712. Memorandum from Chase to McGeorge Bundy, October 41
SUBJECT
- Guantanamo Base—Visit
Here are some of the high-lights of my visit to Guantanamo on October 1–2. I went with John Crimmins and Joe Califano. (Ed Martin, because of last minute pressures, could not make it.) We tried to educate ourselves on the whole range of Guantanamo problems but focussed particularly on the contingency planning for likely Castro actions against the Base.
1. My general reaction was positive. Base morale is high, and generally speaking, the staff seems willing and able to cope with any Castro provocations. Most importantly, Rear Admiral Davis, the Base commander, appears to have a good feel for the political dimensions of his job. He struck all of us as being sober, careful, and politically sensitive; moreover, he seems to have conveyed this sense to his staff.
2. However, there are some problem areas, all of which will be studied carefully over the next couple weeks.
(a) If Castro decides that it is in his interest to retaliate against our increasing activities, he can easily shut off the Base water supply. It would have great nuisance value and would only cost him about $180,000 per year in foreign exchange earnings.
If Castro cuts off the water, present planning calls for the evacuation of dependents from the Base and the transport of water to the Base from Port Everglades in two water tankers. Evacuation of dependents seems a fairly drastic step and we are looking into ways of avoiding this eventuality.
(b) A recent DOD directive, which aims at reducing the gold flow and saving money, and which calls for a RIF (reduction in force) of local employees at all overseas bases, presents special problems for Guantanamo. Among other things, a reduction of the Cuban work force will allow Castro to get plenty of propaganda mileage out of the apparently harsh treatment of Cubans who have thrown in their lot with the U.S. Some people will construe the RIF as a U.S. move to phase out of Guantanamo. Many riffed employees probably will exile themselves from Cuba and simply refuse to leave the Base. DOD is now thrashing out this problem.
[Facsimile Page 2] [Typeset Page 1821](c) Even assuming that the DOD directive will not apply to Guantanamo, dependence on Cuban workers still presents a problem. Castro could easily cut off the flow of Cuban workers who live off the Base (over 2000); moreover, this is not unlikely. Although one might argue that Castro would be reluctant to take such a step in view of the fact that Base workers provide him with roughly $4½ million annually in foreign exchange, it should be noted that Castro is permitting no new people to obtain jobs on the Base; apparently, foreign exchange is not of over-riding importance. Additionally, he undoubtedly knows that a cut-off of Cuban labor would cause us problems.
If Castro takes this step, present planning calls for the transfer of Seabee personnel to Guantanamo to take up the slack. This will be expensive, however, and alternate sources of labor should be explored more fully (e.g. Jamaica and Miami). Alternate sources are already being explored to a limited extent to deal with the normal attrition rate (roughly 5% a year) which has resulted from Castro’s ban on new Cuban workers for the base.
(d) [text not declassified]
3. Since we obviously cannot foresee all the contingencies (especially minor harassment-type actions) which may arise with respect to Guantanamo, the most important thing is that we have a commander there who is competent and in charge, who is politically sensitive, and who is responsive to Washington. I think Admiral Davis probably fills the bill as well as most.
At the same time, there is a good deal of contingency planning which can, and should be done in Washington. This is in the works.
- Highlights of Chase’s visit to Guantanamo Base October 1–2. Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Cuba, Guantanamo Base, 8/16/63–10/4/63.↩