Summary: Nixon informed Médici he strongly opposed an effort by Venezuela and Ecuador to lift OAS sanctions on Cuba.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 772, Country Files, Latin America, Brazil, Vol. IV, 1973–1974. Top Secret; Exclusively Eyes Only. On April 18, Scowcroft informed Kissinger that Nixon had “reacted strongly to an item [text not declassified] regarding Venezuela’s and Ecuador’s efforts to remove OAS sanctions from Cuba. Scowcroft attached a copy of the item with Nixon’s handwritten note, “K[issinger]—inform State now—we are to vigorously oppose this move—get our position in the private channel to Médici.” (Ibid.)
84. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Walters) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
Summary: Médici informed Nixon that Brazil would publicly oppose an attempt to lift sanctions on Cuba.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 772, Country Files, Latin America, Brazil, Vol. IV, 1973–1974. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. On March 20, in a backchannel message, Nixon informed Médici that he appreciated Brazil’s opposition to lifting OAS sanctions on Cuba. (Ibid.)
Summary: The Department informed the Embassy that, given the rapid economic development of Brazil and con[Page 242]gressional hostility to indefinitely continuing assistance programs, bilateral assistance (with the exception of narcotics and family-planning assistance) would be phased out.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 BRAZ–US. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to Rio de Janeiro. Drafted by Lippincott, cleared by Low and Kleine, approved by Crimmins. The FY 1974–1975 CASP submission, February 17, is ibid. On May 10, the Embassy reported that it had “learned informally” that the IG was planning on phasing out U.S. Government economic assistance to Brazil and wanted confirmation from the Department. (Telegram 2757 from Brasília, ibid.) The final version of the CASP has not been found.
86. Memorandum From Richard T. Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
Summary: Kennedy recommended that Kissinger approve FMS credits in FY 1974–1975 for Brazil to purchase aircraft even though it would constrain future allocations of FMS credits.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 772, Country Files, Latin America, Brazil, Vol. 4, 1973–1974. Confidential. Sent for urgent action. Kissinger approved the recommendation. Kissinger wrote on the memorandum, “See me. HK.” Attached but not published are Tab A, a chart on FMS credits, undated, and Tab B, a memorandum to the Director of OMB from Tarr, May 1. On August 31, the Brazilian Air Ministry signed a contract with the Lockheed Corporation to purchase the C–130s, and the Ministry intended to sign a contract with the Northrop Corporation not later than September 7 to purchase the F–5s. (Memorandum from Peet to Schlesinger, September 4; ibid., RG 59, ARA/NSC–IG Files: Lot 75D224, DEF 12–5, Sale of F–5s, 1973)
Summary: Rogers and Gibson Barboza discussed a possible visit by President Nixon, economic matters, and a speech by Kissinger on a “New Atlantic Charter.”
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, ORG 7 S. Confidential. Repeated Priority to Brasília and Rio de Janeiro. Rogers visited Rio de Janeiro and Brasília May 19–22. In telegram 1734 from Kingston, May 27, the Embassy sent to the Department a memorandum of conversation of a separate Rogers-Gibson Barboza conversation on Law of the Sea. (Ibid.) Kissinger’s April 23 speech is printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXXVIII, Part 1, Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1973–1976, Document 8. In telegram 3014 from Brasília, May 19, the Embassy informed the Department that Gibson Barboza might raise the issues of collective economic security and the multilateral commercial negotiations of 1973, strengthening the UN and OAS, terrorism, and regional issues. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]) The 2-year U.S.-Brazil Shrimp Conservation Agreement was signed on May 9, 1972.
Summary: Rountree reported on Brazilian internal politics and the good prospects for sustained economic growth. The Ambassador added that while the United States and Brazil had failed to achieve consensus on international commodity agreements and the Law of the Sea, the Brazilian military’s decision to strengthen ties with the United States boded well for future relations.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL BRAZ–US. Confidential. Repeated to São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro.
Summary: Nixon asked Médici if Brazil would send peacekeeping troops to Vietnam as part of the International Commission of Control and Supervision.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 749, Presidential Correspondence, President of Brazil Emilio Garrastazu Médici. Secret. Kissinger sent the letter to Nixon on July 16, under cover of a memorandum in which he informed the President that a letter from him to Médici would greatly improve the prospects of a favorable Brazilian reply. Although the memorandum of conversation between Rogers and Médici has not been found, Rogers briefed Nixon on his May 23 conversation with Médici in a May 29 meeting. (Conversation Between President Nixon and Secretary Rogers, May 29; ibid., White House Tapes, Cabinet Room, Conversation No. 124–3) On July 24, Médici informed Nixon that because some of the members of the ICCS were not upholding its mission, and its members had been subjected to attacks, he declined the President’s offer. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 749, Presidential Correspondence, President of Brazil Emilio Garrastazu Médici)
90. Memorandum From William J. Jorden of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
Summary: Jorden informed Kissinger that with discreet coordination, Washington and Brasília could rationalize the process of distributing assistance to the new Chilean Government. The Department instructed Crimmins to meet with Foreign Minister Gibson Barboza to discuss the matter.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 772, Country Files, Latin America, Brazil, Vol. 4, 1973–1974. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only; Completely Outside the System. Sent for action. The attached memorandum, entitled [title not declassified] is not published. Scowcroft approved the recommendation for Kissinger. On September 14, Kissinger, [text not declassified] stated, “We appreciated very much the message conveyed through him from Foreign Minister Gibson Barboza. Our Ambassador will be discussing this matter with the Foreign Minister and indeed may already have done so. We believe the Minister and the Ambassador should determine the manner and level of further contacts on this subject.” The message was to be cleared by Crimmins before it was relayed to Cortés. (Ibid.)
Summary: The Department informed Crimmins that he could raise with Gibson Barboza the issue of diplomatic recognition of the new Chilean Government, as well as the attitudes of Chile’s neighbors toward it, the future of the new regime, and U.S. assistance.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850027–1631. Secret; Flash; Eyes Only. Drafted by Devos, cleared by Bowdler, approved by Kubisch. In telegram 182529 to São Paulo, September 13, the Department instructed Ambassador Crimmins to deliver a démarche to Gibson Barboza on Chile. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 772, Country Files, Latin America, Brazil, Vol. 4, 1973–1974) On September 14, Cortés informed [text not declassified] that Gibson Barboza would probably raise the following issues: the diplomatic recognition of, attitudes in the region toward, and the future form of the Chilean regime. Also, Cortés stated that Gibson Barboza might inquire about the Chilean regime’s requests for assistance. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Box 19, Brasília 1973–1980) No record of the Crimmins-Gibson Barboza meeting has been found.
Summary: Kissinger and Gibson Barboza discussed regional issues and Brazil’s growing role in world affairs.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL BRAZ–US. Secret; Exdis. The meeting took place at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations.
Summary: Thanking the Ambassador for his suggestions, the Department suggested possible approaches he could use to improve the dialogue with Brazil.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 772, Country Files, Latin America, Brazil, Vol. 4, 1973–1974. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Bowdler, approved by Kubisch and Eagleburger. In telegram 7372 from Brasília, October 29, Crimmins reported that the Brazilian Government was dubious that the United States really desired a special relationship with Brazil. Crimmins recommended close policy coordination between Brasília and Washington on regional issues, in particular on Chile. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840121–2657) The Kissinger-Gibson Barboza correspondence has not been found.
Summary: The Embassy commented on the election of Geisel as President, noting that the return to representative government promised by the Médici regime had not taken place.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Buenos Aires, Caracas, Montevideo, Santiago, Recife, Rio de Janeiro, and São Paulo.
95. Draft Telegram From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to Secretary of State Kissinger
Summary: In light of Shultz’s preparations to announce a countervailing duty investigation regarding Brazilian footwear, Scowcroft presented to Kissinger options for minimizing damage to bilateral ties between the United States and Brazil.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Scowcroft Daily Work Files, Box 6, 2/19–28/74. Secret; Sensitive. Kissinger was in Jerusalem February 27–28. On February 20, Kissinger, in a conversation with Gibson Barboza in Mexico City, stated that he would do the best he could to delay the application of countervailing duties on Brazilian footwear. (Telegram 1556 from Mexico, February 22; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])
96. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Kubisch) to Secretary of State Kissinger
Summary: Because the Department of the Treasury was scheduled to announce a countervailing duty proceeding on Brazilian shoes, and the duty contradicted an understanding between Kissinger and Foreign Minister Gibson Barboza, Kubisch had a letter drafted to explain the Treasury’s decision.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850150–1169. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Kubisch. Attached is the draft of a telegram to Gibson Barboza, not published. A handwritten note indicates it was sent on March 7. Telegram 45677 to Brasília, March 7, transmitted a letter from Kissinger to Gibson Barboza informing the Foreign Minister that Shultz would make the announcement March 8. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]) On March 7, Ambassador Crimmins delivered Kissinger’s letter. Gibson Barboza informed Crimmins of his displeasure regarding the decision and the short notice given Brazil, and he questioned whether the United States and Brazil shared a “special relationship.” Crimmins responded that the U.S. Government had been requesting countervailing duty discussions since September 1973, but the Brazilians had not agreed. (Telegram 1572 from Brasília, March 7; ibid., P740141–0350)
Summary: Crimmins discussed the prospects for political liberalization in Brazil. He concluded it would be a continuing source of difficulty for the Geisel administration.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]. Confidential. Repeated to Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, and Recife. In airgram A–24, February 16, the Embassy summarized Huntington’s discussions of “decompression” in Brazil. (Ibid., P740012–0462) In telegram 3722, May 25, the Embassy concluded that the Geisel administration, despite backsliding in a few areas, continued to pursue political liberalization. (Ibid., D740132–0519)
Summary: President Geisel and Secretary Shultz discussed the effects of higher oil prices on Brazil. Geisel noted that Brazil was dependent on imports of oil for about 80 percent of its consumption and that Brazil had increased exports in order to earn foreign exchange to pay for oil.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D740073–0337. Confidential; Priority. Also sent to Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo.
Summary: Colby reported that President Geisel planned to continue Médici’s policy of using extra legal means against subversives but would limit executions to the most dangerous subversives and terrorists.
Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 80M01048A: Subject Files, Box 1, Folder 29: B–10: Brazil. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. According to a stamped notation, David H. Blee signed for Colby. Drafted by Phillips, [names not declassified] on April 9. The line for the concurrence of the Deputy Director for Operations is blank.
Summary: Kissinger and Silveira discussed countervailing duties and Brazil’s foreign policy.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 772, Country Files, Latin America, Brazil, Vol. 4, 1973–1974. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Watson and cleared by Bowdler and Schwab. Silveira was in Washington for the Foreign Ministers meetings April 17–18. In telegram 75824 to Brasília, April 13, the Department transmitted to the Embassy a letter from Kissinger to Silveira in which Kissinger said he supported setting up working groups or preparatory commissions on science and technology, resources transfer, and possibly on problems of foreign investment. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840114–2591) In telegram 2533 from Brasília, April 15, Crimmins reported on his conversation with Silveira, in which they discussed Brazil’s regional policy, including relations with Peru, Chile, Argentina, and Cuba. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 772, Country Files, Latin America, Brazil, Vol. 4, 1973–1974)
Summary: Meeting during the OAS General Assembly session in Atlanta, Kissinger and Silveira discussed the possible establishment of a U.S.-Brazil special coordinating mission, trade issues, and Brazil’s relations with neighboring countries.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840114–2579. Confidential; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Watson; cleared by Bowdler, Schwab, and Gammon; approved by Eagleburger. In telegram 86800 to Brasília, April 27, the Department transmitted a letter in which Kissinger informed Silveira he supported the idea of setting up a working group to discuss science, technology transfer, and transnational enterprises. (Ibid., P840114–2584)
Summary: Crimmins argued for an increase in FMS funding and stressed the importance of U.S. military assistance to Brazil.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D740157–0256. Secret. Repeated to Rio de Janeiro, JCS, OSD (IA/DSAA), and USSOUTHCOM. In telegram 31505 to all American Republic diplomatic posts, March 8, the Department required all ARA posts to provide by June 15 an assessment of the need for U.S. Government security assistance for their respective countries. (Ibid., [no film number]) In telegram 83250 to all diplomatic posts, April 24, the Department outlined its plans for military assistance. Brazil received $60 million for FMS and $800,000 for MAP training. (Ibid., D740096–0402)
Summary: Silveira warned Kissinger that if the U.S. Government applied countervailing duties to Brazilian footwear, it would damage bilateral ties.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D740164–0955. Confidential; Immediate; Stadis; Exdis. Drafted by Watson, cleared by Ballantyne and Kubisch, approved by Eagleburger. On June 6, Silveira wrote to Kissinger on the possibility of setting up a special committee for cooperation between the two countries. (Telegram 125471 to Brasília, June 13; ibid., D740152–0400) On June 13, in a letter to Silveira, Kissinger agreed to regular consultations. (Telegram 125457 to Brasília, June 13; ibid.) In a June 21 telephone conversation, Kissinger informed Secretary Simon that “we paid a horrendous price in Brazil” because of the damage to bilateral ties over the duties on shoes. (Department of State, FOIA Electronic Reading Room, Kissinger Transcripts) On June 25, Kissinger informed Silveira that U.S. law required that countervailing duties on shoes be applied. (Telegram 136133 to Brasília, June 25; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D740166–1128)
104. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Walters) to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)
Summary: Walters informed Scowcroft [text not declassified] with Brazilian officials on political and economic matters, and on Brazil’s relationship with China, the Soviet Union, Argentina, Cuba, and Portugal.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Henry A. Kissinger Office Files, Box 147, Agency and Congressional Files, CIA, Colby, 1974, 2, General Walters. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified].
Summary: Secretary Kissinger informed Foreign Minister Silveira that the U.S. Government was obligated by law to impose a countervailing duty on Brazilian footwear. Kissinger suggested the two countries work out their differences at a technical level to prevent the dispute from damaging bilateral ties.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D740211–1163. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Ballantyne; cleared by Kubisch and Bowdler, and in draft by Knepper, Glitman, Self, and Crawford; approved by Kissinger. In telegram 139040/Tosec 101 to Kissinger in Moscow, June 27, the Department transmitted Silveira’s letter which requested that the U.S. Government refrain from applying the duties, noting that Brazilian public opinion would not understand the new duties. (Ibid., D740170–0623)
Summary: President Ford and Foreign Minister Silveira discussed OAS sanctions on Cuba and Brazil’s economic progress.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 6, September 29, 1974, Ford, Kissinger, Brazilian Foreign Minister Silveira. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the Oval Office. The full memorandum of conversation is ibid. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting lasted until 10:40 a.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) Silveira was in Washington for bilateral discussions after attending the UN General Assembly in New York. On November 12, Kissinger told Ford that the Brazilians would probably abstain in the OAS vote to lift sanctions on Cuba: “They [the Brazilians] are slightly more hard line than us, but they don’t want to be left behind. State had been for voting for, but I straightened that out.” (Ibid., National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 7, November 12, 1974, Ford, Kissinger)
Summary: Secretary Kissinger and Foreign Minister Silveira discussed bilateral issues, petroleum prices, Cuba, and regional policy.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D740291–0954. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Watson; cleared by Ballantyne, Zimmermann, and Bowdler; approved by Eagleburger. Silveira was in Washington for bilateral discussions after attending the UN General Assembly in New York.
Summary: The Department informed the Embassy of its concern over a series of restrictive measures that Brazil placed on imports. The Department instructed the Embassy to transmit a list of products subject to the new restrictions.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D740372–0367. Unclassified; Priority. Drafted by Williams; cleared by Slattery and in STR, USDA/FAS, Commerce, and Treasury; approved by Dunford. Repeated to the UN Mission in Geneva, the EC Mission in Brussels, and to Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. Telegram 4685 from Brasília, June 26, and telegram 4532 from Rio de Janeiro, December 9, are ibid, D740168–0930 and D740357–0334. In telegram 142, January 7, 1975, the Embassy informed the Department that the import restrictions reported in Rio de Janeiro 4532 were in addition to those reported in Brasília 4685. (Ibid., D750006–0795) In telegram 585 from Brasília, January 22, the Embassy informed the Department that it thought efforts to scale back import restrictions should be directed toward specific commodities or trade provisions that constituted a clear violation of the GATT. The Embassy concluded that across-the-board criticisms risked damaging bilateral relations. (Ibid., D750024–0300)
Summary: The Department instructed the Embassy to deliver a démarche to Foreign Minister Silveira to inform him of congressional concern over human rights abuses.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750073–1045. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Watson; cleared by Zimmerman, Crunyon in L, and Lister; approved by Bowdler. In telegram 14917 to all diplomatic posts, January 22, the Department described Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, which required the President to reduce or terminate assistance to any government which engaged in a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights. (Ibid., D750025–0090) In telegram 43532 to all diplomatic posts, February 26, the Department informed posts in countries receiving U.S. security assistance that “human rights factors must, under existing Department of State policy, be carefully considered in planning and carrying out our Security Assistance Programs.” (Ibid., D750069–0367) Crimmins raised the cases of Kucinski and Wright in a meeting with Araujo Castro on April 25. (Telegram 7073 from Brasília, August 14; ibid., D750281–0294)
110. Briefing Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Ilké) and the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Vest) to Acting Secretary of State Ingersoll
Summary: Iklé and Vest informed Ingersoll that the FRG-Brazil agreement on the sale of nuclear materials to Brazil increased the difficulties for the U.S. Government in coordinating nuclear export policies. Iklé and Vest thought it important that the Germans delay their sale until U.S. and German officials could discuss the matter.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P830132–1855. Secret; Exdis. Sent through Sonnenfeldt. Drafted by Oplinger; cleared by Wolfe, Kalicki, and Bloom. Attached but not published are Tab A, Talking Points, and Tab B, an informal translation of the FRG note, both undated. In a March 21 meeting with German Ambassador Von Staden, Ilké stated his initial reaction to the Brazil-FRG agreement was that it would make it harder for the U.S. Government to apply stricter safeguards on the transfer of nuclear materials to Iran. (Telegram 66020 to Bonn, March 24; ibid., D750102–1013) In a March 25 meeting, Ingersoll informed Von Staden that “Secretary Kissinger is very concerned about this whole problem area [nonproliferation] and that U.S. believes that an agreement on more stringent multilateral controls is possible” and requested that the FRG defer the agreement with Brazil until discussions with U.S. officials could take place. The FRG agreed to discussions. (Telegram 66712 to Brasília, March 26; ibid., D750106–0309)
Summary: Crimmins suggested possible topics for Kissinger’s prospective trip to Brazil. Specifically, the Ambassador requested that the Secretary raise with Geisel political liberalization, in particular human rights abuses.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Trip Briefing Books and Cables of Henry Kissinger, Box 8, 4/75 Latin America (trip cancelled). Confidential; Priority; Stadis; Exdis. Because of the impending collapse of the South Vietnamese Government and crises in the Middle East, Kissinger’s visit to Latin America was postponed until 1976.
112. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford
Summary: By seizing two U.S. shrimp boats, Brazil triggered Section 3 (b) of the Foreign Military Sales Act barring sales, credits, or guarantees for the purchase of weaponry. Kissinger informed the President that a termination of assistance to Brazil would strain bilateral ties and recommended that he waive the provisions of the FMS Act and allow the continuation of assistance to Brazil for national security reasons.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Latin American Affairs Staff Files, Box 1, Brazil, Political, Military. Confidential. Attached at Tab A is a memorandum from the President to the Secretary of State and a Justification, both undated; attached at Tab B is a memorandum from Kissinger to the President, May 6; and attached at Tab C is a memorandum from Lynn to the President, May 7. The attachments are not published. According to telegram 109691 to Brasília, May 10, Ford signed the Presidential Determination on May 9. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750165–0084) The U.S.-Brazilian Shrimp Agreement was signed on March 14 and ratified by the Senate in October. See Document 115.