As in the case of earlier contingency studies with respect to Cuba, while
we have used few members of our staffs this memorandum has not been
fully staffed in either State or DOD
nor seen by the JCS, and thus does not
necessary represent the views of our respective Departments. Also, we
are presenting this study in accordance with the desires of the Standing
Group merely to provide a basis for discussion.
Attachment
SUBJECT
- Possible Soviet Initiatives to End US Aerial Reconnaissance
Over Cuba
Problem:
To evaluate considerations involved and the various options available
to the USSR and Cuba in seeking to
end US aerial reconnaissance over Cuba.
Discussion:
The Soviet Union, and still more Castro’s Cuba, wish the cessation of
US overflights of Cuba. The issue at present is only in the
background, and the Communists evidently do not feel it is desirable
to raise their objection prominently until they think there is
something they can do about it. They evidently recognize that the
shooting down of a reconnaissance plane would probably provoke
active countermeasures to which they could not effectively respond,
and moreover not end the surveillance. Assuming that they continue
to believe that they cannot with impunity use direct action to end
the overflights, they may nonetheless turn to other measures in an
effort to compel us to stop further reconnaissance. Moreover, they
[Facsimile Page 3] may
believe that some such other measures may, even if unsuccessful in
themselves, create a better foundation for shooting down a plane
later.
Alternative Courses of Action:
There appear to be six possible lines of political action open to the
Communists in attempting to get us to call off the aerial
reconnaissance of Cuba:
[Typeset Page 1748]
(1) Cuba could protest in the United Nations General Assembly and/or
Security Council, calling for condemnation of the US action and for
a cessation of the flights.
(2) Cuba could bring action before the International Court of
Justice, or seek UN action
requesting an advisory opinion from the ICJ, calling for cessation
of the flights.
(3) The Soviets could initiate pressures elsewhere—such as Berlin,
privately or publicly tying the new pressure to the continuing
overflight of Cuba, and offering to relax the new point of tension
in exchange for cessation of aerial reconnaissance of Cuba.
(4) The Soviets could privately offer to withdraw all Soviet military
personnel from Cuba in exchange for quiet dropping of aerial
surveillance by the US.
[Facsimile Page 4]
(5) The Cubans could publicly propose a trade-off allowing ground
inspection in exchange for an end to aerial inspection, but we are
sure they would not do this unless they also added in demands for
ground inspection in Florida or elsewhere in the Caribbean.
(6) The Cubans could, with discrete Soviet assistance, initiate
aerial reconnaissance of some other area in the Caribbean—say,
Guatemala or Nicaragua—on the grounds that offensive military action
was being prepared in those countries (as it had been before the Bay
of Pigs attack), justifying and requiring Cuba to undertake this
peaceful aerial inspection. Then, the Cubans could offer to call off
their surveillance if we call off ours.
Action in the United Nations:
A Cuban protest in the United Nations, vigorously supported by the
other Communist powers, would open up an issue which most people
have forgotten. They would probably gain some support for the idea
that indefinite aerial overflight and reconnaissance was an undue
infringement of sovereignty and should be stopped. The US defense
would rest on two bases: The OAS
Resolution of October 23 authorizing such action, and the de facto resolution of the October crisis in
which with forbearance the US settled for unobtrusive aerial
reconnaissance [Facsimile Page 5] instead of insisting on ground inspection.
Therefore, it would not be necessary to rest our case on a general
right to reconnaissance, and this should hold in line many states
which would be unwilling to agree to any position which justified
aerial reconnaissance over their own countries.
It seems unlikely that the Cubans could get the necessary two-thirds
of the General Assembly or a majority of the Security Council to
support them (in the latter case, of course, we would veto). In
fact, we believe that the Cubans, and the Soviets, would not expect
an initiative in the UN to end the
overflights, and probably not even to garner enough votes to be
useful propaganda against the US action.
[Typeset Page 1749]
Action by the ICJ:
Cuba has not agreed, and is not likely to agree, to compulsory
adjudication by the International Court. If she did, there are a
number of counter-suits which the US could initiate (expropriations
of US properties, etc.). However, while the Cubans could not be sure
of winning their case on the overflights, we could be even less sure
of winning. Our defense would be the OAS Resolution of October 23, but if Cuba announced its
complete severance from the OAS
(which it has not yet done), it is doubtful that we would win.
[Facsimile Page 6]
On balance, we think it unlikely that Cuba would submit its case to
the ICJ, but if they did and we conceded jurisdiction to the Court,
we could be in trouble.
Counterpressures:
The Soviets could initiate pressures elsewhere. In particular, they
could attempt to gain support from our European Allies by making an
end of reconnaissance over Cuba the price for warding off a new
Berlin crisis. There are certain precedents for the Soviet policy of
counterpressures, which would be more likely in a situation where
the Soviets could better control the degree of tension than they
could, for example, when there was a real crisis over Cuba.
Nonetheless, it would appear unlikely that the Soviets would expect,
or would succeed in rallying, much support in the West for a sellout
on Cuban reconnaissance in exchange for relaxation of artificially
generated tensions elsewhere.
Inducements:
If the Soviets and Cubans are sufficiently desirous of ending the
overflights, they might approach us privately with an offer of some
expendable quid pro quo. In particular, if
they should decide that the continued presence of Soviet military
personnel was not [Facsimile Page 7] essential, they could offer the complete
withdrawal of such personnel in exchange for an end of the
overflights. They would, of course, have to consider that if the US
refused, they would have tipped their hand on the negotiability of
the continued Soviet military presence. Nonetheless, if they are
sufficiently concerned, and do not believe they can force their way,
they may attempt to buy it.
Presumably, our response would be insistence that the overflights
continue until there was also active on-ground inspection, and that
Soviet offers to withdraw their military only reflected growing
awareness of the untenability of their position in having military
men in Cuba in the first place.
Bargaining:
The Cubans could announce with much fanfare their readiness to accept
ground inspection if aerial surveillance were ceased and if [Typeset Page 1750] ground inspection were made of
places which they believed were being used to mount offensive action
against Cuba: the Bahamas, Florida, Puerto Rico, and perhaps others.
If this approach followed protests by Cuba or in the UN, it might
persuade some that the Cubans had a reasonable solution as well as a
justified complaint.
[Facsimile Page 8]
The US defense would be acceptance in principle of the encouraging
Cuban indication of readiness to substitute effective ground
inspection for aerial coverage, but rejection of any tie-in of the
extraneous matter of alleged support for offensive actions against
Cuba, and noting (in backgrounding) US clamp-down on Cuban exile
activists. The OAS members would
probably hold firm with us, but some might be willing to entertain
the Cuban offer plus inspection against
subversive training and export by Castro. All in all, the Cubans
would be less likely now than in November to stir up much support
for their position, and would probably not effectively create an
impression of reasonableness sufficient to provide political
justification for unilateral action to stop the overflights.
Sauce for the Goose:
The Cubans could tacitly embrace our own concept for justification,
and turn it against us. They could announce that they were mounting
aerial reconnaissance over some area where offensive forces had
previously been mounted against them. Conceivably, they could carry
reciprocal action to the point of announcing in advance their plans
to overfly Dade County or Puerto Rico, but recognizing the greater
risk in this initiative it seems more likely that they would pick
[Facsimile Page 9]
Nicaragua, Guatemala, or the Dominican Republic for MIG–17 or B–26 overflight. They would
probably announce their intention in advance in order to undercut
our use of presumptive bombing attack as justification for immediate
interception. If the United States undertook or supported the
interdiction of Cuban reconnaissance flights, the Cubans would have
a much stronger basis for an appeal to the UN complaining over Yankee attempts to apply a double
standard. If we did not interfere, there would be substantial
repercussions outside of Cuba and some pressures to agree to mutual
cessation of reconnaissance overflights. Again in this case, the
chief US defense would be the OAS
Resolution of October 23.
Conclusions:
This quick survey of possible Communist initiatives to end US aerial
surveillance of Cuba is not exhaustive, but includes the half-dozen
most feasible courses they might consider. None of them appears so
sure of success as to be immediately attractive, but such decision
is also a product of the intensity of their desire to end the
overflights, which it is difficult to measure.
The possible courses of action are not necessarily mutually
exclusive. The Communists could concert a carrot and stick
combination [Facsimile Page 10] of [Typeset Page 1751] UN action and pressures, for example. They
could try several courses in turn. A counterpressure on our access
to Berlin would pose greatest danger of direct confrontation with
the USSR and would be the course
most involving pressures on our NATO Allies.
Attached is an illustrative scenario, couched
in terms of a memorandum to Khrushchev from his “staff,” outlining one way in
which the Soviets might combine some of the possible options
described above.
