Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, American Republics; Cuba 1961–1962; Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Volumes X/XI/XII, Microfiche Supplement

66. Airgram A–731 from Bogota, May 10¹

Bogota, May 10, 1963

SUBJECT

• Political Contingencies—Extra-legal Changes.

CONTENTS

I.	Introduction
II.	Conclusions for U.S. Policy
III.	Conditions for Extra-legal Change
IV.	Range of Possibilities
V.	Elite Action
VI.	Civilian-Military Action
VII.	Military Coup
VIII.	Social Revolt

I. Introduction

For the purposes of contingency planning this airgram considers the plausible range of alternatives which might take place under the hypothesis that an alteration of the constitutional order occurs. The range of alternatives considered here—and these are contingencies not predictions—go beyond what might be termed unconstitutional change (e.g. a golpe) to include quasi-legal change, that is, a forced change within the constitutional framework but outside the normal cycle of election—full term—new election (e.g. forced resignation of the president and assumption of the presidency by his constitutional successor).

It is obviously not possible to predict the precise form of an extra-legal development. The possible variations are virtually infinite. All that is attempted here is to consider what conditions might prompt an extra-legal change (a tabulation which could also serve as a listing of “early warning signals”) and the general broad categories of possible action and US response.

II. Conclusions for US Policy

Any survey of this subject matter leads rapidly to one conclusion—any break in the constitutional process, however mild, runs a high risk of starting a chain reaction that cannot be contained. Such an opening of Pandora’s box means that virtually no one would have any control over subsequent events, and the risk of developments unfavorable to the US interest would become significantly great. For that reason extra-legal changes are to be avoided where possible. The inference is obvious for the US—US policy should be aimed at supporting the efficacy of the present administration and the National Front system and their ability to respond to national problems and aspirations. The converse of this inference is also clear—we should do nothing to weaken the administration. Thus, in seeking to prod the political mechanism to appropriate developmental action the relatively fragile political pattern must not be pushed beyond its depth (Embtel 654).

The above, of course, is the recommended general thrust of current US policy. Should it happen that a break in the constitutional process is provoked in any way, the range of choices then open to US policy would obviously be determined by the nature of the extra-legal change and of the surrounding and succeeding circumstances. In any such situation, regardless of its precise configuration, the basic objectives of US policy would be at least:

a) Avoid having the national situation in Colombia become hostile to the US and, if at all possible, maintain a friendly or sympathetic environment;

b) Minimize dislocations, antagonisms and frustrations to avoid the build-up of discontent and instability; instability provoked by dislocated and abnormal political and social patterns is particularly deleterious in terms of sane accommodation to domestic problems and needs, as well as potentially explosive in terms of international balance of power factors;

c) Avoid control of the country or sizeable increase in influence by Communists and Castroists.

To achieve these desiderata US policy would have to be aimed at:

a) pressing for a return to institutional normality (presumably elections) and to norms of sufficient enlightenment and flexibility to handle aspirations and change with a minimal risk of explosion;

and b) providing such financial and other assistance as circumstances may indicate are appropriate to avoid chaos and social dislocation and ease the return to normality.

The difficult part, obviously, is the translation of the above in to specific courses of action. In the Colombian context, any of the contingencies listed here, except possibly elite action resting on a very broad-based consensus, would probably mean the end of the National Front. The stronger the break with constitutionality the greater the probability of civil divisions and antagonistic reactions. This risk is great considering Colombian history and the depth of traditional political feeling and divisiveness. In the event such flux and divisions occur, whether along historical political cleavages or even on class lines, the image of the US held by the various elements in the society will be extremely pertinent for future US relations with Colombia. The point for US policy is that identification of the US with one sector or sectors at the expense of antagonizing opposed but otherwise legitimate elements could be dramatically counter-productive.

It would be natural in such a contingency to feel the compulsion to do something rather than nothing. But in circumstances of wide fragmentation, restraint may be the wiser course. One is, in fact, tempted to argue that, given Colombian history and character, with its infinite internal animosities and complexities, the US should attempt not so much to manipulate specific internal elements as to exert its pressure on the broad basis of making clear to the society what the US goal is in terms of social justice, development, etc., and what circumstances will receive our cooperation and support. We must also recognize that the Communists will attempt to clothe themselves in legitimate causes. A correct policy of combatting the Communist threat will therefore require us to avoid both a simplistic understanding of the situation, and an oversimplification of our interest in public order into opposition to legitimate class or economic interests. Obviously a deterioration of the situation into civil war or an impending danger of Communist take over may require our greater commitment in the internal situation. But recognizing this means we must exert considerable wisdom, patience and understanding to avoid unnecessary involvement in domestic complexities.

Still another caveat is worth mentioning. It may be that past US policy in Latin America made the mistake in a few instances of supporting (and identifying itself) with the status quo, when the status quo was neither able to meet the people’s aspirations or was itself domestically discredited. Just as the Alliance for Progress seeks to achieve, through what can be called the “normal” political system, an evolution of the social status quo to something more responsive to national aspirations, these same goals should be the guide for US policy in an abnormal political situation. The problem there will be to seek constructively to return that abnormal situation to a more normal and stable one to achieve the same goals.

It will be clear, then, that a situation which develops subsequent to an extra-legal change can become most complex and subtle. The force US policy to consider, on the one hand, the need to influence events and shape circumstances constructively to convert the situation into one favorable to us or at least not unfavorable to us, and, on the other hand, the need to avoid intervening in complex domestic situations in such a way as to ruin the chances of achieving that very objective. The Scylla and Charybdis of this dilemma will be the limits between which US policy must tred in such circumstances.

While US responses to general categories of contingencies are mentioned below, the following generalizations may be made by way of summary:

1. Recognition. The more broadly based the support for an extra-legal change, the less difficult is the problem of recognition. In any event, recognition as a means of leverage has severe limitations, as history has shown. Hence the US should not use recognition as a lever except in a quite limited manner for nudging the situation in a given direction. In case of a change, there will probably be no value in immediate public comment on the situation. The first task will be to gauge the situation and determine how stable or how convulsed it is. For this a prudent time will be required. If it is determined that a reasonably stable government is established, recognition can be extended. Not to do so given an otherwise stabilized situation is probably not practical. Recognition, however, should be based squarely and explicitly on Resolution 35 of the Ninth Inter American Conference, and it should be made clear that recognition implies neither approbation nor commitment per se. This puts the proof of the pudding on performance and avoids the risks and dangers of US identification with the regime in case of subsequent deterioration (in the way that Rojas became progressively unpopular).

2. OAS . Real and meaningful consultation should be undertaken. There will obviously be a value in allowing a number of LA states to recognize first, and it may be that OAS channels will prove valuable levers depending upon circumstances. It should be recognized, however, that the US cannot evade being judged alone, regardless of what other American Republics do, and it will probably be judged with different criteria. (Thus the public opinion of Uruguay’s decoration of Pérez Jimenez was not the same as that of the US’s performance of the same thing.)

3. Assistance Programs. Barring civil war or a particularly obnoxious regime, the first US reaction should probably again be silence and maintenance of existing programs. No public comment or speculation regarding the aid programs should be made so that future maneuverability is not lost. Whether aid programs continue to be maintained at the same levels, or are increased or decreased would depend upon the development and the nature of governing elements. The aid programs are of course our strongest leverage, and should be used as such firmly but adroitly.

4. Military Assistance. What is said of 3 applies in this case. Military aid, however, is an especially delicate thing to handle. About all that can be said for planning purposes is that we should recognize the following pitfalls: It is quite likely that an extra-legal change would involve the military and military control of government. Such a change is also likely to arouse public reaction and resistance. Hence US military assistance could become mistaken for support of a military supported dictatorship. On the other hand, removal of military aid may cripple the only institution capable of confronting Communist subversion, especially insofar as the Colombian violence problem is concerned. The dilemma is deepened by the fact that legitimate opposition to military rule would most probably manifest itself in renewed rural violence, and a repetition of the 1948–53 political violence is a real possibility. In those circumstances US military assistance may be used to fight legitimate political opposition. These considerations must be carefully kept in mind. At this point it is difficult to imagine circumstances grave enough to warrant US military intervention, and it will be important to keep a tight rein on such compulsions.

III. Conditions for Extra-legal Change

An extra-legal alteration of the constitutional order could occur as one of two basic things: 1) “preventative” action by status quo elements motivated by a belief that their interests can be protected in no other way and/or by a belief that action is needed to forestall category 2; or 2) social revolution, violent or not, from either the right or left, aimed at changing the existing institutional order and status quo.

Circumstances and conditions which could result in category 1 are:

a) Widespread and intense discontent;

b) Intensification of problems especially economic and social;

c) Relative impotence of authority to handle problems, and consequent lack of confidence in the administration or even in the institutional order;

d) Visible increase in subversive capacity or challenge;

e) Existence of leaders with sufficient prestige and power to take action.

Since the decision to act in a “preventative” type action is essentially a subjective one, it is impossible to predict at what point such a decision might be made. It could be made without disintegration being far advanced or the substantive situation being really very bad, because it would essentially be anticipatory.

Circumstances and conditions which would result in category 2 are:

a) Widespread and intense discontent;

b) Intensification of problems, particularly social problems that affect lower classes, such as unemployment;

[Here follows sections IV through VIII comprising “Range of Possibilities,” “Elite Action,” “Civilian-Military Action,” “Military Coup,” and “Social Revolt.”]

1. Political contingencies—extra-legal changes. Confidential. 5 pp. DOS, CF, POL 23 COL.