Your March 21 memorandum to me asked us to reexamine the purposes, goals
and rationale behind our security assistance programs in Africa. You
suggested that we conduct this reexamination in order that the
information might be useful in developing the most persuasive brief
possible for presentation to the Congress of the FY 1974 Security
Assistance Program.
Attachment:
Paper
Washington,
undated
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I. Justification for Provision
of Foreign Military Sales Credit to African Countries in View of
their Pressing Economic Needs.
African countries do not produce significant amounts of military
equipment but they need a certain amount. Their need is rarely
caused by potential external aggression. Internal security is the
primary security concern of almost all African nations. These
internal security needs are not primarily caused by unpopular
regimes trying to maintain themselves in power. Rather, they are
inherent in the vastly complicated and diverse cultural make-up of
each of the African nations. Unity is the essential prerequisite to
economic and social development towards which most African
governments are committed. A limited quantity of appropriate weapons
is necessary to maintain this unity. FMS credits are a visible token of our interest in the
fundamental security concerns of African nations.
African nations need some military equipment and will obtain them
regardless of cost and source. It would be an error to make a direct
one for one link between funds an African nation might expand on
military equipment and the funds they have available for economic
and social development. By proper use of FMS credits we can help keep certain key African
countries favorably disposed toward us. By the influence we build
with them we maintain some influence over their military
expenditures and the nature and sophistication of their
armaments.
The African military is one of the modernizing forces in most African
countries by being above tribalism. African military establishments
can assist African nations in integrating and unifying their
societies. Certain parallels can be drawn between this effect in
African countries and the effect military service has had in the
U.S. since the abolishing of segregated units in the US
military.
African military establishments provide a form of training and
education which has significant civilian application. Depending on
the African country, the military may provide one of the few means
open to this end. Twentieth century industrial concepts are
introduced which may otherwise be lacking, for instance,
preventative maintenance and managerial skills.
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FMS credits, as compared to grant
materiel programs, have proven to be an excellent way to bring home
the cost of weapons to African governments and to make African
governments consider their own military, economic and social
priorities. We can use limited quantities of FMS credits in order to drive home the point that the
primary African focus should remain economic and social development
and that political problems should be resolved through political
means.
Some FMS credits are used for items
that are not uniquely military. Not all, or even a majority of
FMS credits go for weapons. Much
of the FMS credits go for transport
equipment which has an obvious economic and disaster relief
potential as well as a military application.
FMS credits assist in opening
markets for US commercial firms in non-military equipment. For
instance, where military aircraft have been furnished under FMS credit we have noted that
commercial aircraft and other items follow. The initial expenditure
of FMS credits introduce some US
material, generally of superior quality, which interest African
Governments in other purchases. In this way FMS credits play a role in reorienting trade patterns
away from the preference systems and habits of the past.
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II. Rationale for the Provision
of Grant Military Assistance Training to African Countries,
Particularly Those Which Traditionally Look to Metropole Nations
for Such assistance.
Politically, economically, and socially, African countries are fully
as complex as non-African countries. The USG cannot totally ignore one facet of international
relations in Africa and deal exclusively with others more to our
liking.
The newly-independent countries of Africa in most cases remain
closely linked economically, financially and in other more subtle
ways to the former metropoles; however, they each face strong
internal pressures to demonstrate their independence. Looking
elsewhere for new relationships, including some military training,
is an Africa-wide characteristic. Most African countries realize
they are neither in a position nor do they wish completely to
replace the continuing role of the former metropole in all fields.
They are very interested in “tokenism” and we should be responsive
to this urge without attempting to replace the former metropole.
It is quite likely that token US assistance in various fields,
including military training, actually helps in maintaining the
former metropole as the principal donor by providing a safety valve
for internal African pressures.
All US military services benefit to some extent by the personal and
professional contacts established with their African counterparts,
The US military learns about Africa and the African military gains a
broadened viewpoint about the US military.
By providing some military training involving development of middle
level management skills, the US participates in nation-building
within African States. Additionally, we build ties with future
significant figures in African states. The returns may be
intangible, but we consider them significant in both directions.
In the same fashion, there are significant advantages to US society
as a whole, and particularly to our large black minority, in having
contact with young African elites—including the military. African
military who benefit from US training gain a more accurate point of
view about the
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US which they
will bear with them throughout their lives. US citizens, civilian or
otherwise, learn something about Africa which will help to overcome
false preconceptions or simple ignorance. Again, this benefit is
intangible and impossible to quantify, but we consider it real and
significant none-the-less.
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III. Contribution of So-Called
“Military Regimes” to Stability and Development
It is not now U.S. policy to export our political system. African
politics or political systems are not those of the U.S. and African
countries and their governments would be hypersensitive to any
attempt on our part to export our system. We have learned that
African countries are just as loath to subordinate their newly-won
independence to Soviet or Chinese influences.
Africa is in the process of working out its own political and social
forms based on its own traditions and experience. The political
systems left to the new African governments by their former colonial
powers have, in many cases, been set aside and new forms are
emerging. Military governments may be seen as one stage of such a
development towards authentic African forms.
The introduction of the African military into the African political
scene may also be seen as symptomatic of Africa’s basic quest for
stability. In an African context, even a heavy-handed military
regime which imposes public order, may be preferable to a collapse
of public order. There is nothing to assure that a military regime
is inherently better than a civilian administration in this respect,
but the number of military regimes in Africa is symptomatic of the
quest for stability. African military regimes are usually not based
on a narrow, traditional, military elite. The professional officer
Corps represents in many cases the modernising, nationalistic forces
in African countries, which are trying to impose a sense of
nationhood above tribal politics. As such, same military regimes are
fairly broadly-based and have turned into modernizing political
movements.
A “military regime” in Africa should not be discounted on the basis
of that catch phrase alone. A military regime is not necessarily a
danger to its neighbors or repressive internally. African military
regimes recognize and accept existing colonial-imposed borders as
readily as civilian governments. There is for the most part a lack
of aggressiveness on the part of African military regimes which
means that neighboring countries have little to fear from that
particular type of government.
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IV. Specific Accomplishments of
the Program in Recipient Countries
It is next to impossible realistically to point to examples in this
sphere as we do not know what the alternatives would have been had
we either flooded certain African countries with military equipment
or, alternatively, refused any security assistance. On the other
hand, we firmly believe that our security assistance program has
assisted in providing the following factors in support of US foreign
policy:
Stability
As discussed elsewhere, stability is the sine qua non for progress.
Zaire provides a good demonstration of where an infusion of security
assistance over the years has assisted a country in over-coming its
dramatic centrifugal forces and has led to a climate which economic
and social progress can take place.
Basic Orientation
Many African military establishments have remained favorably disposed
to ties with the West which have been established or reinforced
through judicious use of our security assistance program. Morocco
might be cited as case in point, as Morocco has cooperated with the
US on a number of issues of vital importance to us. Anti-US or
anti-western pressures have rarely come from those military
establishments with which we have had a significant security
assistance relationship.
Access
The relations established on a personal basis, as well as through
grant materiel and foreign military sales have provided the US
military and through our military the USG with access to certain key elements in some African
countries. The reception accorded elements of the 4th Fleet in the
Mediterranean during joint naval exercises with the Tunisian Navy
(Tunisian CNO is USN trained) is an example.
The Commercial Aspect
As grant military assistance programs have been transformed into
military sales programs not only have the providers of military
equipment benefited, but other US
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businesses have benefited as well. With a few
exceptions Africa was basically unknown to US businessmen 15 years
ago. Today there is an increased awareness of Africa on the part of
US business, both as a market for sales and as a source of African
products. Zaire again furnishes a good example.
Limitation of Local Arms Races
By offering a limited amount of military equipment the US has managed
to keep some African military establishments looking to us as one of
their suppliers. Through our Embassies and MAAGs we have managed to introduce some cost realism
into African military requests and have been able to influence
African military to limit their acquisitions to some extent. This
has permitted us a certain degree of influence in order to prevent
wasteful local arms races.
The Cold War Aspect
By deliberately avoiding “Cold War” competitions in Africa we have
also managed to limit, to some extent, the total quantity of arms
imported into Africa from Soviet as well as Chinese sources. This
has permitted some African countries to focus better on their
pressing economic and social development problems and brought them
to realise that they could not play off the super powers one against
the other. As an example, our assistance to Ethiopia, while
continuing, has been conservatively scaled to avoid creating
East/West competition in the Horn of Africa between Ethiopia
(largely supplied by us) and Somalia (largely supplied by the USSR).
