128. Telegram 480 From the Embassy in Ethiopia to the Department of State1 2
Subject:
- Policy: Ethiopia’s Eritrean Problem
Refs:
- (A) Asmara 0027;
- (B) ********;
- (C) ********;
- (D) FBIS London 09/2046ZJAN75;
- (E) Beirut 0044
Summary. This message provides the Embassy’s comments on Asmara 0027 . The Embassy does not concur in the recommendations contained in that telegram. Specifically, the Embassy: (a) recommends against a USG offer of good officers to the EPMG on Eritrea at present as other powers better placed are already providing them; (b) considers a decision on future military assistance to Ethiopia premature but urges timely consideration of our posture on US MAP as it affects our relations with Ethiopia in the contingency of large-scale civil war; (c) assumes that the continued operation of Kagnew station remains a US interest of major importance but believes that in present circumstances we should be prepared to evacuate our nationals and inactivate the installations on short notice; (d) believes that the near future is more likely to bring further turmoil and confusion in Eritrea than the emergence of a structured, independent eritrea entity; (e) thinks the renewal of EPMG/insurgent fighting likely but doubts a decisive, sustained change in the pattern of conflict or its results in the near term; (f) recommends that the departure of dependents who wish to leave should be facilitated but that the removal of all dependents should not be required at present. End summary. There follow the Embassy’s comments on the substance of ref A:
1. In assessing the imminence of the possible emergence of an independent Eritrean entity which might rpt might compel US to reconsider certain facets of our relationship with Ethiopia, one should bear in mind the immense difficulties yet to be overcome by any group or faction seeking the leadership and the control of such an entity. Themselves internally riven by tribal and religious factionalism, ELF and PLF still seem as much competitors as allies for power in Eritrea, let alone brothers-in-arms. The difficulties in Addis Ababa, which no doubt have raised the insurgents’ hopes, bring with them not only opportunity but also a sharpening of rival ambitions in the insurgent camp. Refs D and E illustrate the dilemma, and information reaching the Embassy suggests that the committee of Eritrean notables currently meeting with the insurgents (per ref B) in the hopes of starting a dialogue between the latter and the EPMG must spend much of its efforts in trying to keep the ELF and PLF from resuming the internecine warefare which has been a prominent feature of the Eritrean insurgency for many years.
2. The Eritrean insurgency is not only divided by geography/topography, tribalism, religion and differing objectives related thereto, as well as personal ambitions-it is kept that way by the patronage of competing foreign interests. Be this of various colorations, Libyan Islamic nationalists, PDRY ultras, Sudan and Saudi coservatives, Kuwaitis, Egyptians, Somalis all continue to pursue special interests to which the recipients of their bounty is money and arms must be sufficiently responsive to keep the support coming. Needless to say, this does not help them to form a solid front. In all of this, the roles of China and the Soviet Union are currently marginal. Both of these powers appear to be engaged primarily in conducting normal state-to-state relations with Ethiopia, and we would expect them to maintain this posture unless and until events in this country reach a stage in which they must advance their interests by other means.
3. We quite agree that recent actions of the PMG have resulted in greatly increased domestic support throughout Eritrea for the insurgents, and it may well be that this ground swell of public backing will serve to narrow the differences between the competing factions of the poorly articulated insurgent leadership structure. This is a trend which will bear watching.
4. As the Department is well aware, the problem of factionalism is also at the heart of the difficulties faced by the EPMG in addressing the Eritrean problem. It is the reef upon which current effort at dialogue, and perhaps ultimately negotiation, may founder. The specific difficulties with which the EPMG must wrestle is reaching any decision on concessions have been reported elsewhere and need no recapitulation here. Suffice it to repeat that “DIRG” fears over the impact of concessions in Eritrea in other parts of Ethiopia are rooted in realities and cannot, therefore, be easily dismissed.
5. Emerging from the foregoing is the image of competing forces inhibited in their impact upon each other and events by internal contriadictions which seem likely to presist for some time. This leads us to the view that the near future is more likely to include turmoil and confusion in Eritrea, and perhaps other adjacent parts of the empire, than the emergence of a structured, controlled, independent Eritrean entity. A fluid situation of this kink, of course, inherently continues to provide opportunities for accommodation as well as grounds for further conflict. This is why we think it premature to discard the possibility of arrangements between the EPMG and insurgent elements capable of limiting the scope and impact of the insurgency.
6. As for the possibility of renewed fighting, we would rate it high. It remains to be seen, however, whether in the case of a resurgence of military activity the situation above-described would be decisively altered. We would point out, in this context, that although the government’s regulars in the north are vulnerable in the field and possibly even in their garrisons, they represent a considerable military potential if properly disciplined and led. We believe, moreover, that the Army has shown on December 23 that it will not hesitate to retaliate against civilians if attacked. This suggests pretty formidable disincentives to all-out warefare on both sides, and that suggests that future clashes may rpt may continue to be relatively limited.
- Source: Department of State, Addis Ababa Embassy Files: Lot 77 F 121, Box 9, The Political Function. Confidential; Exdis. Repeated to Asmara. Drafted by Peter Sebastian of the Political Section; cleared by DAO, MAAG, and POL/A; approved by Wyman.↩
- Chargé Wyman disputed the assessment of Acting Consul General Perry in telegram 27 (Document 127) about the Eritrean insurgency and advised against U.S. involvement in a settlement of the Eritrea question. He also called for a timely consideration of military assistance.↩