121. Minutes of the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting1 2
In Attendance (Thurs., 12/5/74)
- Secretary of State Kissinger (presiding as Chairman)
- D Mr. Ingersoll
- P Mr. Sisco
- T Mr. Maw
- C Mr. Sonnenfeldt
- AF Mr. Blake
- ARA Mr. Rogers
- EA Mr. Hummel (Acting)
- EUR Mr. Hartman
- NEA Mr. Sober (Acting)
- INR Mr. Hyland
- S/P Mr. Lord
- EB Mr. Katz (Acting)
- S/PRS Mr. Anderson
- PM Mr. Stern
- IO Mr. Buffum
- H Mr. Holton
- L Mr. Aldrich (Acting)
- S/S Mr. Springsteen
- S Mr. Bremer
[Omitted here are portions of the discussion unrelated to the Horn of Africa.]
SECRETARY KISSINGER: How about Ethiopia? Can we have two minutes on Ethiopia?
MR. EASUM: Yes. The Ethiopian situation is terribly confused. There is a racial problem there that I think frightens all of us. The Gallas are in control of the PMG. And the Moros, who are an increasingly important society, are concerned that they were the representatives of their troops that were killed. There were no troops that were killed. The whole question of Eritrea—
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Is there some other solution to the problem? (Laughter.)
MR. EASUM: The problem of Eritrea is of great concern. Aman seems to have been done in because as an Eritrean he was trying to achieve a political solution to the Eritrean problem, where Eritrea received greater [Page 3] autonomy. It’s of interest that 14 African leaders have publicly expressed themselves in opposition to the killings. This is a change. Generally, Africans don’t criticize other Africans. They haven’t criticized Aman for what he’s done in terms of pressure on others in Uganda, nor did they criticize the Tutsis for rubbing out the Ghandis. But this time they did stand up to express alarm and concern over the safety of the Emperor.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: What is the political orientation of that government? That’s what interests me.
MR. EASUM: We don’t know what it is.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: For whatever it’s worth, that predicted to me exactly what would happen in October.
MR. EASUM: We have our aid programs under review, and we’re making a note of the difference.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: We are not making deliveries to get us into the mess, to begin with. Sadat predicted if we didn’t raise our military—if we didn’t increase military aid to the fellow who was killed—that it would have a life expectancy of two or three months.
MR. EASUM: Well, you know the problems we have.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I know. They don’t pay off [Page 4] on the problems but the result. Everybody has a problem. We should have gone to the Congress. This Department stands for what’s right in foreign policy. Anybody else can bargain all over the place. We can bargain; we can hire ourselves lawyers to see what bargains we can strike. Somebody has to say what’s right. If we don’t say what’s right, we haven’t got a chance.
MR. EASUM: The decision you made in. April—which was for 44 million dollars of grant aid and 26 million dollars of straight sales—we all thought was a bargain. It turned out later they kept pushing us for more.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: We had reports. I remember they were extremely disappointed.
MR. EASUM: I’m sorry. Extremely—?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: We had reports that they were extremely disappointed.
MR. EASUM: Well, the Emperor asked for 400 million dollars.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I’m not talking about the Emperor; I’m talking about the new government.
MR. EASUM: And as I recall it, we were proposing to [Page 5] go to the Hill. We were trying to figure out how to go to the Hill. PM had concerns about it; others didn’t. And we had that proposal in the works.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I didn’t know enough about it. All I know is when I visited Sadat, I told him what my problem was. He told me what his problem was. And they said if they had that sort of a problem, they’d force him out of the American relationship, since the sources of the Nile started in Ethiopia. Well now, there’s nothing we can do about it. I’m not saying we could have done more, as long as we proceeded by normal procedures. It’s an evolution that goes back two years. I remember when people were beating me over the head when I was insistent about moving out of that base. The only reason for moving out of that base was so that the Navy could get Diego Garcia. There was no other reason for it. I asked people to tell me what the impact of American interest—the perception of American interest—over Ethiopia would be, and somebody was at that meeting when I was arguing with the Under Secretary—who was actually on my side, whoever was the under Secretary at [Page 6] the time. He had made a deal with the Pentagon to get that base out.
MR. SISCO: That was a couple of years ago.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I forgot the name of the base. Well, can we get an assessment of what’s going on in Ethiopia? I, unfortunately, have to leave.
[Omitted here are portions of the discussion unrelated to the Horn of Africa.]