123. Telegram 248481/Tosec 160048 From the Department of State to Secretary of State Kissinger 1
248481/Tosec 160048. Subject: Letter From Brazilian Foreign Minister Silveira. Ref: Secto 16021.
1. Following is English translation of letter to you from Foreign Minister Silveira which was delivered by Brazilian Embassy night of October 17.
2. Begin text of letter:
My dear Henry:
I need not tell you of the pleasure which our two meetings in New York gave me. Bill Rogers must have already made you aware by now of the agreement of the Brazilian Government with the new dates proposed for your visit to Brasília. Genscher has agreed to be here on November 17 through 19. Thus, we will be ready to welcome you on the 20th, when I shall have the pleasure of honoring you with a banquet soon after your arrival. The President will receive you on the 21st; next morning on the 22nd you will be able to fly down to Rio for the week-end which has been promised to Nancy. I also await a word from you [Page 342] on the suggestion which I conveyed through the Department of State on our joint inauguration of the direct dialing telephone system between Brazil and the U.S.A. It would be a good opportunity, for instance, to make your visit known to the public.
I shall now take up the subject of the establishment of a “special relationship” between our governments, a matter on which I promised to write you. You told me that you are convinced of the need of such a relationship, even though you knew of the political difficulties which would result from making a distinction singling Brazil out from the other nations of the hemisphere. You also asked me to make suggestions on means and formulas which would render that relationship operational, so that there would be something which could be formalized on the occasion of your visit to Brazil. I confess that I find some difficulty in reopening the subject in its substantive aspect, but not in its formal one. From the formal viewpoint the establishment of a “special relationship” between Brazil and the U.S.A. is an issue that could be taken care of through the creation of a special coordinating committee, as I have proposed in my letter to you dated June 6, 1974, to which you replied on the 13th of the same month. Such a committee as contemplated in my proposal would provide the adequate framework, both ample and flexible, for the institution of an operational mechanism at high level for mutual consultation on matters of either individual or common interest of the parties. Such a committee would be different from the traditional joint commission as it would be concerned basically with political consultations.
It is in its substantive aspect that the understanding at which the two governments may arrive appears to me to be less clear. Like you, I believe that what is necessary is that there exist on both sides a clear awareness of this “special relationship” as well as straightforward ideas about what it really signifies. From Brazil’s viewpoint the two aspects are interconnected. Evidently, both Brazil and the United States can live without the formal establishment of a special relationship between the two governments. In the measure, however, that one can be useful to the other for the attainment of certain common or particular aims, this relationship can be really important. Importance, therefore, is the function of the objectives of this relationship.
It is not for me to presume what could be the interests of the United States within a “special relationship” with Brazil. I can state, [omission in the original] be. Basically, in our case, the aim would be to obtain from the United States Government the recognition that an economically strong and prosperous Brazil, as a member of the community of developed countries, will be an important factor in the survival of the values of the Western world. Under these conditions, it is important that no obstacles be raised against the swift economic expansion of [Page 343] Brazil, through measures which might impede or retard that development. More than this, it is important that this rapid transformation be helped by the creation of favorable conditions for trade expansion, for the diversification of exports, for the increase of Brazil’s commercial and economic presence in the world, for domestic industrialization and, above all, for technological modernization under conditions leading to autonomy and creativity rather than perpetuate or increase dependence.
A special coordinating commission, as I see it, should serve to realize a “special relationship” of this type. A joint commission along classic standards would run the risk of merely making us still more dependent. As I mentioned to you in New York, the systems of consultation between highly unequal countries frequently produce the result of not altering the conduct of the stronger and manacle the weaker ones. We have seen examples of this in our own bilateral relations. The United States Government has frequently a multiplicity of reasons not to alter its behavior, be it for reasons of global policy, or for reasons of domestic policy. On certain occasions, it would be said that certain measures are not possible because they could not count on the support of “trade” or other more articulate groups, whether professional or under the pressure of public opinion. On other and more frequent instances, the justification put forward is that of the lack of support by Congress. I cannot omit noting that allegations of the same order, coming from Brazil, are never considered as carrying the same weight or validity.
In sum, my dear Henry, neither my government nor I lack the willingness to attempt to articulate a “special relationship” between Brazil and the United States, a relationship that would be really meaningful for both countries. Naturally, I have taken in full consideration the argument that you presented me in New York in the sense that the Department of State and you yourself need a mechanism of special understanding between the United States and Brazil which would make it possible to prevent some sectors of the American administration from taking abrupt measures, with a negative effect on Brazil. I would like, nonetheless, to be sure that both of us are thinking of the same thing when we talk about a “special relationship” between our countries.
As aiding material for our forthcoming conversation on the subject, I am sending you herewith a few preliminary suggestions aiming at indicating along general lines the format which might be adopted for the commission. I enclose also a copy of the “memorandum of understanding” that I am to sign with the United Kingdom next week, which in my view, establishes an extremely flexible framework for consultations. Warmest regards from Antonio. End text of letter.
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Summary: The Department transmitted a letter from Silveira in which he outlined for Kissinger his concept of the structure of a “special relationship” between Brazil and the United States.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750362–1106. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated Immediate to Brasília. Drafted by Eltz, cleared by Fishlow, approved by Zimmermann. Published from an unsigned copy. Kissinger was in Tokyo. Summaries of the September 22 and 27 Kissinger-Silveira conversations, in which they discussed bilateral and regional issues, are in telegrams 227373 to the Secretary’s Delegation in New York, September 24, and 235769 to Brasília, October 3. (Ibid., D750330–0181 and D750342–1215) Kissinger’s visit to Brazil was postponed until 1976. The June 1974 Kissinger-Silveira correspondence is referred to in the source note to Document 103. On October 15, Rogers outlined options for Kissinger regarding a bilateral mechanism with Brazil. (National Archives, RG 59, L/ARA Files, Country and General Files, 1965–1979: Lot 81D324, POL 1 BRAZIL, General Policy, 1975) On October 18, Barbian indicated Kissinger wanted “a more formal structure with at least semi-annual meetings.” (Telegram Secto 16021 from the Secretary’s Delegation in Tokyo, October 18; ibid.)
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