. Many past problems resulted from absence of a single US point of interest. The various agencies involved—American contractors, American military services, our Defense Security Assistance Agency, the Embassy in Belgrade—do not always know what the others are doing. He suggested that we should initiate the new process by sending an expert from Washington who is thoroughly familiar with our procedures to advise our Embassy and Yugoslav officials and, if the Yugoslavs wished, the Yugoslav defense attache in Washington, Col Vuckovic, could accompany the experts to help get the new process underway.

The Secretary said that when General Cemalovic⁴ meets with General Fish ⁵ in Washington on 17 October, we will discuss various candidate systems in which General Cemalovic expressed interest—air defense systems, air-ground anti-tank weapons, and other Air Force systems. General Ljubicic interjected that the aircraft engine would also probably be discussed, to which Secretary Brown agreed.

The Secretary said that certain weapons are consistent with Yugoslav interests and with our new arms transfer policy concerning sensitive technology. He pointed out examples, specifically Harpoon, in which the US said “No” not only to Yugoslavia but also to others who were either friendly but not Allies, or were Allies, and cited Kuwait, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, the Philippines, and the Republic of China. He said that we want to be clear that we are not singling out Yugoslavia for negative treatment.

Secretary Brown said that the definition of sensitive technology depends upon time. In some cases our policy prevents transfer now. In those cases, SecDef proposed that we would first discuss Yugoslav needs and when those needs must be filled, and then discuss alternatives, since some alternatives may not be sensitive enough to prevent their future release.

The Secretary assessed overall US-Yugoslav relations as improving in economic, political, cultural, and in military areas since the Mondale visit. He described the purpose of his visit as beginning and advancing the consultation process in order to advance military relations as progress is made in other areas. He completed his statement by expressing the hope that he has cleared up any misunderstandings, but noting that the US is still unable to transfer all systems desired by the Yugoslavs. General Ljubicic thanked SecDef for his information. He recognized the impossibility of much progress in an initial meeting. He stated that if the US offered many things now, Yugoslavia probably could not absorb them all. However, he considered that the list could contain more equipment that it did. General Ljubicic stated that the Yugoslavs understand US regulations and our organization and will try to adapt to us. He continued that one responsible for the Defense of his country must consider why it is impossible to acquire necessary equipment. Certain time is required, and patience will be required. He acknowledged that more was expected than was offered, but that this fact in no way decreases the significance of Secretary Brown’s visit. It opened the door and more will come later. The Secretary agreed and responded that we should move forward now and try to resolve problems which exist.

General Ljubicic stated that regarding procedures, the American expert can come. He added that Yugoslavia does not want to create problems with the administration and Congress, and that there are people who oppose cooperation with Yugoslavia. SecDef concluded the meeting with the observation that the modest expansion of military relations and arms transfers will be generally popular and approved by the American people and Congress.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR, and East/West, Larrabee Subject File, Box 68, Yugoslavia: Military: 11/77–12/78. Secret. Drafted by Commander Eric A. McVadon on November 3; approved by David E. McGiffert on November 16. The meeting took place at the Federal Secretariat of National Defense.
2. A memorandum of conversation of the first plenary session, which consisted of a general presentation of U.S. policy on arms transfers to Yugoslavia, is ibid. Following his meeting with Ljubicic, Brown met with Yugoslav Vice President of the Presidency Stefan Doronjoski. (Ibid.)
3. The second plenary session, which followed the unscheduled private meeting on October 14, consisted of a Yugoslav presentation of military cooperation with the United States and Yugoslav expectations. (Ibid.)
4. Colonel General Enver Cemalovic was commander of the Yugoslav Air Force and Air Defense Forces.
5. Lieutenant General Howard M. Fish was Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) for Security Assistance and Director of the Defense Security Assistance Agency until March 1978.