128. Memorandum of Conversation1
SUBJECT
- Secretary’s Meeting with the President Geisel and Foreign Minister Silveira
PARTICIPANTS
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Brasília
- President Ernesto Geisel
- Foreign Minister Azeredo da Silveira
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US
- The Secretary
- Assistant Secretary William D. Rogers (notetaker)
The Secretary: Mr. President, I would like to thank you for the warm reception I received on my arrival.
President Geisel: We take great pleasure in your visit.
The Secretary: My wife so very much wanted to make the trip. She was hopeful I could delay it.
President Geisel: It is too bad that she is not here.
The Secretary: She would love to come to Brazil.
[Page 354]President Geisel: Foreign Minister will make all the arrangements for the trip when she is ready to come.
The Secretary: The Foreign Minister and I are really good friends. We see each other frequently, and now we are regularizing those meetings and that relationship with the new Memorandum of Understanding we are signing on Saturday.
President Geisel: Brazil and the United States have good relations now; Silveira reports to me about all his meetings with you.
The Secretary: We understand each other and in the broad sense our objectives are the same, though we may use different tactics to reach those objectives on occasion.
President Geisel: Fundamentally, the US and Brazil are walking the same path. There is not, however, a 100% identity of views on everything. But we understand each other.
The Secretary: That is our conviction. Brazil has grown so that it now can work with the United States without complexes, and on the basis of equality and partnership.
Foreign Minister Silveira: Complexes, indeed! Let me tell you, we have them.
President Geisel: My personal impression is that our relationships, which are already strong, should be intensified in this bilateral framework. We talk in international fora like the OAS and the UN, but there is not yet a sufficiently high level of understanding between our two countries. We need to work more intensively on the bilateral issues between us, with greater reciprocity and understanding.
The Secretary: For our part, we are ready to talk with you and reach bilateral agreement before we meet in multilateral fora, and we are also prepared to work on our bilateral issues.
President Geisel: I don’t mean to downplay the importance of the multilateral fora. They exist. But the United States and Brazil need to arrive at a higher understanding between ourselves. There is a good working relationship between you two foreign ministers, and the agreements that you have been able to work out have been good. But the need for greater understanding, in my view, goes beyond the efforts of the Department of State and Itamaraty. It should extend also to intellectuals, to economic, scientific and cultural exchanges. We need more of these.
The United States leads its own life. Not much attention is paid to Brazil in the United States, now, and what is said about Brazil is distorted. Our image is an image of dictatorship, and of violence. This does not correspond to the realities of modern Brazil. We really ought to work out ways in which the understanding of Brazil in the United States may be more profound and more in accord with realities.
[Page 355]The Secretary: Since my trip here in 1962, I have been profoundly convinced that Brazil is destined for world greatness. There is and should be a special partnership between Brazil and the United States. We need to intensify our relationships, not only on the foreign ministerial level, but also on the highest levels. I do hope you will be able to visit the United States this year, for it will provide a great opportunity to symbolize for the people of our country the significance we attach to our relations with Brazil. We are going to propose that you consider the possibility of a visit in September, if that will be convenient. We will work out the precise dates. The two Presidents could symbolize together, in this way, the special relationships we see between our two countries. As far as we are concerned, its domestic organization is Brazil’s concern. We have trouble enough conducting our own domestic policy, without trying to conduct yours.
President Geisel: You are right, but this is not the prevailing attitude in the United States.
The Secretary: There are a lot of frustrated missionaries in my country.
President Geisel: I take great pleasure in receiving the invitation of President Ford to visit the United States, and I would really like to see the President. But speaking frankly, there is one difficulty which is stuck in my throat. It is hard for me to envisage a visit just now, in view of the problem for us which arises from the foreign commercial policy of the United States, which is not yet overcome. You know, we had a serious problem with the increase in petroleum prices. We have not overcome that yet, entirely. In addition, there is the more recent problem of our grave imbalance of payments. The United States is a very important part of this problem. Our deficit in trade with your country is US $1.5 billion. The US under its law, creates more restraints all the time on our exports. I don’t know whether this is right or wrong, but it places me in a difficult position. This is the difficulty with a visit by me. It is impossible for public opinion here to understand how two good friends can have such difficult problems. I speak frankly.
The Secretary: The difficulty is that we operate under severe congressional restrictions now. Sometimes these are so severe that they destroy the very design of our foreign policy. As I said in my toast, we approach these issues within a political framework, not as a matter of economic detail. And we are prepared to work hard for an international agreement in Geneva to govern subsidies and countervailing duties. But we must solve this issue somehow. It is just not worthy of great countries to haggle about shoes.
President Geisel: I agree. I read both speeches at the banquet. We can’t consider these matters as merely economic. They vitally affect our political relations. I also understand that Congress is under heavy [Page 356] pressure in trade questions, but, really, we also have to recognize that the trade balance between the United States and Brazil is the Achilles heel of the development of Brazil. We are having a very difficult struggle this year, and we cannot minimize it. So I emphasize that we must struggle for a solution, for this is Brazil’s truly great problem.
The Secretary: Relations with Congress are going to be tough this year, without a doubt. The new President, I think, will have a stronger hand. I am also persuaded, incidentally, that President Ford will win. The Democrats have no issue.
President Geisel: (In English) What about Kennedy?
The Secretary: I think, that Kennedy really doesn’t want it. Mr. Rogers knows him. What is your opinion, Bill? I think, also, that if Kennedy got the nomination, he would either win a tremendous victory or suffer a tremendous defeat. The US public doesn’t want a movie star this year. They want a steady, strong leader. If Eisenhower were around, he would win. But I really don’t think my theory about Kennedy will be tested. More likely than Kennedy, I think Humphrey will get the Democratic nomination. You know, I am not a Republican. I have worked with Democratic Presidents. But I often wonder, when I look at the catalog of Democratic candidates, just where in life it occured to people like Carter, Bayh and Udall that they should begin their executive careers by becoming President. One of the group may well win the nomination. My thinking is that if they do, they will be defeated by President Ford.
President Geisel: Your prediction is valuable to me, and is, in fact, very like mine, even though I confess to you that I am fairly ignorant about US politics. But it is evident, to me, that this year Congress is going to be strong. The new President next year, on the other hand, is bound to be stronger than President Ford is now. And this, I think, will make our relationship stronger. It could remove some of the stones which are now in our path.
The Secretary: But to return to our basic problem, what we need is to create the political will to deal with and control the technical agencies. This is the importance of my visit, as I see it, to establish control over the technical agencies.
President Geisel: I share a profound conviction that our two countries must be closer. There are many reasons for this, and I am prepared to do all I can to help. But may I ask an indiscreet question? How will the US settle the problem of Congress’ establishing a 200-mile limit? Will it fight Congress, or accept it?
The Secretary: Mr. President, there are no indiscreet questions between us. We should indeed speak frankly. In this spirit, I say to you that the State Department wants to settle that issue as part of an [Page 357] overall international agreement. For this reason, the President does not want a confrontation with the Congress this year on it. He is working out ways to delay action, and we are developing procedures for that purpose, so that there can be Congressional delay until after the Law of the Sea Conference. While we’re on this, let me also mention the deep sea issue. We have tremendous pressures, particularly in the Congress, to start exploitation of these resources. We want, though, to settle both issues through international agreement. Brazil’s role, Mr. President, could be decisive on this. I hope we can work together.
President Geisel: I am in accord on that. We are prepared to see how we can use our influence to help the Law of the Sea Conference. We should continue to avoid difficulty and confrontation. You are also right, and I agree, that we need a joint study between our two countries, to see if we can work out a line of action, for we want to settle the matter, not have a crisis. The seabeds are going to be very important to mankind. As we use up our surface resources, we are going to be turning increasingly to the deep seas.
The Secretary: Our technical people in New York should intensify their discussions, then, for this will be a good year to settle the question.
President Geisel: The US has moved ahead in technology in this area, and we therefore need close cooperation. Brazil is prepared to cooperate. You are right that the matter should be settled in a global framework, otherwise, there might be a real conflict. If the US begins exploitation alone, there would be serious friction, and all the other countries would be on the other side. For this reason, we should keep exploring for joint solutions with you.
The Secretary: This is exactly our view, Mr. President.
President Geisel: Well, we will see you at the football game tomorrow.
The Secretary: You know I saw the Brazilian team in Mexico in 1970. It had a really great offensive, and I found it very exciting.
President Geisel: The Brazilians do get excited about football. It has even political significance here. In 1974, the President attended the first game—like tomorrow’s—which begins the process of selecting the national team. That team lost the World Cup, and the Government party then lost the elections. Some people think the two events were connected. So you can see why I am preoccupied in selecting a really good team, starting tomorrow, for the 1978 World Cup.
The Secretary: Thank you Mr. President. It has been a great honor.
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Summary: President Geisel and Secretary Kissinger discussed petroleum prices, a visit by Geisel to the United States, Brazil’s trade deficit with the United States, and Brazil’s 200-mile territorial sea claim.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P820117–0826. Secret; Nodis. The conversation was held in Planalto Palace. Drafted by Rogers on February 21 and approved in S on March 12. The February 21 Memorandum of Understanding, in which both nations pledged to hold consultations semi-annually, is in the Department of State Bulletin, March 15, 1976, pp. 337–338. In memoranda to Bentley, Woods directed that follow-up memoranda on trade issues, a visit by Geisel, and Brazil’s 200-mile territorial sea claim be written. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P820117–0832 and P820117–0833)
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