Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970

119. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, August 14, 1972.

SUBJECT

• Military Supply Policy for the Lower Persian Gulf States

With the transition of the lower Persian Gulf sheikhdoms from complete British protection to independence, we must now decide whether and under what guidelines the US will supply military equipment to these states. When the British maintained them as protectorates, we left the field completely to them. Now, however, some of the states are interested in developing a supply relationship with the US as well.

The Under Secretaries’ Committee has completed a study of possible US postures, which Under Secretary Johnson has summarized in the memo at Tab A.² A summary of the entire study is on top.

The central recommendation of that study is that you approve a policy of US readiness to supply arms selectively to these states. This would be done within the following general guidelines:

• —The overall thrust of US policy, as you told the Shah in Tehran,³ is to encourage the larger friendly states bordering the Gulf (Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait) in cooperation with other interested states like Jordan, gradually to assume the main responsibility for the security of the entire Gulf area and Oman.
• —The British should be encouraged to remain as heavily involved as possible, especially in assisting the development of local security forces. We should consult carefully with the British on our policy toward the Gulf in order to avoid creating any impression that we are trying to assume a role as primary protector of the Gulf states.
• —Attempting to preserve the British role in the area of security, we should not, however, forego direct sale of US arms but should try to strike a balance between our interest in preserving the British role and our political and commercial interest in the closer direct relationship which would emerge from the direct supply of arms to these states.
• —The US Government would support efforts by private firms to sell reasonable amounts of defense equipment and services to these states and we would make these states, where commercial channels are inadequate, eligible to purchase equipment under the Foreign Military Sales Act.
• —We would try to avoid situations in which US military personnel would be in these states except perhaps briefly to provide temporary advisory or maintenance instruction with new equipment.
• —We would review carefully sales of large quantities of heavy equipment to minimize disruption of the relationships which are in our broader interest.

The main decision being made here is the decision to move from a position of providing no significant equipment to one of providing some military equipment, moving cautiously so as not to disrupt other relationships in the area that are important to us.⁴ The basic decision is whether to supply or not.

A follow-on decision is, if we are going to supply arms, whether to set guidelines for ourselves which would require review of each significant sale in the light of how it would affect the Saudis, Iranians and British and how it would affect the general level of equipment in the area. Such guidelines would seem important at least to protect the role and sensitivities of the British, Iranians, Saudis and Kuwaitis. In addition, there is an issue whether or not we are going to try to encourage some limits on the kinds of arms these states procure once we have taken into account the sensitivities of our friends in the area. The only practical answer seems to be that an eye should be kept on this while recognizing that our ability to affect the level of arms in the Gulf will be limited. The Gulf states will try to procure advanced weapons, and because they have the money, they will probably be able to buy them somewhere. Our ability to win the cooperation of other suppliers is limited. So our main concern is to be sure that our sales are understood by our friends and are consistent with the broad regional cooperation we are encouraging.

Recommendation: That you approve US supply of military equipment to the Persian Gulf states subject to review of each major case in the NSC Under Secretaries’ Committee in the light of its effect on our general policy of encouraging the principal states of the area to assume primary responsibility for its stability. If you approve, the decision memorandum at Tab B will be issued.⁵

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–236, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 186. Secret. Sent for action. Haig initialed the memorandum for Kissinger. A handwritten notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.
2. Attached but not printed at Tab A is a memorandum from Johnson to the NSC Under Secretaries Committee, April 24, which forwarded to Kissinger the undated report, “Sale of Defense Articles and Services to Lower Persian Gulf Shaykhdoms and Oman.” Earlier drafts of the paper are ibid., Box H–255, Under Secretary’s Study Memorandums, U/SM 70–73.
3. Nixon visited Tehran May 30 and 31 on his return from the Moscow Summit. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume E–4, Documents on Iran and Iraq, 1969–1972, Documents 200–202.
4. In telegram 2535 from Jidda, July 2, the Embassy detailed the caution that needed to be exercised in U.S. arms policy so as not to negatively impact relations with Saudi Arabia, and not to create centrifugal rather than unifying forces in the newly established states. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 FAA)
5. The President initialed his approval. Tab B is Document 120.