Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XX, Eastern Europe

240. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, August 31, 1977

SUBJECT

• Military Sales to Yugoslavia

As requested in NSC memorandum 5468 of August 23,² the State Department has reviewed the interagency study on this subject.³ Provided that the outcome of the September mission to Belgrade⁴ is satisfactory and that we receive necessary assurances concerning unauthorized retransfers of US-origin equipment, the State Department recommends that a refined version of Option III (Expand the relationship moderately, with an emphasis on political impact) set the general direction of future US policy.

We should signal to the Yugoslavs our interest in improving and modestly expanding the current arms transfer relationship. Any such forthcoming message, however, should (a) not raise false Yugoslav expectations, especially with regard to the level of technology we will transfer; (b) not impose a significant political cost on the US if the Yugoslavs are unresponsive; and (c) not put the US in the position of pressing arms on an uninterested recipient.

Accordingly, the Yugoslavs should be informed in substance that:

—we want to contribute to the security of an independent and non-aligned Yugoslavia;

—the maintenance and improvement of the arms transfer relationship, in our view, would contribute to that objective;

—nevertheless, both sides must recognize that there are limits on the amount and kinds of arms which can be transferred. These constraints include:

—a shared reluctance to undertake USG financing;

—limits on the level of technology which can be transferred;

—shared interest in not jeopardizing broader political relations (i.e., US-Soviet and Yugoslav-Soviet relations);

—need to assure that the systems are defensive and could not threaten our security nor that of our friends and allies.

These constraints, which would include a ban on the transfer of offensive air and naval systems, will limit the arms transfer relationship with Yugoslavia. They are consistent with the PD–13 guidelines.⁵

Limited procedural improvements also should be proposed. For example, we could designate Ambassador Eagleburger as the focal point for US action on arms transfer requests and invite the Yugoslavs to name a counterpart in Belgrade. If the Yugoslavs demonstrate a strong preference for having such exchanges in Washington, similar arrangements could be made between the State Department and their embassy. A formal consultative mechanism, however, should not be offered.

Since our purposes are primarily political, the State Department should have the lead in determining the timing of this initiative, as well as that of responses to specific Yugoslav arms requests.

The State Department also recommends that it be asked to conduct an interagency study to develop specific guidelines to facilitate our responses to subsequent Yugoslav requests.

Peter Tarnoff

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 56, Yugoslavia: 1977. Secret; Sensitive
2. On August 23, the White House tasked the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Central Intelligence Agency to review an interagency study on U.S. options for arms transfers to Yugoslavia. The memorandum requested that substantive comments on “major problems or necessary additions” as well as a clear indication of which option the agencies favor be forwarded to the White House by August 31. (Ibid.) On August 30, ACDA notified the White House that it supported either option II or III of the interagency study. On September 1, the CIA responded that it had no substantive comments on the paper. In telegram 5865 from Belgrade, August 30, the Embassy reported its own strong support for option III. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770313–0596) The Department of Defense response is Document 241.
3. Following Admiral Holloway and Vice President Mondale’s visits to Yugoslavia, Brzezinski requested a interagency memorandum to review U.S. options on military sales to Yugoslavia based on Yugoslav requests. The full study, forwarded by the Department of State to the White House on August 19, discussed four possible alternatives: “1. Curtail the Relationship; 2. Maintain the Status Quo; 3. Expand the Relationship Moderately with emphasis on political impact; and 4. Expand the Relationship Substantially, with emphasis on force modernization and improvement.” The study concluded that options 2 and 3 most closely matched U.S. interests, and that option 3 would “be an unmistakably favorable indication to the Yugoslavs about U.S. intentions.” While option 4 “is most consistent with the U.S. strategic interest in maintaining Yugoslavia’s ability to protect its independence,” it “could add stress to U.S.-Soviet relations” and “would tend to commit us to supporting the Yugoslavs in the event of conflict.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 56, Yugoslavia: 1977)
4. A U.S. team met September 14–15 in Belgrade with Yugoslav officials to discuss the uses and disposition of MAP military equipment previously provided to Yugoslavia. The Embassy reported in telegram 6256 from Belgrade, September 17, that “our objectives and concerns have been met.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770339–0574)
5. Presidential Directive 13, signed by President Carter on May 13, 1977, limited the sale and transfers of conventional weapons to cases that are deemed clearly in the national interest of the United States.