Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, American Republics; Cuba 1961–1962; Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Volumes X/XI/XII, Microfiche Supplement

642. Memorandum from Brubeck to McGeorge Bundy, April 1¹

April 1, 1963

SUBJECT

• Prevention of Pin-Prick Raids against Cuba

The Deputy Coordinator of Cuban Affairs has supplied me with the enclosed memorandum which he has prepared for the Attorney General.

In accordance with the Deputy Coordinator’s request, I am forwarding it to you for your information.

/s/ C.C. Moor
for
William H. Brubeck

Executive Secretary

Enclosure

April 1 1963

SUBJECT

• Actions and Recommendations to Prevent Pin-Prick Raids against Cuba

At the Miami meeting (March 29–30), the group learned that ten exile raiding operations were planned for the immediate future and recommended the following actions:

1. Authorize Coast Guard to dispatch aircraft to watch over Norman Key in the Bahamas, from which action appeared imminent.

Current Status: Approved by White House. Aircraft dispatched.

2. Obtain British cooperation in preventing action from the Norman Key and other Bahama islands and seek British permission for Coast Guard to land men as necessary.

Current Status: Approved by White House. British Ambassador, informed of U.S. concern over raids, was receptive to suggestion of British cooperation. CIA and FBI arranged to provide British Intelligence continuing information regarding proposed raids that might involve British territory. British Embassy action officer undertook to act immediately on intelligence. Twenty man Bahamian police force landed at Norman Key at dawn March 30 and detained two Americans and one Cuban (names not yet known) who arrived by airplane while police were there. Still closer arrangements with British will be pursued. Miami Coordinator will go to Nassau this week.

3. Authorize INS to impose departure controls over suspected Cubans and Americans.

Current Status: Approved by White House. List of 29 highly suspect Cubans agreed upon by Miami intelligence agencies. INS served 25 with warnings not to depart U.S. and, in case of parolees, not to depart Dade County, Florida. State and Justice legal staffs agreed upon procedure for controlling departure of suspect Americans; policy officers will consider implications.

4. Authorize Coast Guard and Customs to impound suspect boats.

Current Status: Approved by White House. Coast Guard and Customs informed.

5. If personnel involved in contemplated raids are parolees, authorize appropriate agencies to warn and/or detain suspected parolees. (INS can detain suspected parolees for brief or extended periods for having violated the condition of their parole).

Current Status: White House approved warnings but not detention. INS should be permitted to detain suspects who ignore warnings. Decision requested.

6. Warn all exile suspects that U.S. desires raids to stop and is prepared to take necessary action.

Current Status: Approved by White House. Suspects are being informed.

7. Issue policy statement as soon as possible.

Current Status: Approved by White House. Joint State-Justice policy statement issued March 30.

8. Initiate intensified surveillance of prime suspects.

Current Status: Approved by White House. Intensified surveillance being conducted.

9. Study question of prosecution of suspects who are generally undesirable.

Current Status: Approved by White House.

******

The Miami group also recommended the following sustained actions to diminish the number of raids over the long run, for which approval is required.

1. Authorize Coast Guard to conduct daily air surveillance of the Bahamas.²

2. Authorize Coast Guard to maintain continuous boat surveillance of the Bahamas.2

3. Issue periodical statements to educate the public on United States policy, as elaborations upon the March 30 basic statement.

4. Publicize raiding plans of exiles as they become known.

5. Authorize INS to detain suspect raiders.

6. Prosecute selected cases.

7. Continue intensified intelligence collection.

8. Request Customs, Coast Guard and INS to intensify present programs.³

9. Warn persons who may assist raiders, such as boat charterers and fund contributors.

10. Develop guidance for more fruitful exile activities.

11. Include Puerto Rico in all foregoing programs. (As the Miami area tightens, many suspects will shift to Puerto Rico; additional funds, personnel and equipment would be needed to control activities there.)

Robert A. Hurwitch

Deputy Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

1. Transmits memorandum from Hurwitch to the Attorney General on actions and recommendations to prevent pin-prick raids against Cuba. Secret. 5 pp. DOS, CF, POL 30–2 CUBA.
2. Coast Guard now has 4 Albatross aircraft and would need 4 to 6 more (possibly from Navy). Coast Guard has 3 helicopters and would need 4 more. Coast Guard now has two 95-foot patrol boats and would need 6 more. With additional equipment Coast Guard believes it would have a 50% chance of detecting raids.
3. If Customs is to pick up and hold on to suspect boats, it would need 65 more men in order to cover the 500 mile coast line. Coast Guard gave Customs one 30-foot boat on March 30 and Customs urgently needs one more 35-foot boat for the Key West area.