Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 2, Documents on South America, 1973–1976

119. National Intelligence Estimate 93–1–75¹

Washington, July 11, 1975.

THE OUTLOOK FOR BRAZIL

PRÉCIS

Brazil’s long-term economic prospects are good, but in the shorter term it will experience reduced rates of growth, relatively high rates of inflation, and large deficits in its balance of trade.

• —Brazil’s prospective growth rate for 1975 constitutes good performance by current world standards, although it will be a disappointment of expectations after the 10 percent annual growth of 1968–1974.
• —Discontent with economic conditions contributed to the unexpected success of the opposition party in last November’s election.
• —Should economic conditions appreciably worsen, the regime would become increasingly vulnerable to attack by its domestic critics and there could be a resurgence of economic nationalism.

President Geisel has undertaken to liberalize the political system through a process which has come to be known as “decompression.”

• —The aim is to ease controls on political activity and to widen participation in the political process.
• —“Decompression” has had some important results, including the remarkably free 1974 congressional elections and some easing of press censorship.
• —But it rests on a fragile consensus among various groups not to challenge the status quo in any serious way, and it has run into opposition from conservative members of the military hierarchy.
• —The outlook for political liberalization in Brazil, although better than at any time since 1968, is still not particularly favorable.
• —A return to civilian rule in the next few years is highly unlikely.

Pragmatic considerations, particularly economic ones, will continue to guide the formulation of Brazilian foreign policy.

• —Preferential treatment for Brazilian exports will be a primary goal, and protectionist measures by the developed countries will be viewed as inimical to Brazil’s vital interests.
• —Brazil has aspirations to a role as an emerging world power, and its policymakers have a sophisticated understanding of the reality of economic interdependence and of the constraints imposed on Brazil’s autonomy by its need for foreign capital, technology, and raw materials.
• —Nonetheless, Brazil remains an underdeveloped country, and it will side with such countries on many issues in order to secure economic concessions and to force a redistribution of the world’s wealth to its own advantage.
• —Brazil cannot aspire to become spokesman for the Spanish-speaking countries of Latin America, but wants to solidify its position as the paramount power there so that it can play an international role as an emerging major power.

While Brazil has almost certainly not made a decision to develop nuclear weapons, the government does not want to foreclose this option.

• —It sees nuclear power as an important factor in supplying its future energy requirements.
• —It regards US pressure to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as an unacceptable infringement of its sovereign rights.
• —It is purchasing from West Germany the technology and facilities for a complete nuclear fuel cycle.

Within a framework of strong traditional ties, Brazil’s foreign policy will almost certainly diverge increasingly from that of the US.

• —Disagreements are most likely to involve economic issues and will probably become more numerous with the passage of time.
• —Despite differences on specific issues, Brazil overall will continue to desire close and cooperative relations with the US.

[Omitted here is the body of the NIE.]

1. Summary: The authors of the Estimate predicted that although the United States and Brazil would disagree over economic issues, the Brazilian Government would continue to desire close, cooperative bilateral relations.

   Source: Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council, Job 79R01012A: Box 500, Folder 3: (NIE 93–1–75), Outlook for Brazil, NIE 93–1–75, July 1975. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. According to a note on the cover sheet, the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Treasury, the NSA, and the Energy Research and Development Administration participated in the preparation of this Estimate. The Director of CIA submitted this Estimate with the concurrence of all members of the USIB except the representative of the FBI, who abstained on the grounds that it was outside his jurisdiction.