Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970

116. Telegram From the Embassy in Kuwait to the Department of State¹

Kuwait, June 15, 1972, 1145Z.

1085. Dept pass Cairo. Subject: Kuwaiti Views on Mideast and Peninsula/Gulf Region.

Summary: Kuwaiti Foreign Minister expressed worry over Soviet and Chinese encroachment in area which he believes abetted by US Mideast policy. Kuwait also feeling squeezed between conflicting interests of three bigger neighbors, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Iran. USG should not be building up Iranian and Saudi military machines whose presence (A) might result in establishment of military regimes in both countries and (B) encourage their aggressive tendencies in Gulf. Kuwait wants better relations with Iranians who must stop their public blasts against Kuwait. Saudi tough policy toward Abu Dhabi and South Yemen counterproductive. Foreign Minister was told US had no chosen instruments to carry out policy of polarization or carve out exclusive sphere of influence in Mideast, including Israel. US wanted just settlement of Arab-Israeli dispute and believed Gulf security responsibility of local states themselves. US did not expect Kuwait to walk around hand in hand with it in public but Kuwait should remember fundamentals, most important of which is that Kuwait interests lie with West. End summary.

1. Called on Foreign Minister Sabah June 14 for hour’s chat. Told him I proceeding Washington on business (did not mention British connection)² and would be seeing Mr. Sisco and others who would be interested in latest Kuwaiti views on Mideast in general and on Peninsula/ Gulf in particular.

2. Sabah said Kuwaiti view of USG policy on Arab-Israeli question quite clear. Aside from rights and wrongs of situation, GOK deeply worried about steady [garble—rapid?] spreading of Soviet and Chinese presence in Mideast, problem with inevitable spill-over into Peninsula and Gulf. GOK believes US Mideast policies greasing wheels of this process which is not in Western nor Arab interest. Unable budge Israel themselves, Arabs have no choice but turn to Communist powers. These are facts, and no need belabor them.

3. Sabah said survival of Kuwait, situated as it is between three larger states of Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Iran, was tricky business. No use criticizing Kuwait for taking special pains stay on good terms with Iraq which had been aggressive in past and could be again. Not at all clear that someone ready pull Kuwaiti chestnuts out of fire if trouble with Iraq erupted. Moreover, while Baathis bad enough, Communists worse, and GOK believed its policy of assistance and close ties with Iraq was factor helping to prevent Communist takeover in Iraq.

4. Similarly, Sabah said, Kuwait held out its hand to South Yemen because country poor and people hungry. No one helping except Russians and Chinese. GOK believed radicalism of PDRY dictated more by these factors than love of world revolution and Communism. Saudi efforts push South Yemenis to wall very expensive and likely lead to very opposite result.

5. Sabah said he concerned about US build-up of military forces of Iran and Saudi Arabia, two main friends of US beside Israel in area. Such build-up dangerous because (A) it greatly increased possibility of leftist military take-overs in these countries where internal opposition to both regimes is growing (B) encouraged aggressive action by both countries in Gulf which likely lead to unhelpful counter-action by radical states and big power rivalry as well.

6. Sabah said Kuwait sincerely wanted closer relations with Iran. But Iran needs understand that Kuwait must live with Iraq and that violent anti-Kuwaiti statements in Iranian press only make rapprochement more difficult.

7. Kuwait trying its best to play constructive role in Gulf both on its own and in cooperation with Saudis, but Saudis no help. SAG had some good people like Kamal Adham, Saqqaf and Pharaon but King Faisal unbending and tough beyond all reason. He still actively claiming Kuwaiti islands and large part of present-day Abu Dhabi, despite fact he has huge country, most of oil in world and has need for stability and friends on his eastern flank. Shaikh Zayid could not be blamed for wanting Soviet mission in Abu Dhabi; Soviets in any case would be no less dangerous if forced carry out their activities behind Zayid’s back. US should point out to both Saudi Arabia and Iran realities in Gulf and ill effects of their bulldozer approach to this region.

8. I thanked FonMin for his frank comments which I would convey to Washington. As smallest of three countries but also largest and most experienced of Gulf states, I said, Kuwait had unique role to play which fortunately well understood and appreciated by rest of Gulf states. USG thus valued Kuwait’s views and looked to Kuwait as well as Iran and Saudi Arabia to help preserve stability and promote progress in Gulf area. Kuwait’s financial and project help throughout Arab world also well known to US. It important that GOK not infer that USG had chosen instruments in Mideast to carry out policy of polarization of area or carving out exclusive US sphere of influence. Israel not American tool in Mideast; we only trying help arrive at just solution to problem between Israeli and Arab friends. Iran, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait not tools of US; on contrary they responsible for security and progress of Peninsula and Gulf not we.

9. I said most people wanted a just end to Arab-Israeli dispute, but no one could say when settlement would come. In meantime, among realities of current Mideast scene was US Mideast policy, which was sincere effort to help, like it or not. I personally hoped Kuwait would not lose sight of fundamentals. Mutual US-Kuwaiti interests very important in long run, and both US and Kuwait would be making mistake by drifting apart. US and Kuwait did not need publicly walk around area hand in hand, but they should consult closely and frequently and keep eye on essential question: what needs to be done to promote orderly development of area and its people. US and Kuwait could work together in quiet way. Kuwait should not wear coat of too many colors which was confusing to budding states of Gulf and could be sometimes misunderstood by Kuwait’s friends, including US. Incidentally, Zayid should be unequivocably discouraged from allowing Russians establish mission Abu Dhabi at this time. Such step would rip it with Saudis for long time to come.

10. Regarding arms to Iran and Saudi Arabia, I said it was not US policy to pour weapons into any Mideast country. However, we did not control these governments; they were friends and deserved our support. We always tried to respond as reasonably as possible. We would do same for Kuwait. Our assessment was that Saudi and Iranian regimes here to stay for foreseeable future.

11. I said we trying do what we could as friends both sides to encourage Saudi-UAE rapprochement. Anything Kuwait could do would be in all of our interest. Sabah said he not sanguine but would help as possible. He wished us luck.

12. Comment: Sabah was most cordial and I think appreciated opportunity pass to USG some of GOK’s current worries. Believe conversation also beneficial in conveying to Sabah idea that while we can understand its desire cover its left flank, we think Kuwait needs to show a little more spine; that is, in not always trying hide fact that its true interests lie with West.

Stoltzfus

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–14 ARAB–ISR. Secret. It was repeated to Amman, Beirut, Jidda, London, Manama, Tehran, Tel Aviv, and Abu Dhabi.
2. Presumably a reference to ongoing U.S.–U.K. negotiations over Persian Gulf issues.