Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–6, Documents on Africa, 1973–1976

132. Minutes of the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting¹ ²

Washington, February 7, 1975, 8 a.m.

In Attendance (Fri., 2/7/75)

• Secretary of State Kissinger (presiding as Chairman)
• P Mr. Sisco
• P Mr. Robinson
• T Mr. Maw
• M Mr. Brown
• C Mr. Sonnenfeldt
• AF Mr. Mulcahy (Acting)
• ARA Mr. Rogers
• EA Mr. Habib
• EUR Mr. Hartman
• NEA Mr. Atherton
• INR Mr. Hyland
• S/P Mr. Lewis (Acting)
• EB Mr. Boeker (Acting)
• S/PRS Mr. Anderson
• PM Mr. Vest
• IO Mr. Blake (Acting)
• H Mr. Jenkins (Actin)
• L Mr. Leigh
• S/S Mr. Springsteen
• S Mr. Borg

[Omitted here are portions of the discussion unrelated to the Horn of Africa.]

What’s happening in Ethiopia?

MR. MULCAHY: Well, some of them they were bringing out by light plane; others by roads. All kinds of roadblocks were encountered in the way of armed insurgents and areas where we found there’s been dissatisfaction. But apparently, as I would piece it together this morning, the Governor of this province north of Addis Ababa who defected, or went into the maquis, a month ago has now managed to arm some supporters.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But what does he represent?

MR. MULCAHY: The conservative old regime. And this would also be true of the insurgency in the Tigre Province next to it.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: So why is that bad news?

MR. MULCAHY: Well, the Ethiopian army is rapidly expending its ammunition and supplies and is going to come to us. We’re going to have to face a decision on whether we’ll bail them out on an emergency basis.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: And what happens if we don’t?

MR. MULCAHY: I don’t know that we can see that far down the road.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, it doesn’t lead that far down the road. You’re going to face a decision of either bailing them out or not.

MR. MULCAHY: I think we should.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes. But what happens if we don’t bail them out? First of all, what does it mean—“bail them out”?

MR. MULCAHY: Well, with the government fighting in, say, three provinces—defending itself already.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I mean, how much would we have to give them?

MR. MULCAHY: It would be mostly ammunition.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But how much—how much in dollars?

MR. MULCAHY: I don’t think anybody can estimate that at this stage.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Can we get an estimate on that?

MR. MULCAHY: We’ll look ahead.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Can we get it by the end of the day? They’ve got to make a determination in a two-hour period—just a rough estimate.

MR. MULCAHY: Fine.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: And, also, what are the consequences if we don’t do it?

MR. MULCAHY: That the government we support may well go down.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, “support”—I mean, with this bunch of crooks—it’s one thing if they’re in firm control that we support them because of our historic investment in Ethiopia. But is it in our interest to keep them in office? I don’t know; I’d like an answer to it.

MR. MULCAHY: I think we’d be better off with someone nearer to the center.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: He’s afraid to say “further to the right.” (Laughter.) You may have to be confirmed for some things there.

MR. SISCO: Would you say a word on this Kagnew problem this morning?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No, no—just a second. If we’re better off, why should we give them ammunition? Why not let them fall?

MR. MULCAHY: Well, the supply line, of course, is at least three months long. It has to go around the Sea of Good Hope, unless we want to go into airlift—which would be a very spectacular thing to do.

MR. SISCO: But doesn’t it land in Eritrea, in those ports? Where does it come in?

MR. MULCAHY: Either Assab or Massawa—probably Assab, the southern port.

MR. MAW: Three months on American flagships there?

MR. MULCAHY: Yes.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What do you mean for three months?

MR. MULCAHY: Well, six weeks, perhaps—five weeks. Often five weeks from U.S. ports before anything can reach there.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, if I judge the competence of that government, they will not come to us when they have a five-weeks supply.

MR. MULCAHY: No.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: They will come to us when they have a three-days supply.

MR. MULCAHY: That’s what I’m afraid of.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Can we look ahead at the problem of what happens in the foreseeable contingency?

MR. MULCAHY: Yes, sir.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Otherwise we’ll be faced with an airlift problem if we want to help.

MR. MULCAHY: That’s right.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I’m not saying we ought to do it, but we have a problem. Can I have a paper before I go abroad?

MR. MULCAHY: Yes, sir. One other thing: General Allen wanted an earlier version of this. (Indicates document.)

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I told you yesterday I wouldn’t approve it.

MR. MULCAHY: This is acceptable. This is the National Security Council’s implementation of classified documents—cryptographic material—to be prepared to move if they have to. He assures me that there’s no interruption of this communications facility.

MR. SISCO: Will he accept this?

MR. MULCAHY: Yes.

MR. SISCO: It’s fine from our point of view, then.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What do you want to bet they’ll be out of there in a week?

MR. SISCO: I know.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Regardless of what’s happening.

MR. SISCO: Unless the security situation really deteriorates, we’re not going to agree—that’s the point.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: You will wake up one morning and find out there are only two people left in that station.

MR. SISCO: Well, there are about 10 now.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: How many are in there normally?

MR. MULCAHY: Normally, about 80.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Bill, is that your department?

MR. HYLAND: Yes, sir.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, you watch so that they’re not going to abolish that station.

MR. HYLAND: They’re not going to abolish it without your permission. But Allen told me yesterday if all Americans are pulling out, it’s pretty dangerous to leave 10 of his people—who are very sensitive people—to their own devices.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But are all Americans pulling out?

MR. SISCO: No.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: When all Americans are pulling out, of course, they have to go.

MR. MULCAHY: The people in intelligence operations are only going initially as far as Addis Ababa and will hold there. They can go back to their whole intelligence operations very quickly.

MR. SISCO: The principle ought to be that they move or fail to move when all the rest of American personnel go together—in other words, they’re all together.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Are you telling me they’re all out of Addis Ababa?

MR. MULCAHY: No. With this agreement to destroy the cryptographic material, classified equipment, there will be no need for more than 20 of them. There will still be 10 there. The communications, which are important on your forthcoming trip, will operate without any problem—unless the station falls.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That’s not important, you know, in my trip—I don’t make that dependent on it. What I’m concerned about is the United States bugging out of an installation that we’ve had for a long time—for which we have, as of now, no replacement—just because Allen panics, and because the Defense Department is using every opportunity to pull out of the place.

MR. MULCAHY: I made those arguments with General Allen last night and got him to hold up this message. He says that the last major mission that had to be performed—which was the photography of the Soviet base at Berbera that was done on the 3rd of January—

SECRETARY KISSINGER: And they’re absolutely right. Never again in history will we have to photograph that Soviet base.

MR. MULCAHY: But it can now be done from someplace else, I understand.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What do you think, Bill?

MR. HYLAND: Well, you can get it by satellite.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What’s your view?

MR. HYLAND: Well, I have a feeling that the situation around Kagnew is going to turn worse and worse—that’s just plain food, water, fuel and everything else—the situation is going to deteriorate to the point where Americans may not be able to stay there at all. EVen though there are 10,000 Ethiopians there, the city seems to be going to hell pretty fast. They restored water supplies yesterday and then generators, but now they don’t have fuel for the generators to work more than a few hours a day. A city without water for very long is going to deterioriate, and I wonder if the government can really hold things together. We ought to think seriously that we will have to abandon Kagnew for sheer physical reasons; but for political reasons we should hang in there, if there are only two people.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I’m in favor of abandoning Kagnew, if necessary. What I don’t want is that we sneak out of there while we’re pretending we keep it open as a result of low-level administrative decision.

MR. SISCO: Kagnew is operating under very difficult circumstances, and I think it’s fair to say that the hang-in approach is being implemented. I would agree with you—and I don’t think we’re going to get out, unless necessary for everybody to get out. As I read the security situation, and as Bill reads the security situation, I think we’re going to have to get out. I agree with that.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have too much experience with Defense sneaking out of places, so by the time you get—

MR. MULCAHY: We still have 10 uniformed U.S. Navy personnel.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have no particular interest in maintaining it. If we want to make a decision to pull them out, I’m delighted to discuss it. I just don’t want General Allen to make the decision.

MR. MULCAHY: He’s been trying to play a fast bureaucratic game with us. But I think in this case he is justified; since he feels he does not have important intelligence missions there which can not now be performed from someplace else, he doesn’t want to risk his personnel. And they’re only going as far as Addis Ababa where, if things do turn out well, he could have them back there in hours.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: If he’s got no intelligence mission, he shouldn’t have them there, to begin with. You know, they want to close Kagnew, so they have another argument for Diego Garcia. This has been going on for three years. I mean, this isn’t new. There has been an inexorable march out of Kagnew—lest there be any reason, any argument against.

MR. SISCO: That was a pressure tactic played the other night.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: You know that’s the real case and that’s the real game going on.

MR. SISCO: That’s right.

MR. MULCAHY: Well, he was frank enough to say last night that this would be expediting anyway what they were going to get done over the next 15 months.

MR. SISCO: That’s right.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Exactly. And, therefore, I don’t trust their reports and I want it to be made as a result of a high-level discussion—which might be his aim.

MR. SISCO: In clearing this cable. And there is in this cable—this is no irrevocable decision and so on. We want it clearly understood that if one has to go to the next step, that this has to be a decision taken at the higher level. So I made this point, by the way, the other night; but I think it ought to be reinforced.

MR. MULCAHY: Well, I tried to find out when this was sent to State. We really ought to be getting it from the Secretary of Defense after he’s cleared it with the Secretary of Defense.

MR. SISCO: Let’s see what Defense thinks, because Defense has been with us on this.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Bill?

MR. HYLAND: We wouldn’t want to hit the Secretary of Defense and have them take some decision.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No. That’s a rather good way of proceeding, but they’ve been wanting to close Kagnew for three years in order to get Diego Garcia. So I just don’t trust, basically—I mean, these reports may be true, but I wouldn’t trust the unsupported statement.

[Omitted here are portions of the discussion unrelated to the Horn of Africa.]

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, Entry 5177, Box 6, Secretary’s Staff Meetings. Secret.
2. Secretary of State Kissinger and his staff discussed the insurgency in Eritrea, the future of Kagnew Station, and military assistance to Ethiopia.