668. Paper prepared by Joseph Califano, April 251
COMMENT ON CUBA PAPER
The following paper contains an outline of the paper, including a list of the specific actions proposed.
The attached paper is virtually identical with the two papers you considered last week, with the exception of Annex B, a brief discussion of the paper prepared by the Assistant Director of National Estimates.
The paper is subject to the same objections as it was last week. There are no specific actions for approval by the Special Group. The paper still appears to be inadequately thought out: (1) the objectives of the proposed program are ambiguous, (2) its cost effectiveness (in terms of men, money and matériel) is insufficiently developed, (3) the program does not offer a sufficiently flexible array of target choices, and (4) the program offers no mechanism for continuous and systematic evaluation.
With respect to paragraph E on page 2, to my knowledge Cy Vance never agreed in the Cottrell Committee to placing devices within the hold of a cargo ship to sink Cuban vessels; he merely agreed to the use of such devices to disable Cuban vessels, recognizing that there was a risk that the vessels would be sunk.
I still hold to the belief, which becomes stronger as I work more in this area and discuss the problem in more detail with experts, that the CIA (with our support) can devise a program of covert intelligence collection, hit and run raids, sabotage and resistance activities, carefully keyed to an established but flexible time table (during an arbitrarily selected period, say four or six months) and to existing and potential human and matériel assets. The objective of such a program might be to probe Soviet and Cuban (Castro and the Cuban population) intentions, to test the neutrals, the Latin Americans and our allies, to keep the Castro Regime off balance, to prevent Castro from further stabilizing and consolidating his regime and to effect economic, political and/or psychological damage on Cuba. Such a program could present an array of choices so that varying emphasis could be placed on intelligence, economic targets, psychological targets, etc., during any selected [Facsimile Page 2] period. Such a program could be devised so that the Special Group [Typeset Page 1714] would have an opportunity to select an appropriate mix of covert activities for CIA to undertake during a subsequent time period.
- Covert intelligence collection, hit and run raids, sabotage, and resistance activities. Top Secret. 2 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 77–0131, Sabotage/Destruction.↩