241. Telegram 209192 From the Department of State to the Embassies in Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, and Bolivia1
209192. Subject: Operation Condor.
1. You are aware of a [less than 1 line not declassified] on “Operation Condor.” The coordination of security and intelligence information is probably understandable. However, government planned and directed assassinations within and outside the territory of Condor members has most serious implications which we must face squarely and rapidly.
2. In considering how most effectively to bring our concerns to the attention of the governments involved:
—We recognize that the internal problems in the three key Condor countries are significantly different.
—We want to demonstrate in our discussions our appreciation of real host government concerns and threats to their security.
—We propose to engage the highest level of government in Argentina, Uruguay and Bolivia in a broad discussion of the issues and security questions involved.
3. For Buenos Aires, Montevideo and Santiago: You should seek appointment as soon as possible with highest appropriate official, preferably the Chief of State, to make representations drawing on the following points:
A. The USG is aware from various sources, including high government officials, that there is a degree of information, exchange and coordination among various countries of the Southern Cone with regard to subversive activities within the area. This we consider useful.
B. There are in addition, however, rumors that this cooperation may extend beyond information exchange to include plans for the [Page 655] assassination of subversives, politicians and prominent figures both within the national borders of certain Southern Cone countries and abroad.
C. While we cannot substantiate the assassination rumors, we feel impelled to bring to your attention our deep concern. If these rumors were to have any shred of truth, they would create a most serious moral and political problem.
D. Counter-terrorist activity of this type would further exacerbate public world criticism of governments involved.
E. We are making similar representations in certain other capitals {without specifying}.
4. For Buenos Aires: You are authorized to add to your approach the following points if you deem it appropriate:
A. We are fully aware of security threats created by terrorist activities within Argentina. It is not the intention of the U.S. Government to attempt to advise the government of Argentina on how best to get its internal security problem under control.
B. Activity along lines of 2.B. would have serious negative impact on Argentine image abroad in general and foreign refinancing efforts of Martínez de Hoz, in particular.
C. In connection with para 2.D., you should include statement of our profound concern regarding attacks on refugees from whatever quarter in Argentina and make specific reference to some 30 Uruguayans who have disappeared and about whom we made representations to Ambassador Musich in Washington.
D. We are prepared to undertake periodic exchanges with the government of Argentina of information on the general level and mode of communist and other terrorist activity in the Hemisphere and elsewhere if the GOA would be interested. [FYI: We would plan to provide background material to you later to serve as a basis for oral exchanges at a level agreed upon jointly with the GOA.]
5. For Montevideo: We assume your best approach is to General Vadora rather than to either Acting President or President Designate who apparently know nothing about Operation Condor and, in any event, would probably have little influence on situation. You may use talking point D. in paragraph 4 on exchange of information if you consider it appropriate.
6. For Santiago: Discuss with [less than 1 line not declassified] the possibility of a parallel approach by him.
7. For La Paz: We agree with your suggestion [La Paz 3657], as you see. While we are not repeat not instructing you to make the specific démarche on Condor, you may wish to take an appropriate occasion with Banzer or other senior GOB official to propose periodic exchanges of information such as contained in para 4.D. above.
[Page 656]8. You will be aware of extreme sensitivity of points 2.B. and 2.C. Great care must be taken not to go beyond phrasing used.
9. For all action and info addressees: You should of course be certain that no agency of the U.S. Government is involved in any way in exchanging information or data on individual subversives with host government. Even in those countries where we propose to expand our exchange of information, it is essential that we in no way finger individuals who might be candidates for assassination attempts.
10. Warning notice: Sensitive intelligence sources and methods involved—not releasable to foreign nationals—not releasable to contractors or contractor consultants.
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Summary: The Department directed the Embassies in Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, and Bolivia to express deep concern to high-level government officials regarding rumors of assassination plotting.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P760139–1959. Secret; Immediate. Roger Channel. Repeated immediate to Brasília and Asunción. Drafted by Zimmerman and Luers on August 18; cleared by Shlaudeman, Kirk, and Habib; approved by the Secretary. In telegram 210906 to Buenos Aires, Montevideo, Santiago, La Paz, Brasília, and Asunción, August 24, the Department informed the recipients of telegram 209192 that the reference in paragraph 4 part B to “2.B.” should read “3.B.”, that the reference in paragraph 4 part C to “2.D.” should read “3.D.”, and that the references in paragraph 8 to “2.B.” and “2.C.” should read “3.B.” and “3.C.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P760139–2183) In an August 30 memorandum, Shlaudeman informed Kissinger of what he thought was the purpose of the démarches: “what we are trying to head off is a series of international murders that could do serious damage to the international status and reputation of the countries involved.” (Ibid., P860084–1945)
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