Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, American Republics; Cuba 1961–1962; Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Volumes X/XI/XII, Microfiche Supplement

64. DOS Guidelines for Policy and Operations: Colombia, December 1962¹

December 1962

COLOMBIA DEPARTMENT OF STATE GUIDELINES FOR POLICY AND OPERATIONS

I. Basic Approach

There are no acute bilateral problems between Colombia and the U.S. Major U.S. concerns regarding Colombia are almost entirely connected with the general instability of the country’s political, economic and social structure. Poverty, ignorance and the resulting social unrest are somewhat less evident than in most of Colombia’s neighbors, but they still represent serious problems. Since the dictatorship was overthrown in 1957, Colombia’s Government has reestablished democratic processes and has done much to restore Colombia’s commercial reputation. Colombia appears to have caught the spirit of the Alliance for Progress and is actively seeking substantial assistance from abroad in order to carry out a comprehensive economic and social development plan.

The country has just given its Government a vote of confidence in congressional and presidential elections, and there is a good possibility that Colombia can provide constructive leadership in Latin America. Careful use of all available U.S. resources cannot only assist in the development of Colombia, but provide incentives for progress at a rate which should be able to meet the rising expectations of the people in this, the fourth most populous country in Latin America.

[Here follows section II., “Background.”]

III. Objectives

1. To continue under present circumstances to support National Front governments as the most effective means of providing political stability, for developing a sound economy, and for solving Colombia’s social problems within a framework of representative democracy.

2. To bring about recognition by greater numbers among the Colombian elite of the necessity for economic and social reform, and of their class responsibility to lead toward such reform.

3. To achieve a practical solution to the problem of stabilizing coffee prices on the international market, while actively working toward reduced dependence on coffee through the diversification of exports.

4. To assist with the continued reduction and eventual control, even in isolated areas, of the rural “violence” problem.

5. To encourage continued Colombian example and leadership in impressing the gravity of the danger posed by the Castro-Communist alliance on other hemisphere governments and peoples, as well as Colombia’s participation with the U.S. and other OAS states in preventing or countering Castro-Communist aggressive action or subversion.

6. To assist the labor unions in resisting Communist infiltration, and to orient the labor movement toward the U.S.

IV. Lines of Action

Political

1. Impress on the political leadership of the major factions that U.S. contributions to the socio-economic development of Colombia depend on the extent to which they subordinate partisan or personal objectives to the national interest, thereby promoting both political and socio-economic stability and viability.

2. Encourage democratic political groups to move toward the isolation of extremist elements of both right and left.

3. Encourage the government and the governing elite to continue to press forward in a positive program of tax revision, housing development, agricultural and educational reform.

4. Encourage the government to: (a) take a leading role in impressing on other Latin American governments the gravity of the Castro threat to hemispheric peace and security, (b) inform Colombian public opinion of the true Communist, totalitarian and subversive nature of the Castro regime, and (c) influence other Latin American governments to do likewise.

5. Elicit Colombian support of broad U.S. international objectives, including OAS action on Cuba, and encourage Colombian leadership within the framework of the OAS, UN and IA-ECOSOC.

6. Utilize the efforts of the Labor Attaché, the newly appointed USIS Information Officer (Labor) and all other U.S. Government and private means available to help free labor unions to defeat Communist efforts to gain control of the labor movement.

Military

1. Implement, and if necessary amplify, the April 1961 military assistance agreement with Colombia in support of the elimination of the continuing problem of rural violence, but at the same time stress to the Government the complementary need of improved law enforcement, reform of judicial procedures, and other measures to counter the “impunity” now enjoyed by many perpetrators of violence.

Economic

1. Continue to support Colombian planning for economic and social development in accordance with the aims of the Alliance for Progress, making judicious use of grants and loans which can be designed to step up the pace of this development. All branches of the U.S. Government should seek every available opportunity to praise the start which Colombia has made and to encourage the Colombian Government to implement new programs vigorously, so that Colombia can remain in the forefront of the Alliance for Progress.

2. Emphasize the need for responsible financial and import policies as a necessary basis for economic and social development, including consideration of a simplified and more realistic exchange rate structure. U.S. officials should continue to stress the fact that any reversion to the financial excesses of 1961 will not only imperil the favorable commercial reputation which Colombia has worked so hard to maintain, but will also drain off capital needed for essential economic and social projects. Because of the interconnection between Colombia’s overseas trading position and internal economic development, consideration of any U.S. aid project must include a study of its effects on the balance of payments.

3. Pursue negotiations for an international coffee agreement energetically, meanwhile encouraging Colombia to reduce coffee production. The technical assistance and AID loan programs in Colombia should regard the diversification of exports as a primary objective.

Public Affairs

1. Meet intensified Cuban, Chinese and European Communist propaganda by better explanation and interpretation of U.S. policies and objectives and through stepped-up publications output and improved distribution. Additional efforts are also necessary to publicize the expanding economic assistance program of the U.S.

2. Continue the AID labor leader program, as well as certain other technical assistance grantee visits to the U.S. which are consonant with the aims of the Alliance for Progress and which serve to augment the small leader grant and student exchange programs. The leader grant program should give increased emphasis to visits to the U.S. by young and volatile but non-Communist politicians whose knowledge of this country is deficient.

3. Expand community development projects on the Barrio Quiroga model at points of the longest range strategic value.

V. Contingencies

Possible developments which might frustrate U.S. policy and for which contingency planning may be needed:

1. A decision by the Colombian elite to rest on their political and economic accomplishments to date, with an accompanying refusal to implement social and economic reforms.

2. An inclination by the Colombian Government to relax financial and import controls in the belief that the U.S. will fund balance of payments deficits which arise.

3. A collapse of the world coffee market leading to a severe decline in coffee prices.

4. A breakdown of the National Front coalition system followed by a military coup d’état which might lead to either a rightist dictatorship or a Castro-Communist counter-revolution and takeover plus a shift toward neutralism in Colombian foreign policy.

1. Secret. 10 pp. DOS, S/P Files: Lot 69 D 121.