Bolivia
59. Telegram 599 From the Embassy in Bolivia to the Department of State
Summary: Ambassador Siracusa argued that Bolivia was not a “police state” but had overreacted to the threat from the extreme left.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 29 BOL. Confidential. Repeated to Buenos Aires, Brasília, Asunción, Lima, Santiago, Rio de Janeiro, and USCINCSO for POLAD.
60. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon
Summary: Rogers recommended Nixon invite Banzer to Washington for a State visit.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 BOL. Confidential. A typewritten note attached to the memorandum reads, “Approved—see memo of 4/26 from Mrs. Davis. jlh.” The February 22 memorandum to the Department has not been found. In telegram 2063 from La Paz, April 11, Siracusa reported that he had informed Banzer that Nixon had approved the visit “in principle.” (Ibid.) In telegram 2708 from La Paz, May 7, Siracusa, on behalf of the President, extended an invitation to visit the United States. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 770, Country Files, Latin America, Bolivia, Vol. 2, 1971–1974)
61. Letter From Bolivian President Banzer to President Nixon
Summary: Banzer informed Nixon that he was disturbed by the announcement of the sale of U.S. reserves of strategic minerals, which, by depressing tin prices, would harm the Bolivian economy. Banzer noted that no amount of U.S. assistance could compensate for the lower tin prices.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 749, Presidential Correspondence, President Banzer, Bolivia, 1971–1974. No classification marking. The text is a translation prepared by Language Services; Banzer’s original letter in Spanish is ibid. On April 6, Banzer expressed similar concerns to U.S. officials in La Paz. (Telegram 1961 from La Paz; ibid., RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]) Nixon’s reply to Banzer’s letter is referenced in the source note to Document 63.
62. Country Analysis and Strategy Paper
Summary: Ambassador Siracusa provided an overview of U.S. interests in Bolivia, which included supporting the Bolivian military, providing economic assistance, and interdicting narcotics.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 BOL–US. Secret. Sent as an enclosure to airgram A–75 from La Paz, April 16. The final version of the CASP has not been found.
63. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon
Summary: Kissinger recommended that Nixon sign letters to Banzer and Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn of Thailand announcing stockpile disposal of 5,000 tons of tin during the first 6 months of FY 1974.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 749, Presidential Correspondence, President Banzer, Bolivia, 1971–1974. Confidential. A stamped note on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. Attached at Tab A is an undated draft of a letter from Nixon to Banzer, not published. The final version of the letter, dated June 4, is ibid. Tab C, Banzer’s April 13 letter to Nixon, is Document 61. Tabs B, D, and E are attached but not published.
64. Telegram 155286 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Bolivia
Summary: The Department sent the Embassy the text of a letter from Nixon to Banzer concerning consultations with tin-producing nations over increased stockpile sales.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Meyers (text received from the White House on August 6); cleared by Fisher in ARA/BC and by John Ingersoll in EB/ICD; approved by Katz. Repeated to London. Nixon’s June 4 letter is ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 749, Presidential Correspondence, President Banzer, Bolivia, 1971–1974. On September 7, the Department informed Bolivian Ambassador Valencia that the U.S. Government would begin sales on September 10. Valencia noted that the U.S. Government’s action seemed to reflect its sincere desire to avoid a deleterious impact on the economies of Bolivia and other tin-producing nations. (Telegram 179280 to La Paz, September 10; ibid., RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])
65. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Kubisch) to Acting Secretary of State Rush
Summary: Kubisch informed Acting Secretary Rush that Banzer’s decision to postpone his State visit indicated the seriousness of the economic and political instability in Bolivia. Kubisch reported that the unwillingness of the U.S. Government to offer assistance for budget support likely contributed to Banzer’s decision.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 BOL. Confidential. Drafted by Binns on October 3. Karkashian and Shlaudeman concurred. Attached is telegram 6010 from La Paz, October 2, not published. On October 9, Pickering forwarded to Scowcroft a copy of Banzer’s October 3 letter to Nixon apologizing for the postponement and a suggested reply. (Ibid., Central Foreign Policy File, P750018–0349) In telegram 6283 from La Paz, October 16, Stedman informed the Department that he thought Banzer postponed so that he could hold negotiations with international and Bolivian officials regarding austerity measures. (Ibid., P750018–0343) Banzer’s trip was not rescheduled.
66. Telegram 900 From the Embassy in Bolivia to the Department of State
Summary: Because military assistance gave him an important source of leverage in his management of bilateral relations, Ambassador Stedman urged that the Department refrain from cutting aid to the Bolivian armed forces.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]. Confidential. Repeated to USCINCSO. In telegram 23517 to all American Republic diplomatic posts, February 5, the Department listed the levels of military assistance allocated for Latin American countries in FY 1974. (Ibid., [no film number]) The Department, citing “world-wide reductions and high priority requirements in Cambodia and the Middle East,” denied Stedman’s request to maintain the level of military assistance at $3.5 million. (Telegram 39843 to La Paz, February 28; ibid., P750001–0806)
67. Telegram 2581 From the Embassy in Bolivia to the Department of State
Summary: President Banzer, Country Director Karkashian, and Ambassador Stedman discussed economic and military assistance to Bolivia.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D740096–0755. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to USCINCSO. Nixon’s letter to Banzer has not been found. The Departments of State and Defense allocated the $4 million FMS credit on April 12, and Banzer accepted the terms on April 24. (Telegram 2604 from La Paz, April 24; ibid., D740096–1013) According to telegram 3098 from La Paz, May 14, Banzer expressed pleasure to Stedman on May 13 that the U.S. Government had begun shipping the MAP equipment. Banzer also informed Stedman of Bolivia’s desire for continued economic development assistance. (Ibid., D740118–0978)
68. Telegram 4041 From the Embassy in Bolivia to the Department of State
Summary: Stedman and Banzer discussed the possibility of Bolivian purchases of arms from the Soviet Union. Banzer indicated that prompt deliveries of munitions from the United States would preclude Bolivia from purchasing Soviet weapons.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D740163–0507. Confidential; Exdis. “Carros de asalto” are armored assault vehicles. In telegram 4082 from La Paz, June 24, Stedman reported: “I concluded during our talk [on June 20] that without specific P&A [price and availability] data on a tank substitute such as an assault car, the pressure on US for equipment would increase if I applied more pressure on him not to accept matériel from the USSR.” (Ibid., D740165–0716) In telegram 142916 to La Paz, July 2, the Department informed Stedman it would send the P&A data as soon as possible. (Ibid., D740176–0364) In telegram 4746 from La Paz, July 23, Stedman again asked for the P&A data and for a $2.5–$4.0 million FMS credit for Bolivia for FY 1975 to purchase the vehicles. (Ibid., D740199–0668) In telegram 174463 to La Paz, August 9, the Department notified Stedman that it could not offer any direct FMS credits to Bolivia pending enactment of the 1975 Foreign Assistance Act. (Ibid., D740219–0870)
69. Telegram 5772 From the Embassy in Bolivia to the Department of State
Summary: Stedman conveyed Banzer’s request for a U.S. guarantee of Bolivian neutrality in the event of a war between Chile and Peru.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Latin America, Box 2, Bolivia, State Department Telegrams to SecState, Nodis. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated Immediate to Santiago, Brasília, and Lima. In telegrams 210975 to La Paz and 236927 to Santiago, September 25 and November 20, the Department refused to guarantee Bolivian neutrality but promised consultations if events warranted them. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D740269–0217 and D740306–0982) Telegram 7408 from La Paz, November 13, transmitted Banzer’s expression of appreciation for the offer of consultation. (Ibid., D740327–0422)
70. Telegram 10423 From the Embassy in Peru to the Department of State
Summary: Assistant Secretary Rogers and President Banzer met in Lima and discussed Bolivia’s access to the sea, arms limitation, and U.S. assistance.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D740359–1015 and D740359–0139. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to La Paz and Santiago. In telegram 10424 from Lima, December 11, the Embassy conveyed highlights of the Declaration of Ayacucho, which committed the eight signatories to create conditions to permit the limitation of armaments and to consider Bolivia’s land-locked situation. (Ibid., D740359–0142)
71. Paper Prepared in the National Security Council Interdepartmental Group for Inter-American Affairs
Summary: U.S. officials reassessed NSDM 160 and recommended that development assistance to Bolivia be allocated based on economic, as opposed to political, criteria.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–232, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 160. Confidential. Sent by Rogers to Scowcroft under a February 5, 1975, covering memorandum. NSDM 160 is Document 111 in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume E–10, Documents on American Republics, 1969–1972.
72. Telegram 1086 From the Embassy in Bolivia to the Department of State
Summary: Citing Bolivia’s cautious policy regarding purchases of military equipment and the importance of enhancing the efficiency and morale of the Bolivian military, Ambassador Stedman asked the Department for an increase in FMS allocations to Bolivia for FY 1975.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750052–1087. Confidential; Priority. On February 12, Bolivia’s Ambassador requested a $12 million FMS allocation for FY 1975. (Telegram 34359 to La Paz, February 14; ibid., D750054–0908) On March 10, the Department acknowledged the request but noted that the legislation appropriating FMS funds had not yet been enacted. (Telegram 53439 to La Paz, March 10; ibid., D750084–0437) In telegram 1720 from La Paz, March 11, Stedman urged the Department to notify Bolivia “that chances of acquiring FMS credits in the neighborhood of $12 million are quite small.” (Ibid., D750085–0419) According to telegram 60734 to La Paz, March 18, Karkashian met with the Bolivian Ambassador on March 17 to do so. (Ibid., D750094–0719)
73. Telegram 3254 From the Embassy in Bolivia to the Department of State
Summary: President Banzer, Minister of the Interior Pereda, and Ambassador Stedman discussed threats to Bolivia’s external and internal security.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750164–0238. Confidential. Repeated to Lima, Santiago, and USCINCSO. The May 8 conversation between Stedman and Banzer is reported in telegram 3201 from La Paz, May 8. (Ibid.) On May 7, the Bolivian Cabinet required Gulf Oil Company to state if it had passed bribes to Bolivian officials between 1966 and 1972, and it requested a U.S. Government investigation. (Telegram 3191 from La Paz, May 8; ibid., D750162–0178) The September 1974 Banzer-Rosson conversation is summarized in Document 69.
74. Telegram 133974 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Bolivia
Summary: The Department provided talking points for the Embassy to use in explaining FY 1975 FMS allocations for Bolivia.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750200–1009. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Williams; approved by Bloomfield, Weber, Weany, and Karkashian; and cleared by Ryan. In telegram 3718 from La Paz, May 31, Stedman requested “guidance as to how to answer any queries about $20.5 million [FMS] allocation to Peru in light [of] that country’s major arms build-up, relations with Chile, and sharp public differences with USG on several fronts, which have been well publicized here.” (Ibid., D750191–0451)
75. Telegram 170862 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Bolivia
Summary: Department and Bolivian officials discussed issues of continuing concern in U.S.-Bolivian relations, including Bolivia’s efforts to obtain an outlet to the sea, the Trade Act of 1974, the Gulf Oil Company scandal, and PL 480 assistance.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750250–0902. Confidential. Drafted by Pace; cleared by Fouts, Karkashian, and Polik; and approved by Ryan. On July 1, Foreign Minister Guzmán sent a diplomatic note to the Embassy requesting PL 480 assistance. (Telegram 4715 from La Paz, July 9; ibid., D750237–0789) In telegram 182625 to La Paz, August 1, the Department informed the Embassy that Bolivia would not be allocated PL 480 assistance in FY 1976. (Ibid., D750267–0999) No report by Karkashian on GSA sales and the stockpile legislation has been found.
76. Telegram 8135 From the Embassy in Bolivia to the Department of State
Summary: Ambassador Stedman requested $3.3 million in MAP funding for FY 1976 in order to ensure that the U.S. Government could meet its commitments to Bolivia.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750403–0198. Confidential. The CASP was transmitted as an enclosure to airgram A–58 from La Paz, April 9. (Ibid., D750064–2116) In telegram 272585 to La Paz, November 18, the Department informed Stedman that the Bolivian MAP program would be phased out in FY 1977. (Ibid., D75041–0441) In telegram 284501 to La Paz, December 3, the Department informed Stedman that it would “make all efforts to provide IG endorsed level of dols 3.3 million,” and that, “in the meantime, MILGP can continue to obligate funds under CRA up to dols 2.2 million level.” (Ibid., D750419–1118)
77. Telegram 27 From the Embassy in Bolivia to the Department of State
Summary: President Banzer informed Ambassador Stedman of Bolivia’s efforts to gain an outlet to the Pacific through negotiations with Chile. The Ambassador suggested to the Department that the matter presented the U.S. Government with an opportunity to contribute to the lowering of tensions in the region.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760001–0674. Confidential. Repeated to Lima and Santiago. Telegrams 10662 and 10681 from Lima, both December 30, 1975, are ibid., D750450–0326 and D750450–0592. Capriles’s démarche to Rogers in which he requested “U.S. sympathy and support” for a tentative agreement with Chile on Bolivian access to the Pacific is reported in telegram 301358, December 23, 1975. (Ibid., D750445–0598) On February 14, 1976, Banzer asked Stedman whether Kissinger could discuss Bolivia’s outlet to the Pacific with President Morales Bermúdez of Peru. (Telegram 1333 from La Paz, February 14; ibid., D760057–0659) In telegram 37667 to La Paz, February 16, the Department authorized Stedman to tell Banzer that the U.S. Government was following the matter with great interest. The Department also informed the Ambassador that Chilean Foreign Minister Carvajal and OAS Secretary General Orfila had advised against any U.S. initiative on the issue in talks with the Peruvian Government. (Ibid., D760058–0459)
78. Telegram 1481 From the Embassy in Bolivia to the Department of State
Summary: Stedman recommended an increase in MAP assistance for Bolivia.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750065–1102. Confidential. Repeated to the Secretary of Defense and USCINCSO. In telegrams 3280 and 3828 from La Paz, April 28 and May 18, Stedman repeated his request to retain the present structure of the miltary group in Bolivia. (Ibid., D760161–1044 and D760192–0568) In telegram 131681 to La Paz, May 28, the Department denied Stedman’s request. (Ibid., D760206–0969) In telegram 138216 to La Paz, June 5, the Department informed Stedman that because of a $6 million MAP–M ceiling, it had no choice but to cut Bolivia’s allocation. (Ibid., D760216–1036)
79. Memorandum of Conversation
Summary: Assistant Secretary Rogers, Ambassador Stedman, Secretary Kissinger, and President Banzer held a wide-ranging discussion of U.S.-Bolivian relations.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P820118–1270. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Einaudi on January 18, 1977, and approved in S on March 7, 1977. Brackets in the discussion are in the original. The meeting was held in President Banzer’s home. Kissinger visited Latin America from June 6 to June 13. In a May 26 memorandum, Rogers briefed Kissinger for his meeting with Banzer. (Ibid., ARA/AND Files, Records Relating to Bolivia, 1976–1978: Lot 78D46, POL 7, Kissinger Visit) In telegram 4516 from La Paz, June 9, the Embassy sent a summary of Banzer’s narcotics action plan to the Department. (Ibid., Central Foreign Policy File, D760221–0079) On June 17, Kissinger approved a request that he recommend Presidential approval for a $45 million coca substitution program in Bolivia. (Memorandum from Vance and Luers to Kissinger, June 11; ibid., P760117–1018)
80. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Lynn) and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford
Summary: Lynn and Scowcroft outlined the Department of State/Agency for International Development multiyear option and the OMB 1-year option for funding narcotics control in Bolivia. The National Security Council Staff recommended the State/AID proposal.
Source: Ford Library, President’s Handwriting File, Box 22, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Aid. Confidential. Sent for action. A stamped notation on the first page reads, “The President has seen.” On August 11, Harrison informed Scowcroft that this memorandum reflected Kissinger’s views. (Ibid., National Security Adviser, NSC Latin American Affairs Staff Files, Box 1, Bolivia, Economic, Social) Ford initialed his approval of Option I and his disapproval of Option II.
81. Telegram 207837 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Bolivia
Summary: The Department instructed the Embassy to deliver to the Bolivian Government an aide-mémoire outlining parallel U.S. and Bolivian anti-narcotics efforts.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760320–0389. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Nicholson; cleared by Parker, Harrison, Luers, Wampler, Heyman, and Lion and in draft by Pace, Eyre, Brown, and Cusack; approved by Vance. In telegram 6731 from La Paz, August 25, Stedman informed the Department that he thought the guidelines in the aide-mémoire to be overly rigid. (Ibid., D760325–0060) In telegram 212007 to La Paz, August 26, the Department disagreed, replying that the aide-mémoire represented a “balanced effort.” (Ibid., D760325–1024)
82. Telegram 9124 From the Embassy in Bolivia to the Department of State
Summary: In a conversation with Ambassador Stedman, Foreign Minister Oscar Adriazola complained that U.S. human rights policy restricted security assistance and made it difficult for Bolivia to fight communism.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760426–0101. Confidential. In telegram 231122 to all diplomatic and consular posts, September 17, the Department discussed “explicit congressional policy guidance on human rights matters [that] definitively links provision of security assistance to human rights observance.” (Ibid., D760353–0445) In telegram 45319 to all diplomatic posts, February 25, the Department explained the requirement that Embassies report on human rights policies. (Ibid., D760071–0412)