241. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Duncan) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1
SUBJECT
- Military Sales to Yugoslavia (U)
(S) I have reviewed, as have Secretary Brown and General Brown, the interagency study of US Arms Transfers to Yugoslavia.2 We have concluded that a policy of moderate expansion of US arms sales to Yugoslavia, generally as described by Option III of the study, best satisfies US and Yugoslav interests. A policy based on Option II would serve these interests less satisfactorily. The choice of either Option I or Option IV, as stated in the study, currently is not warranted.
(S) US interests in Yugoslavia are centered on preserving its independence and territorial integrity and fostering its professed role as a nonaligned nation. The possibility of Tito’s death in the near future makes the risks to US interests more imminent. An expanded US-Yugoslav arms sales relationship will assure the Yugoslavs of US support and enhance the position of those Yugoslavs who wish to look to the West for support against Soviet pressures. US sales diminish to some degree the heavy Yugoslav dependence on the Soviet Union for military equipment, and they develop a framework which would be the basis for greatly expanded support should we choose to respond to a Yugoslav request for major assistance.
(S) In addition to the factors noted in the study we must assure ourselves that the Yugoslavs will not make unauthorized transfers of US equipment and that Yugoslavia will assume a truly nonaligned role. The manner in which our policy is carried out should make clear its connections with these factors.
(S) Implementation of an increased military sales program should give proper consideration not only to the expansion of the relationship but also to the constraints which exist. Specific US transfer actions would of course require evaluation on a case-by-case basis in consideration of the guidelines of PD–13, the security and proper use of US equipment, and US force requirements. In general, materiel should come from excess stocks or from production, utilizing existing lead-[Page 770]times so as not to interfere with US force requirements. Yugoslav limitations are also significant. Although we do not understand fully their failure to purchase many items which have been offered, it is clear that they have severe budgetary and political constraints and a measure of unsureness as to their needs and how best to meet them. These factors are likely to persist regardless of changes in US policy, and they will play significant roles in governing the rate and direction of expansion of sales. We must not outdistance the Yugoslavs in our efforts to expand the relationship.
(S) A US policy based on Option III is appropriate for Yugoslavia’s present domestic and international political situation. It is also the policy likely to best serve US interests in post-Tito Yugoslavia. This policy can be carried out in ways which avoid excessive Soviet reactions. Yet it also increases the credibility of Yugoslav deterrence. This can be accomplished by demonstrating US and general international interest in Yugoslav independence and by providing a measure of increased military capability, both of which will heighten Soviet reluctance to risk an embarrassing, prolonged and costly military intervention in Yugoslavia.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 56, Yugoslavia: 1977. Secret.↩
- See footnote 3, Document 240.↩