Brazil


113. Telegram 115636 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Brazil

Summary: Kissinger and Silveira discussed trade and energy issues, Cuba, Portugal, and the election of an OAS Secretary General.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files, Box 2, Brazil—State Department Telegrams from Secstate, Nodis. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Zimmermann, cleared by Ryan, approved by Rogers. On April 14, the preparatory conference for the oil producer-consumer conference stalemated over what issues should be emphasized. Some nations wanted to focus on energy-related issues, while others demanded that the conference address broader economic issues. Agreeing that the conference should center on energy-related issues, Kissinger and Silveira exchanged views on April 14 and 15. (Telegram 85460 to Brasília, April 15; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750131–0405) In telegram 2884 from Brasília, April 16, the Embassy reported that Silveira did not think that the Kissinger-Silveira view would prevail. (Ibid., D750132–0672)


114. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford

Summary: Kissinger advised Ford to sign a Presidential Determination allowing Brazil to purchase Sidewinder missiles.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Latin American Affairs Staff Files, Box 1, Brazil, Political, Military, 2. Confidential. Sent for action. Scowcroft initialed the memorandum for Kissinger. Ford initialed the memorandum. Attached at Tab A is a signed determination from the President to the Secretary, May 22; attached at Tab B is a memorandum from Ingersoll to the President, including a Justification, April 16; and attached at Tab C is a memorandum from Lynn to the President, April 24. The attachments are not published. According to telegram 121642 to Brasília, May 23, the Presidential Determination authorizing the sale of Sidewinder missiles to Brazil was signed on May 22. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750182–0560)


115. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford

Summary: Kissinger advised Ford to request the Senate’s ratification of the Shrimp Agreement with Brazil, which would regulate the total number of ships (including U.S. ships) in an area of the ocean between the accepted 12-mile zone off the coast of Brazil and Brazil’s claim of a 200-mile zone.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Latin American Affairs Staff Files, Box 1, Brazil—Fisheries Problem. No classification marking. Sent for action. Published from an uninitialed copy. On June 10 Linder informed Kissinger that Ford had signed a message to the Senate requesting ratification of the agreement. (Ibid.) Attached but not published are Tab A, message to the Senate, May 22; Tab B, a memorandum from Ingersoll to Ford, May 3; and Tab C, the U.S.-Brazilian Shrimp Agreement of March 14. On July 21, the Assistant Director for Legislative Reference, James M. Frey, informed Ford of Enrolled Bill H.R. 5709, the Offshore Shrimp Fisheries Act Amendments of 1975, which would implement the March 14 agreement. (Ibid.) The Senate ratified the agreement on October 28. Linder informed Scowcroft on December 23 that Ford had signed the instrument of ratification of the agreement. (Ibid., Brazil—Economic, Social)


116. Telegram 146237 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Brazil

Summary: Kissinger informed Silveira that he understood Brazil’s need for nuclear energy and did not want Brazil’s agreement with the FRG to obtain nuclear materials to damage the overall relationship between the United States and Brazil. At the same time, the Secretary was concerned about the implications for nuclear proliferation of the Brazil-FRG agreement.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750217–0235. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Bonn, Vienna, and the Mission to the IAEA. Drafted by Rogers; cleared by Kahan, Ballantyne, Opplinger, Boright, Hoyle, Sonnenfeldt, and Kuchel; approved by Kissinger. The Crimmins-Silveira conversation is summarized in telegram 4875 from Brasília, June 18. (Ibid., D750211–0866) In telegram 138496 to Brasília, June 13, the Department reported on a discussion with Araujo Castro regarding Brazil’s negative reaction to the public debate over the Brazil-FRG nuclear agreement, which was criticized by U.S. officials. (Ibid., D750206–1167) The June 16 conversation between Kissinger and Genscher on the Brazil-FRG nuclear agreement is summarized in telegram 150292 to Brasília, June 25. (Ibid., D750221–0436) In Silveira’s response to Kissinger, June 29, he stated that there had “been a fair amount of misinformation as to the nature of the agreement and undue haste in the evaluation of the Brazilian purposes.” (Telegram 153500/Tosec 50022 to Kissinger, June 29; ibid., D750225–0453)


117. Telegram 5292 From the Embassy in Brazil to the Department of State

Summary: Crimmins informed the Department that the Brazil-FRG agreement on nuclear cooperation reflected Brazil’s desire for major power status. The Ambassador concluded that if Brazil became a nuclear power, it would strain its ties to the United States.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750224–0307. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Bonn, Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro, and São Paulo. The text of the Brazil-FRG agreement was sent to the Department in telegram 10706 from Bonn, July 2. (Ibid., D750230–0721) Angra I was a nuclear power plant near Rio de Janeiro constructed by Westinghouse.


118. Action Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Vest) to Secretary of State Kissinger

Summary: Vest argued that the U.S. Government should clarify to the Brazilians and West Germans its concern with the nuclear proliferation implications of the Brazil-FRG agreement.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P830113–0932. Secret; Exdis. Published from an uninitialed copy. Drafted by Nosenzo on July 7; cleared by Boright, Kratzer, Vine, and Rogers. Sent through Sonnenfeldt. Kissinger disapproved both recommendations, and a handwritten note indicates that he transmitted his decision in telegram Secto 6064, July 12. (Ibid., P840126–2194) Attached but not published is Genscher’s letter to Kissinger, June 25. Telegram 10706 from Bonn, July 1, is ibid., D750228–0240. Other attachments have not been found.


119. National Intelligence Estimate 93–1–75

Summary: The authors of the Estimate predicted that although the United States and Brazil would disagree over economic issues, the Brazilian Government would continue to desire close, cooperative bilateral relations.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council, Job 79R01012A: Box 500, Folder 3: (NIE 93–1–75), Outlook for Brazil, NIE 93–1–75, July 1975. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. According to a note on the cover sheet, the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Treasury, the NSA, and the Energy Research and Development Administration participated in the preparation of this Estimate. The Director of CIA submitted this Estimate with the concurrence of all members of the USIB except the representative of the FBI, who abstained on the grounds that it was outside his jurisdiction.


120. Telegram 6684 From the Embassy in Brazil to the Department of State

Summary: In a meeting at the Foreign Ministry, the Ambassador expressed his displeasure with a Brazilian decree that permitted retaliation against countries that put restrictions on exports from that country. He thought a follow-up letter from Kissinger to Silveira would prove productive.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750278–0345. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. The Simon-Simonsen letter is in telegram 177583 to Brasília, July 28. (Ibid., D750260–0313) In telegram 6498 from Brasília, July 5, the Embassy reported that Brazil intended to apply retaliatory measures against countries, including the United States, that discriminated against Brazilian exports. (Ibid., D750269–0284) In telegram 185309 to Brasília, August 6, the Department instructed the Ambassador to deliver a démarche to Silveira on the matter. (Ibid., D750270–0918)


121. Telegram 201480/Tosec 100086 From the Department of State to Secretary of State Kissinger

Summary: In a letter to Kissinger, Silveira discussed Cuba, détente, and trade policy.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Kissinger was in the Middle East from August 21 to 31, shuttling between Alexandria and Jerusalem. Repeated to Brasília and to Eleuthera for Rogers on August 25. Kissinger’s July 27 letter to Silveira was transmitted in telegram 177906 to Brasília, July 27. (Ibid.) In telegram 7462 from Brasília, August 27, the Embassy outlined topics for a response to Silveira’s letter, highlighting détente, North-South relations, trade relations, consultative mechanisms, and Cuba policy. (Ibid., D750296–0734)


122. Telegram Secto 10214 From Secretary of State Kissinger to the Embassy in Brazil

Summary: In a letter to Silveira, Kissinger discussed détente, sanctions on Cuba, and the dialogue among the nations of the hemisphere.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840099–1284. Confidential; Niact; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated Immediate to the Department.


123. Telegram 248481/Tosec 160048 From the Department of State to Secretary of State Kissinger

Summary: The Department transmitted a letter from Silveira in which he outlined for Kissinger his concept of the structure of a “special relationship” between Brazil and the United States.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750362–1106. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated Immediate to Brasília. Drafted by Eltz, cleared by Fishlow, approved by Zimmermann. Published from an unsigned copy. Kissinger was in Tokyo. Summaries of the September 22 and 27 Kissinger-Silveira conversations, in which they discussed bilateral and regional issues, are in telegrams 227373 to the Secretary’s Delegation in New York, September 24, and 235769 to Brasília, October 3. (Ibid., D750330–0181 and D750342–1215) Kissinger’s visit to Brazil was postponed until 1976. The June 1974 Kissinger-Silveira correspondence is referred to in the source note to Document 103. On October 15, Rogers outlined options for Kissinger regarding a bilateral mechanism with Brazil. (National Archives, RG 59, L/ARA Files, Country and General Files, 1965–1979: Lot 81D324, POL 1 BRAZIL, General Policy, 1975) On October 18, Barbian indicated Kissinger wanted “a more formal structure with at least semi-annual meetings.” (Telegram Secto 16021 from the Secretary’s Delegation in Tokyo, October 18; ibid.)


124. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rogers) to Secretary of State Kissinger

Summary: Rogers summarized Silveira’s vision of a consultative mechanism between the United States and Brazil, and he recommended that Kissinger inform Silveira of his support for the idea of setting up such a mechanism.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P830109–1749. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Eltz on December 23. Attached but not published are Tabs 1–3. Tab 1 is a December 23 draft of the letter transmitted in Document 125. Tab 2 is Silveira’s letter transmitted in Document 123. Kissinger and Silveira were in Paris from December 15–17 for a meeting of the CIEC. Although the Paris Kissinger-Silveira memorandum of conversation has not been found, Rogers briefed Kissinger on the topics that Silveira would probably raise: visits of dignitaries, a UN resolution on Zionism, Angola, the bilateral consultative mechanism, and economic issues. (Telegram 295457 to Brasília, December 17; ibid., D750439–0443) The U.S. Government requested that Brazil oppose a UN proposal to withdraw UN troops from South Korea. (Telegram 248497 to Brasília, October 19; ibid., D750363–0006) Brazil decided to abstain.


125. Telegram 2699 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Brazil

Summary: Kissinger informed Silveira that he agreed to setting up a consultative mechanism.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760004–0023. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Zimmermann; cleared by Fishlow, Ryan, Einaudi, and Rogers; approved by the Secretary. On February 3, Rogers sent a copy of a Memorandum of Understanding worked out between the Embassy and the Foreign Office which stipulated semi-annual meetings. Kissinger approved the Memorandum of Understanding on February 7. (Ibid., L/ARA Files, Country and General Files, 1965–1979: Lot 81D324, POL 1 BRAZIL, General Policy, 1975)


126. Telegram 672 From the Embassy in Brazil to the Department of State

Summary: Crimmins maintained that it was unlikely that direct U.S. Government assistance programs could be used to mitigate human rights abuses, but that regional assistance efforts could be effective.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760029–0551. Confidential. In an April 25, 1975, letter, Crimmins informed Velloso that the U.S. Government was phasing out its bilateral economic assistance program because of Brazil’s rapid economic progress, the redirection of U.S. assistance to relatively less developed nations, and increased U.S. reliance on multilateral channels. (Telegram 9891 from Brasília, November 14, 1975; ibid., D750397–0365)


127. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford

Summary: An interagency working group devised a process for negotiations with Brazil to prevent the spread of nuclear materials and technology. Low-key exploratory talks would be followed by full-scale negotiations if enough common ground existed.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Latin America, Box 2, Brazil (2). Secret. Sent for action. The President approved the recommendation. Attached but not published is Tab A, a February 17 memorandum from Scowcroft to Kissinger, Rumsfeld, Ilké, and Seamans, notifying them of the President’s decision.


128. Memorandum of Conversation

Summary: President Geisel and Secretary Kissinger discussed petroleum prices, a visit by Geisel to the United States, Brazil’s trade deficit with the United States, and Brazil’s 200-mile territorial sea claim.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P820117–0826. Secret; Nodis. The conversation was held in Planalto Palace. Drafted by Rogers on February 21 and approved in S on March 12. The February 21 Memorandum of Understanding, in which both nations pledged to hold consultations semi-annually, is in the Department of State Bulletin, March 15, 1976, pp. 337–338. In memoranda to Bentley, Woods directed that follow-up memoranda on trade issues, a visit by Geisel, and Brazil’s 200-mile territorial sea claim be written. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P820117–0832 and P820117–0833)


129. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford

Summary: Scowcroft transmitted to President Ford a report from Kissinger on his visit to Brazil.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 176, Geopolitical File, Latin America, Trips, February 1976, Trip Book, Folder 10. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Ford initialed the memorandum.


130. Telegram 1718 From the Embassy in Brazil to the Department of State

Summary: The Ambassador informed the Department that the U.S. military assistance program for Brazil was important for maintaining access to the military in Brazil, which would be the predominant group exercising political power in the near term.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760071–0513. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to JCS, OSD (IA/DSAA), SOUTHCOM, Rio de Janeiro for the Consulate and the Joint U.S.-Brazil Military Commission, and São Paulo. In telegram 36160 to multiple American Republic posts, February 13, the Department transmitted information on military assistance levels for FY 1977. (Ibid., D760056–1006)


131. Telegram 2212 From the Embassy in Brazil to the Department of State

Summary: Ambassador Crimmins reported on steps taken by the Embassy to impress upon Brazilian officials the U.S. Government’s concern regarding human rights abuses.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760095–0954. Confidential. In telegram 45319 to all diplomatic posts, February 25, the Department requested information and analysis regarding human rights abuses in countries receiving U.S. economic development or military assistance. (Ibid., D760071–0412) Airgram A–11, March 12, is ibid., P760041–0592.


132. Telegram 2584 From the Embassy in Brazil to the Department of State

Summary: Ambassador Crimmins reported that if the U.S. Government increased tariffs on imports of Brazilian shoes, it would undo a significant portion of the goodwill generated by Secretary Kissinger’s recent visit and Secretary Simon’s prospective visit.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760113–0692. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis.


133. Telegram 111035 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Brazil

Summary: In a letter to Silveira, Kissinger discussed the possibility of a waiver of a countervailing duty on Brazilian footwear and other trade issues.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760177–0409. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Shugart, cleared by Zimmermann and Rogers, approved by Kissinger. Repeated Immediate to São Paulo. In telegrams 79100 and 91811 to Brasília, April 2 and April 16, the Embassy transmitted messages from Silveira to Kissinger that informed Kissinger that increased tariffs on Brazilian footwear would damage bilateral relations. (Ibid., D760124–0101 and ibid., D760144–0506) On April 12, Seidman laid out the options for Ford with regard to import relief for the domestic footwear industry. (Ford Library, Papers of L. William Seidman, Box 1, Briefing Papers, April 1976, Duplicates, Classified) On April 16, Ford, in Economic Policy Decision Memorandum 8, decided not to provide import relief for the domestic footwear industry. (Ibid., Box 57, Executive Policy Board Subject Files, Policy Board Decision Memoranda)


134. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Simon to President Ford

Summary: Secretary Simon informed President Ford that the recently signed agreements with Brazilian leaders meant that relations between the two nations would improve.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box A3, Treasury Department, 5/24/76–10/27/76. Eyes Only. Ford initialed the memorandum.


135. Telegram 177779 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Brazil

Summary: Shlaudeman and Pinheiro discussed human rights and trade policy. Shlaudeman defended U.S. Government efforts to open up trade between the two countries.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760276–0761. Confidential. Drafted by Zimmermann and approved by Shlaudeman. Shlaudeman’s references to Ford’s “courageous decisions” on free trade and “favorable treatment” of Brazilian interests relate to the President’s decision to forego tariff increases on imports of footwear, referred to in the source note to Document 133. Senator Long’s June 17 letter to Ford requested protection from imports and subsidies for domestic sugar producers. In telegram 178637 to Brasília, July 19, Seidman informed Long that no protection or subsidies would be forthcoming. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760278–0378)


136. Telegram 183401 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Brazil

Summary: The Department informed the Embassy of Congress’s intent to phase out the military training program for Brazil.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760285–0077. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Eltz; cleared by Zimmermann, Winship, Black, Borek, Quigg, Ledogar, Johnson; approved by Luers. Repeated Immediate to Rio de Janeiro for the Consulate and for the Chairman of the U.S. Delegation to the Joint U.S.-Brazil Military Commission. In telegram 6085 from Brasília, July 12, Crimmins reported that terminating funding for military training would cause the Brazilian military to suspect that U.S. interest in Brazil was waning. (Ibid., D760268–0300) In telegram 6421 from Brasília, July 22, Crimmins reported that the Brazilian Government was unhappy with the impending termination of grant military training. (Ibid., D760282–0396) In telegrams 191824 and 243040 to Brasília, August 3 and September 30, the Department informed the Embassy that $100,000 had been granted to Brazil for training but that Congress explicitly directed that the funds were for phasing out the grant military training program. (Ibid., D760299–0692 and D760369–0291)


137. Telegram 8010 From the Embassy in Brazil to the Department of State

Summary: The Embassy recommended that an invitation for the head of the Brazilian Army Intelligence Center to visit the United States be deferred in light of concerns over human rights and Operation Condor.

Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Box 11, Brasília. Secret; Roger Channel. Telegram 209192 to Buenos Aires, Montevideo, Santiago, and La Paz, August 23, is Document 241.


138. Action Memorandum From the Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Wilson) and the Legal Adviser of the Department of State (Leigh) to Secretary of State Kissinger

Summary: Wilson and Leigh reviewed for Kissinger three options regarding the U.S. Government’s vote on an IDB loan for Brazil: voting against the loan, voting for it contingent on improvements in the human rights area, and voting for it without making any representations.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P760168–1248. Confidential. Sent through Robinson. Drafted by Hill and Shlaudeman on October 24. Swift, Boeker, and Austin concurred. A typewritten note at the bottom of the last page of the memorandum indicates that Robinson directed EB to vote yes on the loan and that he later instructed Wilson and Shlaudeman to “arrange a low-key approach to Brazilians,” which would note that the United States voted yes because of Brazilian progress in human rights and that U.S. cooperation would continue “as long as this progress is sustained.” Attached but not published is the Department’s undated Human Rights Report on Brazil.