Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970

117. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rogers in Australia¹

Washington, June 28, 1972, 0153Z.

Tosec 93/116175. Kuwait pouch for Abu Dhabi, Oman, and Manama. Tokyo for Asst. Sec. Sisco. Subj: US–UK Talks—Persian Gulf.

Summary: US and UK exchanged assessments Persian Gulf situation, revealing broad unanimity of views and cautious optimism about overall situation in Gulf. Both sides agreed on general approach to difficult question of arms sales in area. British expressed concern about UAE developments. British stressed intention to maintain “high profile” active role in support of Gulf stability. Re Secretary’s Kuwait visit, in response query UK suggested it might be useful for Secretary to urge Kuwaitis to act more firmly in their own self interest, especially in Gulf and oil matters, and not bend so easily to Arab nationalist pressure.²

1. UK group headed by Assistant Under Secretary Parsons met with NEA group headed by Assistant Secretary Sisco in Washington June 26 to discuss Persian Gulf situation. Sisco opened talks by saying US and UK efforts in Gulf are parallel. US Gulf presence limited and in many respects UK in better position to assess situation there. We need to share assessments. Gulf is very much to forefront in US thinking and much thought has been given to US role over last year or two. We want to make certain we are marching together with UK. We particularly interested in how FCO sees UK role developing. As US proceeds to develop diplomatic contacts we are trying to make clear that USG not attempting to assume former British role in Gulf. We are encouraging littoral states, especially Iran, and Saudi Arabia, to take the lead while recognizing ongoing British role, especially in Oman. On the whole, we do not feel Gulf situation going too badly. Newly independent states appear to be approaching their new situation sensibly and generally cooperative thrust is encouraging. We also see role for Jordanians in Gulf and have talked with them about importance of coordinating activities with UK, Saudi Arabia and Iran.³ For the moment, we are softpeddling possible Kuwaiti participation in connection with the Jordanian cooperative role since we uncertain how far we could push Kuwaitis to cooperate with Jordan given Arab nationalist pressures in Kuwait. Sisco continued USG has fielded limited team of diplomatic representatives into Gulf, testing what eventual representation requirements might be. We are being pressed by Qatar for resident representation but we have budgetary problems.⁴ Re technical assistance, we prefer our help to be in civilian sector through entities such as Peace Corps and want our efforts to complement British activities and stimulate regional cooperation. Military assistance is touchy problem. While recognizing we can not ignore requests from Gulf states we are not keen to do too much in this field, do not want to stimulate arms race, and do not want to replace British.

There is also political climate in US against extending overseas commitments. Re equipment sales, we must work on case-by-case basis. Case provisions re Bahrain Stationing Agreement reflect essentially domestic political issue in which many Senators voting to cut funds unless agreement submitted to Senate do not disagree with substance of our naval presence in Gulf. We hope problems with Senate will be straightened out this week. Sisco also wanted to mention Secretary’s brief planned visits to Bahrain and Kuwait which are intended to manifest US interest in Gulf.

2. Parsons said that over large part of Gulf area things are going better than British expected. In Oman, Sultan’s campaign is going well though Omani situation is still fragile. Qatar is better off under new Ruler who is most sensible man in Gulf. Bahrain more stable than UK had thought it would be. Kuwait is “going on in its usual way.” There are, however, serious problems in UAE. In Gulf, British have diverted from “conventional withdrawal policy” and have decided to have “high profile.” UK has modernized its relations. Arab world, except Qaddafi, seems to be satisfied with new British role which is designed to bolster confidence of small states by indicating British have not “gone away.” There is fairly substantial UK physical presence bolstered by treaties of friendship. There is military advisory team in the UAE. This year Royal Navy has made two of its planned 3–4 Gulf visits. Assistance to police and special branch offices continues. UK carrying on technical assistance although phasing out payments for this purpose in view wealth of small Gulf states. Strong cultural role through British Council continues. Long term British objective is to maintain this role so long as it is not damaging to local regimes. Although FCO’s thinking is only tentative so far there is recognition of eventual need to phase our British presence in defense forces to permit “Arabization.” UK will be discussing this with Ruler in next year or two. This is where Jordanian role in Gulf comes in. Conventional Arab pressures against new UK role do not seem to be developing at least so far. British think they can stay for sometime, running down presence slowly in coordination with Gulf rulers.

3. Arms Policy: In response Parson’s question, Sisco summarized recommendations on US policy toward supply of military equipment to Lower Gulf now awaiting approval.⁵ Policy recognizes interest of American commercial firms in arms sales and recommends making Gulf states eligible for FMS but seeks as general rule to approve sale of equipment which would enhance internal security capability Gulf states and not approval sophisticated offensive weapons which might be destabilizing factor. Policy also seeks avoid US military presence in Lower Gulf in maintenance or training functions and to avoid undermining UK advisory role. Sisco noted policy must be implemented on case-by-case basis and USG wants to stay in close touch with British and to complement not compete with UK role. Sisco added we want to emphasize civilian economic development side in our contacts with Gulf shaykhdoms in effort to strengthen structure of these states. Parsons said this “very fair policy” and that US and UK in agreement. It unrealistic to attempt Anglo-American-French effort to impose arms limitation since rulers such as Zayid would turn to Soviets. There is no tidy solution and we must realistically recognize conflict between commercial interests US and American arms salesmen. On political level, however, we are in agreement and are convinced must try to find area outside commercial competition where we can cooperate in restraining flow of unnecessary arms to Gulf states. Sisco noted UK could play useful role in assuring close consultation not only with USG but also with French Government.

4. Two sides then shared assessments situation in individual Gulf and Peninsula states. (Details follow by memcon).⁶ Highlights:

(A) Re Bahrain, UK noted internal stability going well with regime keeping a step ahead of popular opinion. “Kuwaiti-type” constitution will be announced 2–3 weeks to take effect in 2–3 months. It will probably not recognize labor unions but GOB confident it has labor situation under control. Special branch under Ian Henderson major prop to internal security. Bahrain defense force is cause for some worry as possible source future coup. Sisco assured British proposed US coastal surveillance team will work closely with British advisors to stress police rather than conventional naval aspect any expansion Bahraini coastal patrol capability. Re Middle East force Stationing Agreement, Sisco said we regret publicity and are trying again with Senate this week to remove problem. We doubt Bahrainis in position to enter treaty with US re Middle East force but do not wish to remove naval presence from Gulf. Parsons asked if we had considered Das Island as alternative for Middle East force; Sisco said we would examine this.

(B) Qatar: UK encouraged by Qatari development under Khalifa’s rule, including political liberalization and overtures for better relations with Bahrain. Presence deposed Qatari ruler and his son in Dubai hurting Qatar’s relations with UAE. British contemplating weighing in with Dubai ruler, and asking Shah to weigh in also, to urge deposed ruler be sent to Switzerland. Parsons opined USG will eventually have to open resident mission in Qatar and that present chargé-level resident relations with other Gulf states may be only interim solution. Gulf states will put great emphasis on resident Ambassadorial representation. American Ambassador in UAE for example could “breathe down Zayid’s neck” to offset Soviet or Iraqi influence. Sisco explained funding limitations on any early expansion US diplomatic representation in Gulf. Parsons thought Iran should swallow its pride and press for Ambassador in Abu Dhabi rather than Consul in Dubai. French will have resident Ambassadorial representation in each of Gulf states.

(C) Kuwait: Two sides agreed labor situation is worrying, National Assembly more virulent and government seems in sort of paralysis preventing its pursuing Kuwait’s real interests for fear of reaction of Iraq, Qaddafi and National Assembly. Parsons said prosperity is what keeps Kuwait afloat but foreign policy toward Iran and Jordan particularly worrying. Parsons added primary UK concern re confrontation between Iraq and IPC was assessment that Iraq could persuade GOK to cut off oil to the West. Parsons hoped Secretary Rogers might get across to GOK leaders that while we understand pressures on them it not necessary to yield to Arab revolutionary sentiment to extent GOK does. Suggested Secretary might urge that Kuwaitis particularly seek to restore strong, underlying relationship with Iran although public posture towards Iran need be no more than “correct.” Parsons said Iran could do much to check any Iraqi pressure on Kuwait but is disinclined to do so given present state of Iranian-Kuwaiti relations. British suggested GOK might be advised to keep strong “pro-Arab” stance on Palestine question, if this seems necessary, but to stand for Kuwait’s own self interest in Gulf and economic matters. Parsons mentioned recently reported Kuwaiti offer to train Egyptian pilots in Lightnings. Two sides agreed that UK in no political position to oppose this and that purpose of such training appears to be essentially to manifest Arab political solidarity.

(D) British assess UAE situation as “worrying.” While it miracle that there is any federation at all. There no doubt that Zayid has been extremely foolish in external policy, alienating Faisal and Shah as well as Rashid of Dubai, failing to improve relations with Oman and currying favor with wider Arab world which cannot help him while neglecting close neighbors who can. There is real possibility Dubai may pull out of UAE. Re Saudi-Abu Dhabi border both sides agreed that standing Saudi offer is reasonable and Parsons described it as “good deal” for Zayid. Parsons said UK simply unable last year to persuade Zayid to accept and has less influence on him now. Re Iranian desire to see Zayid replaced, British side said it unworkable and noted Zayid for all his faults in foreign policy extremely popular in Abu Dhabi. Parsons reviewed British role in police and military in UAE assessing it a as ample. British noted inability to effectively coordinate Special Branch functions in each state but felt basic internal security apparatus, focused in UAE defense force, sound and adequate under British leadership. British reverted to concern about Iranian irritation with Zayid saying they had promised Iranians that they would work on Zayid at home and in London during summer and that Shah had indicated he might send emissary to Abu Dhabi in September. Sisco said USG will support British effort with Iranians.

(E) Oman: Parsons said progress Sultan’s campaign has been encouraging but he has to keep winning for next year or so to have reasonable prospects disinfesting Dhofari hinterland from significant rebel presence. British enthusiastic about Jordanian interest in role in Oman but coordination with UK, US, Saudis and Iranians essential. Coordination should start in Amman and should link up with the ground coordinating effort in Oman itself. At present, UK officer role essential in Oman but Jordanians provide good start to “Arabization-Omanization” which will take 20 years. Both sides agreed that cooperation in support of Oman should appear as Omani initiative and that US and UK should be in background. Sisco noted we had weighed in hard with Prince Sultan ⁷ for greater Saudi support of Oman and he had indicated Saudis will be forthcoming on economic side, but have limited capability for direct military assistance. Both sides agreed there are problems in Jordan’s desire for US and UK financing of its role in Oman and Gulf. Both sides agreed Kuwait should be kept out cooperative effort in Oman for the moment.

(F) Subversion: British said PFLOAG certainly effective in Dhofar but Sultan’s growing acceptance in Arab world weakening PFLOAG’s position even in Oman. Outside Oman, PFLOAG is weak and to extent that subversive threat exists it would come from Iraqi influence most notable in Abu Dhabi. Parsons noted that most significant factor insofar as subversive capability in Gulf is concerned was June 1967 War which “knocked the stuffing” out of Nasserists and other Arab revolutionaries. As a result, Egyptian influence in Gulf has been at worst passive and at best constructive and it was agreed this situation unlikely to change in foreseeable future.

(G) Saudi Arabia: British noted their difficulties in their relations with Saudi Arabia and expressed concern about stability after Faisal. Parsons said UK concerned by lack of “forward Saudi policy” toward Gulf, with resultant decline in Faisal’s influence in Gulf situation over last decade and corresponding increase in Iranian role. In present circumstances, if UAE went radical, for instance, Shah might feel compelled to intervene directly since he uncertain Faisal would. Sisco gave detailed US assessment of Saudi situation, considerably more optimistic than British, noting favorable internal developments, good relations with Iran, improved Saudi morale as a result of rapprochement with Egypt and evidence of growing constructive Saudi role throughout the Peninsula.

(H) Yemen and PDRY: Both sides agreed Saudi support of Yemen important and should be directed development of civil economy to strengthen structure of state rather than dissipated in fomenting anti-PDRY para-military activity. Parsons said UK would like to see US resume relations with YAR. Both sides agreed PDRY should be left to stew in its own juice. British noted internal conflicts in PDRY between pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese factions and PDRY’s isolation in Arab world. HMG feels that PDRY wishes to maintain its relations with UK, however strained they may be.

(I) Iraq: Parsons felt Soviets might step in to help Iraqis if real confrontation between Iraq and IPC developed. Both sides agreed that there would be political motivations for such Soviet intervention but that Soviet interest in Iran would be inhibiting factor. US side noted economic limitations on increased Soviet role in Iraqi oil. Both sides agreed there limitations on extent to which Iraq is “Soviet stalking horse” in Gulf particularly in view of Iraq’s internal weaknesses. Parsons opined Soviet approach toward Lower Gulf regimes might be to “play it quiet” as in Kuwait.

(J) Chinese role in Peninsula: Both sides agreed PRC views Peninsula essentially as an area of rivalry with the Soviets. Chinese recognition of Bahrain and Qatar had irritated PDRY. Chinese have influence in PFLOAG but PFLOAG’s impact is limited mainly to Oman.⁸

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL UK–US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Twinam; cleared in NEA/ARP, S/S-O, and EUR/BMI; and approved by Atherton. It was also sent to London, Paris, Tehran, Amman, Jidda, Tokyo, Kuwait, and Sanaa. Secretary Rogers was in Australia to attend the SEATO and ANZUS Council meetings.
2. Rogers was in Kuwait from July 3 to July 4 as part of a longer trip to Sri Lanka, the Middle East, Eastern Europe, and Italy, which took place between July 1 and July 11. A summary of his talks in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Yemen is in Document 118.
3. A report on British thinking on the uses of Jordanian troops in Oman is in telegram 5349 from London, June 9. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 729, Country Files, Europe, United Kingdom, Vol. VII)
4. As reported in telegram 489 from Kuwait, March 27. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 17–1 US–QATAR) In telegram 228979 to Jerusalem, December 19, the Department notified the Embassy that it had just created the position of chargé for Qatar. (Ibid.) The Embassy in Doha, however, was not established until February 24, 1973.
5. See Documents 119 and 120.
6. Not found.
7. Prince Sultan of Saudi Arabia was in the United States in mid-June. See Documents 161 and 191.
8. Printed from an unsigned copy.