650. Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to McNamara, April 111
SUBJECT
- U–2 Flights, Cuba—Contingency Plans (C)
1. A joint Department of State/Department of Defense draft paper has been prepared which lists courses of actions available to the United States in the event a U–2 reconnaissance aircraft is attacked over Cuba.
2. This paper emphasizes the political desirability of a prompt military response in such an event. It points out that the United States should be in a position to launch an attack against a single SAM site within the daylight hours of the same day a U–2 is destroyed and that prompt retaliation would deny Khrushchev the opportunity for bellicose threats or actions before the US response becomes a fait accompli.
3. It is militarily feasible to strike a SAM site in 12 hours from present posture, provided weather conditions and remaining daylight permit. In this regard, it is significant to note that planned attacks, which would be conducted at very low levels during daylight, require weather and light conditions of at least 400 feet and 5 miles visibility to assure positive target identification and accuracy. A lesser reaction time could be established by increasing alert measures for specific forces involved. However, it must be recognized that with US forces in their present DEFCON 5 condition, overt military action against Cuba in the context described above entails risks. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that if the suggested courses of actions in the State/Defense paper are approved, the military establishment should take the following measures:
a. Increase readiness to evacuate non-combatants from Guantanamo. The normal non-combatant population for the base, for purposes of evacuation plans, is 2400 individuals. At present, the planned capability to evacuate Guantanamo is from [less than 1 line not declassified]. [Facsimile Page 2] The time spread reflects fluctuations in the availability of shipping. If one AKA and four DDs are in port, evacuation could be accomplished in [less than 1 line not declassified]. With advanced warning and prepositioning of one AKA, this time could be reduced to one hour.
[Typeset Page 1672]b. Increase the world-wide alert posture of US forces concurrently with the decision to attack a Cuban SAM site.
c. Reinforce the garrison at Guantanamo.
4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that minimization of risks and adequate preparation for effective attack are more important considerations than a specific requirement that the retaliatory attack be made the same day.
5. It is requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff be given an opportunity for detailed comment on any subsequent draft before official use thereof.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Joint Chiefs of Staff
- U–2 Flights, Cuba—Contingency Plans. Top Secret. 2 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 69 A 0926, Cuba Sensitive 1963, 000.1—-.↩