707. Memorandum from Chase to McGeorge Bundy, September 61
SUBJECT
- Exile Raids—Extent of Knowledge Within Executive Branch
I refer to your interest in knowing the extent of knowledge within the Government about the exile raids in which the U.S. was involved. The following will give you a pretty good, general picture of the people who knew a little or a lot about the raids. A detailed list which indicates the names and numbers of all the players (including aides, secretaries, S/S types, etc.) and which indicates the extent of their knowledge, will take some time to run down. Are you interested in such a list?
1. White House—The President, you, Tom Parrott, and I knew specifics about the raids.
2. State—The Secretary, George Ball, Averill Harriman, Alexis Johnson, Ed Martin, Sterling Cottrell, John Crimmins, and Bill Bowdler (Crimmins’ deputy) knew specifics about the raids. The head of the Miami Office, Harvey Summ, is cleared for this sort of information but was aware of our involvement only in the most general way.
Dick Phillips and Jim Greenfield in P, in preparation for press queries, were told for their own background that “we were interested” in the raids.
In INR, the liaison men with CIA, Joe Scott and Al Carter, knew about the raids. Presumably, Tom Hughes, George Denney (Tom’s deputy) and John Plank also knew.
3. Defense—Roswell Gilpatric knew details about the raids and, presumably, he told Secretary McNamara.
As a member of the Cuban Coordinating Committee, Cy Vance knew details about the raids; he probably told one or both of his two people who work on Cuba—Joe Califano and Lt. Col. Al Haig.
[Facsimile Page 2]4. CIA—On the operating side, obviously, a number of people knew about the raids. Also, a few intelligence people were given general information so that the events would not be over-played in the intelligence reports. For the same reason, a few people in DIA had general [Typeset Page 1815] information about the raids. Generally speaking, the intelligence people were told about the raids shortly before they occurred.
5. Miscellaneous—The AG, Bromley, and other members of the Standing Group, not mentioned above, knew about the raids. Certain Navy elements in the operational area knew where the attack boats were going, but not the details of operation.
A great many people knew there was something special about these raids, although they did not know the details. For example, the Coast Guard, Customs, and INS had to be told to leave the “comings and goings” of the operation alone. Also, a very few people in DOD who had to procure special equipment, (e.g. cannons and mortars) for the group knew that some “hanky-panky” was going on somewhere. Finally, the intelligence watch officers on duty the night of the raids were told that we were aware of the raids; this prevented needless nighttime phone calls.
6. CIA says that information about the raids is given to people who have a real “need to know”; furthermore, a person is given only as much detail as he needs to know. While Tom Parrott regards the above as a pretty tight control, I regard the apparent security of the two attacks as slightly short of miraculous in view of the extent of knowledge around the government. However, I confess that I don’t know enough about the total security set-up to make a judgment as to whether or not it could be made significantly tighter.
- Exile raids—extent of knowledge within the Executive branch. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, Exiles, 7/63–9/63.↩