232. Telegram 2367 From the Embassy in Sudan to the Department of State1 2


  • USG/GOS Relations in Light Sadat Visit

For the Secretary from Ambassador

1. Nimeiri’s forthright support of Sadat, his almost unique public approval among Arab leaders of Sinai II (Khartoum 2105) and the close working relations between the two Nile nations combine to suggest that Sadat’s pending state visit to Washington could occasion some sort of Egyptian plea to US for faster pace in normalization of USG/GOS relations. If our response could be positive, this would seem likely further buttress Egyptian position here. You may therefore wish consider whether moment has arrived for favorable action on second step in our normalization process. If so, I recommend that “holds” be removed from: (a) consideration of PL 480 sales; and (b) re-opening of our DATT office here. Former would make possible review with GOS specifics of its June request for wheat, need for which has probably increased due recent major Nile floods. Latter would provide welcome symbol here to American-trained officers, from Nimeiri on down, at time they are seeking to broaden regime’s once largely Soviet contacts in military field (Khartoum 2285). Both steps would be in USG interest by serving encourage Nimeiri regime in its present responsible course.

2. Should foregoing commend itself to you, it may well be [Page 2] thought useful and feasible at some time to obtain from Egyptians some sort of up-dating of assurances of July, 1974, that Khartoum murderers will remain in custody in Egypt.

3. As background to foregoing, it is worth noting that, since ExIm and OPIC “holds” were removed last May, Sudanese record on international and bilateral issueshdas included: (a) significant role in postponement Arab summit, which could have complicated Nimeiri’s pending Eritrean mediation; (b) evident support for moderates at OAU and Lima on Israeli UN credentials issue; (c) public Nimeiri endorsement of Sinai 88—an endorsement he publicly reiterated after Syrian efforts persuade him otherwise; (d) forthright support by Sudanese FonMin of your major address before 7th special UNGA; (e) public censure Madrid terrorist caper by Nimeiri’s political organization; (f) private Nimeiri willingness help secure unconditional release four Americans still held by Eritreans; and (g) informal Sudanese authorization for first USN ship visit since 1967. Were undue asymmetry to develop in our relationships with the Sudanese, this would seem from here unlikely to contribute to nourishing our wider interests. It could be concluded that timing would appear ripe for consideration second step in normalization process even were Sadat not in position to claim part of the credit.

  1. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 234, Geopolitical Files, Sudan. Secret; Nodis.
  2. Ambassador Brewer said that Egyptian President Sadat might ask the United States to speed normalization of relations with Sudan because of President Nimeiri’s support for the Middle East peace process. Brewer also recommended lifting the hold on PL–480 sales and reopening the Defense Attaché office.