68. Despatch 576 from San Jose, April 61

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Subject: Status of Relations with Current Costa Rican Government

SUMMARY: The Embassy and all members of the country team are currently concerned over what appear to be steadily worsening relations between United States officials in Costa Rica and the administration of President Echandi. The purpose of this despatch is to bring to the attention of the Department and of Ambassador Telles the country team’s assessment of this situation and at the same time to recommend certain steps which we feel should be taken promptly in order to restore the status of United States representation in San José.

All members of the country team are in full agreement that relations between the top echelon of the Echandi government and the Embassy have been deteriorating for at least a year, and have now reached a low point at which the Embassy and most of its associated United States Agencies in Costa Rica are finding it difficult to perform their basic consultative functions with the Costa Rican government, insofar as these involve contacts with President Echandi and with his most intimate circle of cabinet ministers. Manifestations of the “cold front” are evident in one form or another to all members of the country team and have appeared in manifold and often subtle ways, frequently easier to sense than to document precisely.

Difficulties being faced by the Embassy and USOM in the development loan field have considerable bearing on the overall situation described in this despatch, although they must be regarded as contributing elements to the cold front atmosphere rather than results of it. Beginning with a recent rural credit loan project and in all applications since that one, President Echandi and the Minister of Economy Borbon Castro [Facsimile Page 2] have simply ignored United States representatives in San José, channelling their proposals directly to DLF through Ambassador Escalante in Washington. The fact that these projects have been given prompt and considerate attention in Washington has encouraged Echandi to continue bypassing the Embassy and USOM with the result that recent requests stemming from the Act of Bogota meetings have [Typeset Page 173] been prepared hastily and incompletely and entirely without consultation with United States representatives on the local level.

More specific indications of an intentionally frigid attitude on the part of the Costa Rican government are as follows:

An officer of the Civil Guard noted to the Army Attaché that the attention and entertainment accorded the officers of “HMS Cardigan Bay,” a British frigate which visited Puntarenas in February 1961, was considerably greater than that extended to the officers of United States ships which have visited the same port during the past year, and was, according to the Army Attaché’s Civil Guard informant, intended by the Costa Rican government to emphasize the current feeling of coolness toward United States Missions in Costa Rica.

The United States Army Mission in Costa Rica is experiencing various difficulties in performing its mission, most specific of which has been the unwillingness of the Costa Rican government to assign officer students to the CONUS and USCARIBE Schools in Panama—and which is part of “an obvious change in a formerly cooperative attitude,” which took place following the inability of the Mission Chief to provide an additional space for a Costa Rican participant (Col. Ventura, unofficial commandant of the Civil Guard) on “Operation Solidarity.”

Neither President Echandi nor any of his closest circle of cabinet ministers appeared at a large reception given by the officers of the Embassy on March 16, 1961, to introduce the newly arrived Deputy Chief of Mission, (nor did he or any of his staff reply to or apparently take any cognizance of the formal invitations sent them on this occasion).2 This was particularly noticeable in view of the fact that the President had apparently made a particular effort to put in an appearance at a reception given by the Spanish Embassy during the same week, and on the evening prior to his wife’s departure for a stay in Guatemala.

The President has simply ignored other requests by the Deputy Chief of Mission for appointments—in one occasion [Facsimile Page 3] in order to solicit his taped comments on the Kennedy speech, and in another instance to present to him a personal gift and note from Mrs. Katharine Bracken, Director of the Office of Central American and Panama Affairs (the embarrassment of the President’s personal secretary with regard to these discourtesies has been quite apparent).

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The President’s attitude toward the Deputy Chief of Mission when the latter has spoken to him at other official receptions has been correct but icy.

Certainly one of the sources of Echandi’s current attitude toward the Embassy is his own inner-directed personality, and the same can be said of certain of his cabinet members such as Minister of Economy Borbon Castro. However, the country team is unanimously agreed that most of our current difficulties result directly from a long, and unfortunately continuing succession of United States actions (or lack of actions) which have affronted the sensibilities of the President and his administration. The most important of these are the following:

(1) Occasions on which Echandi feels that he has been let down by the United States.

Case of Claudio Antonio Volio and the Institute at Turrialba. (Ref. Embtels 342, 5/6/60; 346, 5/9/60 and Emb. Desp 642, 6/8/60)

While Echandi believed that he had secured the agreement of other Central American Presidents to have their representatives on the OAS vote for his personal candidate Claudio Antonio Volio to be Director of the Agricultural Institute at Turrialba a year ago, the latter lost the election as a result of a last minute switch by one Central American vote. Echandi subsequently learned that the Honduran Ambassador in Washington was prevailed upon to vote against Volio (which cost him the election). As a result, Volio resigned from the Institute and Echandi has been furious at the United States ever since, since he felt that we had not only not supported him on this matter but had probably influenced the Honduran representative to change his vote.

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Reimbursement for Expenses Incurred In Providing Security at the San José Conference. (Ref. Emb. Desp. 513, 3/2/61)

The President and his military advisors have felt ever since the San José Conference of last August that the United States should reimburse the Costa Rican government for expenses incurred by the Costa Rican Civil Guard in providing security for the conference and the visiting delegations, of which the largest was from the U.S.A. The President has become increasingly disillusioned over the failure of the United States to make any tangible response in this connection.

Costa Rican Requests for Military Equipment.

The President has for some time been hoping for a United States gift of communications and transportation equipment for the Civil Guard, which is now down to the point, according to one source, of having to rent private cars for patrol purposes. A succession of visiting VIP’s from the Department of Defense have come and gone, inevitably [Typeset Page 175] leaving Costa Rica government officials with the impression that the United States would respond favorably to the Costa Rican desire for equipment. As nothing in the way of concrete help has materialized, the disappointed President has taken more and more the attitude that United States promises to Costa Rica are worthless. (This situation was aggravated recently when the Argentine Government decorated the President with the Grand Cross of the Order of San Martín in expression of Argentine appreciation for the care and cooperation extended to their delegation at the San José Conference.)

In addition, the President reflects concern felt by his military staff at the unsympathetic insistence by USCINCARIB for cash on the line for tear gas grenades which Costa Ricans requested urgently at the time of the banana workers’ strike in 1959 (ref. Deptel 226, 1/6/60). The fact that Costa Rican credit with USCINCARIB had been jeopardized [Facsimile Page 5] by prior difficulties in obtaining payment from the Costa Ricans for equipment purchased from CINCARIB is altogether overlooked by the Costa Rican government, and United States hesitancy in what they considered an hour of need is contrasted unfavorably with the fact that the Panamanian government responded immediately to the Costa Rican request with a loan of United States made grenades.

Loan Applications.

The delays and frustration which have attended each of the Costa Rican applications for United States loans to date tend to be regarded by the President and his administration as further examples of lack of United States support. The fact that many of these delays result from improper and inadequate preparation by the Costa Rican government are naturally overlooked locally. Additional salt has been rubbed in local wounds by the announcement of approved loans to Nicaragua and Honduras, as well as extension of a DLF loan to an Italian colony in Costa Rica, while nothing transpired on the Government’s own rural credit loan.

13th Month Bonus Payment to the United Fruit Company Employees. (Emb. Desps. 330, 6/13/60; 685, 6/24/60)

When in January 1960, President Echandi settled the banana workers’ strike by payment on behalf of the United Fruit Company of the full 13th month bonus, he fully expected that the government would eventually be reimbursed by the company for the three weeks’ wages which were paid from public funds. Echandi has been informed that recommendations to this effect by the local management were overruled in Boston and he reportedly thinks that pressure should have been exercised by Washington to bring about this result.

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The Punta Llorona Affair.

Ever since the abortive Punta Llorona affair in which Costa Rica effectively broke [Facsimile Page 6] up a Nicaraguan invasion attempt, Echandi has reportedly felt that the United States Government did not give him adequate and necessary support needed to effectively break up the rebel camp and insure that the arms there were taken over by the Costa Rican Government. Echandi has claimed that Deputy Aguiluz, one of the ring leaders in the affair, was able to get away with a plane load of arms because the United States did not immediately provide adequate air support. Echandi is also reportedly of the opinion that the United States has dragged its feet in response to requests for the use of IAGS and Panama based helicopters during various actual or suspected emergencies.

(2) United States Official Identification with José Figueres.

United States interest in Pepe Figueres as an international figure tends to be completely misconstrued in Costa Rica in consequence of Figueres’ local identification as spark plug of the most active and effective domestic opposition to Echandi, and as leader of only one of the three or more parties currently engaged in pre-electorial maneuvers for the Presidential elections of February 1962. United States high official regard for Figueres has been frequent and continuous, and each public expression of it increases the resentment of the Echandi government and at the same time of the other candidates for Presidential office (see despatches 556 and 559, March 24, 1961). Specific examples of United States identification with Figueres which have rankled deep in San José are:—

Direct citation of Figueres by President Kennedy in his speech of March 13, 1961. Prior to the speech, President Echandi had expressed interest in the Embassy’s invitation to provide taped comments on the substance of the speech. Subsequently he simply ignored the Embassy’s invitation and gave his comments to the local A.P. correspondent. For the even more violent reaction of [Facsimile Page 7] Otilio Ulate, a prominent candidate for the Presidency, see despatch 559, March 24, 1961.

A recent copy of “Combate,” the publication of Figueres’ International Institute of Political Studies prominently featured an article jointly written by Figueres and Adolph Berle. Mr. Berle is in consequence blamed locally for the close identification of the Kennedy administration with Figueres.

The obvious interest of United States official and semi-official visitors in the International Institute of Political Studies and the frequency of high level public exploitation of telegrams and letters of congratulations, confraternity, and esteem from noted American liberals has irritated many conservative Costa Ricans. The activities of United States Professor Harry Kantor and Sacha Volman, and Embassy contacts with the Institute and its backers are all highly suspect in the eyes of the Costa Rican Government.

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During the past year, the new President of the United Fruit Company, Mr. Sunderland, made the tactical blunder of calling on Figueres before calling on Echandi. While this is something for which Echandi can hardly blame the Embassy, he is still most resentful of what he considered a gratuitous slight handed him by the largest United States Company operating in Costa Rica.

(3) Personal Sensitivities.

While Echandi is unquestionably aware of the importance of Ambassador Willauer’s services outside of Costa Rica during the period of his assignment here, the President has evidenced displeasure over what he considers the casual attitude of the Department of State towards Costa Rica in so frequently calling the United States Ambassador away to attend to other priorities and leaving American representation [Facsimile Page 8] in Costa Rica in the hands of a Chargé d’Affaires.

The President and other members of the Costa Rican Government were highly irritated at the conduct of District Engineer Brown of the Bureau of Public Roads. While Brown was ultimately removed from Costa Rica at the Embassy’s request, the impact of his appointment here was just one more in this series of apparent United States affronts to Costa Rican pride.

The above succession of what the President clearly regards as either United States lack of support of his government or direct United States official identification with his opponents has now resulted in the Costa Rican freeze-out of the Embassy and its component elements described above.

The country team feels that the arrival of a new Ambassador, particularly one who is reportedly bilingual in Spanish and one who has a clear mandate to devote himself primarily to Costa Rica, should go far toward the re-establishment of good relations with Echandi, but we believe that additional positive actions by the United States Government are required to break the ice. Furthermore, the country team is agreed that any continuing relationship with Echandi will depend on the willingness of United States Government officials in Washington to avoid public identification with ex-President Figueres and to demonstrate impartiality in dealing with all Costa Rican political leaders.

In line with these thoughts, the country team recommends prompt and positive United States action along the following lines to remedy the situation:

1. Award of the Legion of Merit to President Echandi as an initial gesture by the new United States Ambassador immediately following his arrival. Basis for the award has been stated fully in the proposal made by [Facsimile Page 9] the Army Attaché to the Department of the Army for award of the decoration, a copy of which is attached as Annex A to this [Typeset Page 178] despatch. It is recommended, however, that relatively lesser emphasis be devoted in the citation to the conference of Foreign Ministers in San José, since the Argentines have already beaten us to the punch in this connection, and also in view of the complete change of administration in the United States since the meeting took place. Placed within an appropriate context, the country team feels that this gesture would be greatly appreciated by President Echandi and would help Ambassador Telles materially to make a fresh start.

2. A White House invitation to President Echandi for a Kennedy-Echandi meeting, if possible timed to coincide with approval of a significant Costa Rican loan request. It appears that President Echandi has particular personal reasons why he would appreciate an opportunity for a trip to the United States at the present time, but it is questionable whether he could obtain the required Costa Rican congressional authorization to leave the country except in response to an invitation of this magnitude. In addition, it has come to the attention of the Embassy that Figueres’ supporters (United States and other) are endeavoring to arrange a Kennedy-Figueres meeting. The country team is unanimous in agreement that a Kennedy-Figueres meeting would utterly queer relationships with the Echandi Government and with all other current aspirants to the Costa Rican presidency, unless a Kennedy-Echandi meeting is arranged first.

3. The country team urges all interested Departments and Agencies in Washington to find the $10,000 worth of radio supplies and ammunition which the Echandi administration feels is its due as a result of the San José Conference. The [Facsimile Page 10] Embassy appreciates the good intent of the Departments of State and Defense in sending a proposed mission to examine all aspects of Costa Rican defense needs and endeavor to make a more substantial donation to the Costa Rican Government. However, so many Generals and other dignitaries have come through Costa Rica of late, listened sympathetically to Costa Rican pleas and ultimately provided nothing, that the country team currently advises against sending any new mission to this country unless they come armed with tangible evidence of their good will. In addition, the Chief of the U.S. Army Mission to Costa Rica points out—

a) that complete information on Costa Rican military needs is submitted annually to the DOD in connection with Mission programming (latest submission dated 3/21/61, copy attached as Annex B).

b) minimum lead time for delivery of the type of equipment desired by the Costa Ricans is 18 months which would be too late under any condition to help the Echandi government.

4. Prompt support by Washington agencies for those loan requests submitted by the Costa Rican Government which have prior country team support. The country team feels that it might be very helpful if [Typeset Page 179] the two loans in which USOM has participated from the start (the San José Waterworks Loan and the INVU Housing Loan) could be given particularly prompt attention, which might make clear to the Costa Rican Government the advantages of joint planning in San José over “end runs” to Escalante.

5. Full support and backstopping by the United States at the Washington level for an anticipated Costa Rican request for an Exim Bank loan to cover relocation and reconstruction of the portion [Facsimile Page 11] of the Inter-American Highway between El Coco and San Ramon. This section of the road is obsolete by today’s highway specifications and constitutes a real traffic bottleneck. The work has not been included in BPR programming or appropriations for Costa Rica and is not likely to be until completion of remaining unconstructed sections of the highway have been assured. However, the Costa Ricans are so convinced of the current necessity of this work that they propose to request a three million dollar loan to enable them to undertake at least the most urgent portions of the road themselves. President Echandi and his Minister of Public Works discussed this problem at length with Senators Chavez and Young during their visit to San José in November 1960.

6. Prompt ICA/Washington signature of the contract which will authorize the employment in Costa Rica of IDA contract personnel to advise the Costa Rican National Bank on colonization projects and to assist Costa Rican officials in the preparation of loan applications for this purpose. It is the strong view of the USOM Director in San José that had these experts been available prior to the submission of the current Costa Rican colonization loan project a greatly improved proposal would have been forthcoming. Their assistance in preparation of a resubmission of this request is even more urgently needed now.

E.F. Rivinus
Chargé d’Affaires a.i.

Attachments:

Annex A—Proposal by Army Attaché dated March 28/1961

Annex B—Submission to DOD of 3/29/61

(1) Military Assistance Plan FY 63–67 Plan Backup

(2) Military Assistance Plan FY 63–67 Plan Summary

  1. Status of relations with current Costa Rican Government. Secret. 11 pp. DOS, CF, 611.18/4–661.
  2. NOTE: The Minister of Education did attend the reception and has in fact continued to be both accessible and cooperative in relations with United States representatives.