Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970

118. Paper Prepared by Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, July 11, 1972.

SUMMARY

SECRETARY ROGERS’ TALKS IN THE PERSIAN GULF

The following is a summary of the Secretary’s talks with heads of government in North Yemen, Bahrain and Kuwait. It follows the route which the Secretary took. On the last page is a rundown of the line which the Secretary took on the Mid East problem.

North Yemen

The Secretary was warmly received by President Al-Iryani and Prime Minister Al-Aini. The highlight of the trip, of course, was the resumption of US/Yemen relations.²

[Background: Yemen is a highly underdeveloped desert country. Throwing off a backward-looking tribal leader in 1962, Yemen then became a battlefield between royalists/moderates supported by the Saudis, and more radical types supported by the Egyptians; Saudis and Egyptians ultimately clashed and the situation was not relieved until Nasser, tied up with the Arab/Israeli problem, began pulling out his troops after the 1967 war. By 1970 the moderates, with Saudi help, won and Yemen began to become an acceptable family member among our friends in the area. At a time when the US is less able to do so directly, Yemen is badly in need of assistance. We made clear that resumption of ties would not mean large-scale assistance; nevertheless, acknowledging that, much of Yemeni discourse revolves around their requirements for aid.]

The Yemeni leaders made the following points:

• —The greatest danger to Yemen, and to the Arabian peninsula, is the spread of communism from South Yemen (Aden) next door which the Soviets supply wholeheartedly. [They made no reference to Chinese support.]
• —Saudi Arabia and Libya are helpful militarily but they provide the equipment to rebel tribal groups rather than to the Yemen Government and military; the latter should be properly built up, rather than wasting aid on tribal groups who have not been successful to date. They should understand.
• —The Soviets promised military aid to North Yemen but sent nothing; there is a virtual “Soviet conveyor belt” to South Yemen.
• —Yemen can hardly pay government salaries; the government will lose the confidence of the people if it cannot produce some results. Nevertheless, Yemen understands the US position and will not ask for military aid. But it desperately needs economic assistance, hopes we can speed up old projects and initiate new ones, lobby for Yemen in international institutions, draw private American business to Yemen. Still, Yemen must be militarily prepared.
• —Yemen felt from talks with Saudis that Saudis said the US would be very helpful about assistance once Yemen resumed ties.
• —Yemen hopes something can be worked out on the Mid East. In the absence of peace, the Soviets are gaining in presence. They applaud your Peking/Moscow trips.
• —President Al-Iryani appreciated the Secretary’s hope he might visit the US. (He has never been here.)
• —Yemen is still sensitive to Arab activist views on its decision to resume ties. They hope we can acknowledge publicly our interest in contributing to Yemen so that Yemen can show something tangible.

The Secretary wants good follow-up on Yemen’s needs within the circumstances, and continued consultations with the Saudis.

Bahrain

Secretary Rogers warmly received by the elderly Amir, Crown Prince and Foreign Minister, was gently reminded—by old friends who stand with the US—that the Arab Mid East is important to us and hope we appreciate that.³

[Background: The Bahrainis, much like but weaker than the Saudis, consider themselves steadfast friends who feel we need their wise counsel and hope we understand their purpose in delivering it. They were proud to have followed through with the US on the vote on China’s UN entry last fall, while others’ delegates at the UN—Morocco, Oman, Cyprus—caved in to Arab pressures. By the same token, they expect our understanding of the delicacies they feel they must deal with on our COMIDEASTFOR in Bahrain. Concerned about Arab radical reaction to “imperialist” forces there, they were naturally upset with Congressional and press publicity on the Case resolution (Azores and Bahrain agreements to be submitted as treaties). They are pleased the matter has subsided with last month’s Senatorial deletion of Bahrain from the amendment.]⁴

The Bahrainis made the following points:

• —They are pleased the “acutely embarrassing” problem of the Bahrain naval facility has subsided; it should not now affect US/Bahraini relations. Bahrain stands with its friends.
• —The greatest threats to regional stability are (1) the spread of communism from South Yemen and (2) the gnawing Arab/Israeli impasse which is being felt in the Gulf. The US must help its Arab friends in this regard.
• —Bahrain wishes to maintain its good relations with the US and UK and has noted with pleasure US ties with Yemen and enhanced prospects with Sudan, Algeria, etc. We have many friends but we must support them.
• —The Arab/Israeli problem is at the heart of Bahrain’s worries and having increasing repercussions in the Gulf—where the US has huge investments. It is difficult to predict the future and Bahrain does not wish to be forced into taking hostile positions to the US. The US concentrates on specific problems such as reopening the Canal, whereas the broad trends are the real threat—nationalization for one, Arab public opinion for another.
• —Arabs are becoming increasingly anti-US; the Israeli problem must be “frozen.” The US doesn’t seem able to support its friend Lebanon in the UN Security Council when resolutions come up. Bahrain wants the US to be fair; a strong US in the Mid East is important for Bahrain.
• —Arabs’ greatest need is to save face. Talks should be held between the parties but it requires a good atmosphere. Israel has to make some gesture to demonstrate flexibility, and do this itself without using the US as its interpreter. For the Arab part, Egypt, not Jordan, is key.
• —Bahrain is grateful for US efforts and stands by it. American investment is welcome.

Kuwait

Secretary Rogers had “lively” discussions with the Acting Amir and Crown Prince (Amir away) and it would appear received a fair dose of modern Kuwaiti pro-Palestinian, anti-Israeli feelings and inflexibility on US positions.⁵ The Kuwaitis did not compromise.

[Background: Kuwait, once of the Saudi, Bahraini traditional ilk, has become increasingly strident in support of more radical Arab views. Despite Kuwait’s traditional pro-Western pull, this is partly a function of (1) the fact that over half of Kuwait’s population is non-Kuwaiti—most of these are Palestinians in a time of revived self-consciousness and constitute a domestic political challenge to the ruling family; (2) the fact that Kuwait is reaching accommodation on border problems with Iraq—which once claimed Kuwait territory and scares Kuwait—and thus adopts positions important to Iraq but not necessarily vital to Kuwait. One of these is Iraq’s vocal stance on Iran’s seizure of three islands—protectorates under the UK but claimed by the Arabs—when the British withdrew last fall. Kuwait’s support of Iraq’s claims of “Arab sovereignty” over these three islands enrages the Shah.]

The Kuwaitis made the following points:

• —Kuwait welcomed the visit as a gesture of good US/Kuwaiti relations, but:
• —Great powers need not solve the Gulf problems after the UK withdrawal; the Gulf should avoid great power associations and assume common responsibility for the region.
• —Kuwait regrets the US did not prevent Iran from forcibly taking the three Gulf islands. That action contributed to the mood for a Soviet/Iraqi friendship treaty. At the same time, US shouldn’t be interfering in Gulf affairs. [The Crown Prince could not explain this inconsistency.]
• —Re the Arab/Israeli impasse, your policy is not like President Eisenhower’s and you have given more arms to Israel than anyone else. [This is a favorite theme.] The US policy now is contradictory—it claims not to believe in force, yet supplies Israel with military means to retain the occupied territories. Consequently, Arabs are forced to turn Soviet.
• —The US lost its credentials of impartiality after the 1967 war and is acting against its own interests.
• —Kuwait does not support Security Council Resolution 242 because it is against Arab interests; it will go on supporting the despairing fedayeen. Kuwait does not care what the parties “directly concerned” feel about 242—they can do what they wish.
• —Ducking questions about whether Israel had the right to exist or whether Egypt might agree to a settlement with it, the Crown Prince said Israel must withdraw from all Arab territories. The Kuwaitis would welcome whatever the Palestinians agreed to, including continued fighting.
• — Fatah leader Yasir Arafat, who receives Kuwaiti as well as Saudi coffers, is the true spokesman; others, leftists, are useless.
• —Kuwait believes in peaceful solutions but could not accept peace at the price of misery for the Palestinians.
• —Regardless of what Egypt does, Kuwait would never deal directly with Israel.

Secretary Rogers in all his Gulf talks took the following line on the Mid East:

• —The US has—and will continue to—work hard for a settlement with Resolution 242 as the basis; the problem is that both sides interpret it differently, Egypt demanding total withdrawal, Israel needing secure borders. The US understands Arab positions; it cannot tell Israel what to do.
• —The parties should talk, not necessarily face to face but perhaps in proximity with Sisco possibly in between and the US is available. The only solution lies in negotiations between the parties. Everywhere but the Mid East opposing parties are talking; in the Mid East they are unwilling, yet there is flexibility on both sides behind the scenes.
• —Among the main obstacles are (1) the presence of significant numbers of Soviet troops in Egypt, giving a great power dimension to the Arab/Israeli problem; (2) that Arabs speak with more than one voice: supporting extremists is senseless. The US tried to resist an arms provision to Israel but had to maintain the balance.
• —A territorial settlement is still the best hope for progress.
• —In our view, (1) Hussein is reasonable and entitled to have most of his lands back; (2) most of the territory occupied by Israel should be returned but Israel should have some degree of security; (3) any arrangement would probably involve a demilitarized zone. (In North Yemen, the Secretary referred to the 1969 Rogers Plan as the US view of the best route.)
• —The Arabs must accept Israel.
• —The US encourages Gulf regional cooperation above all.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 953, VIP Visits, Secretary of State’s Visit to the Mid-East and European Countries, 28 June–7 July 1972. Secret. All brackets are in the original. The paper was transmitted to Kissinger under a July 11 covering memorandum from Saunders as part of briefing material prepared for Nixon’s projected meeting with Rogers on July 13. Rogers met with Nixon in San Clemente on July 15 and 17; no memoranda of conversation or tape recordings of the meetings were found.
2. Rogers’s account of his visit with President Iryani is in telegram Secto 203/3315 from Belgrade, July 7, and his account of his visit with Prime Minister Al-Aini is in telegram Secto 212/3328 from Belgrade, July 8. (Ibid.) The Embassy in Sanaa was reestablished on July 1, 1972, after the Yemen Arab Republic severed relations with the United States on June 7, 1967.
3. Rogers’s account of his visit with Bahraini officials is in telegram Secto 210/3326 from Belgrade, July 8. (Ibid.)
4. The Case Resolution, introduced by Senator Clifford P. Case (R–NJ) and four other members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, called on the Nixon administration to submit the executive agreements with Bahrain and Portugal on basing rights to the Senate as treaties, and thus subject to Senate approval. The non-binding Resolution passed March 3 by a vote of 59–6.
5. Rogers’s account of his visit with Kuwaiti officials is in telegram Secto 213/3330 from Belgrade, July 8. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 953, Secretary of State’s Visit to the Mid-East and European Countries, 28 June–7 July 1972)