Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–6, Documents on Africa, 1973–1976

34. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Schaufele) to Secretary of State Kissinger ¹ ²

Washington, January 10, 1976

Possible Contingency Action Regarding Africa

If the MPLA should be able to impose itself as the generally recognized government of Angola we can expect from Africa:

• —A serious questioning of US resolve and ability to counter and balance Soviet efforts to gain influence in Africa;
• —A greater sensitivity to Soviet pressure on issues in other fora and, correspondingly, less responsiveness to US views;
• —A growing tendency to equate US policy with that of South Africa;
• —A greater willingness on the part of the moderate Africans to compromise with the radicals and significantly less resistance to the importunings of Algeria, Guinea etc.

Under these circumstances it would not be productive for us to take a “sorehead” approach and damn the inability of the Africans to come up with a solution to the Angolan problem in their own interest. That would only accentuate the effects listed above, provide the Soviets with even greater opportunities in Africa and seriously erode the willingness of our Western European friends to work effectively with us on Third World issues.

Therefore, in case it proves necessary, the US should be prepared to take the following general steps:

• —Reassure our African friends that the US, whatever happens in Angola, has no intention of allowing the Soviet Union or others to increase their influence in Africa by intervention in internal African affairs and that we will be especially vigilant in observing Soviet actions in Africa;
• —Inform the Soviet Union of our firm views on this subject to make sure that there is no misunderstanding in the future about US interest and determination and tell our African friends that we have done so;
• —Instruct our Ambassadors in Lusaka and Kinshasa to assure Presidents Kaunda and Mobutu of our continued support and willingness to examine sympathetically their needs which are caused by adverse developments in Angola;
• —Take no steps to relax existing restrictions on our relations with South Africa in order to avoid giving the ex post facto impression that we had indeed collaborated with South Africa in the Angolan matter;
• —Remind selected African states, e.g. Nigeria, Ghana, Tanzania, that one of the expressed reasons for their support of the MPLA was to help keep the latter from falling under Soviet domination and inform them that we will follow with great interest their efforts to that end.

Any public statement on Angola should include the following:

• —A fundamental and continuing element of US policy toward Africa has been to exclude great power rivalries from the African continent. That policy has been welcomed in Africa which up to now has been spared the undesirable effects of such rivalries. Unfortunately the Soviet Union supported by Cuba, has engaged in a blatant and massive intervention in Angola, thus introducing those rivalries in Africa.
• —The United States deeply regrets that, largely due to a lack of legislative understanding of our aims and actions, it has not been able adequately to counter the deplorable effects of the Soviet-Cuban intervention in the internal affairs of a newly-independent African state, despite the requests of many African states.
• —However, we wish to assure our African friends that the U.S. remains firmly committed to its policy of excluding great power rivalries from Africa. They may be sure that, after this unfortunate episode, the US will be doubly vigilant in implementing that policy and in observing the actions of others in Africa.
• —During the diplomatic process preceeding the OAU summit the US was assured by many African countries that their recognition of the MPLA, supported by the force of Soviet arms and Cuban troops, was in part based on their desire to assure that the MPLA would be neither dominated by nor dependent on an outside power. We wish them full success in achieving this aim, which we support.

The basic elements of US policy toward Africa have not been affected by this situation and we are determined to continue to play a role in Africa which conforms to Africa’s legitimate aspirations, available resources and our mutual benefit.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Policy Files, 1976, P840010–2098. Secret; Nodis.
2. Schaufele reviewed likely reactions from African countries if the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) were to impose itself as the recognized government of Angola, and suggested steps the United States should be prepared to take in response.