614. Memorandum for record, February 61
At 4:00 o’clock on February 5th, a meeting of the Executive Committee of the NSC was held attended by all, including Cottrell, Salinger, Sylvester and Mr. Jordan of State. The Cuban situation was discussed, overflights were denied despite recommendations by General Taylor [Typeset Page 1606] supported by DCI, for seven low-level missions, and final appeal by DCI for the Cayo Francis mission. DCI expressed one reservation, which was the possible effect of low-level reconnaissance on the Donovan mission, which had not been fully explored. The President ruled there would be no low-level overflights until after a Kennedy-Khrushchev exchange.
The President asked, and DCI responded, that the incoming ship suspected of carrying armament was under careful surveillance and this would continue: DCI would make recommendations concerning low-level reconnaissance of unloading when ship arrived at port, indicating that if the ship went into Havana, low-level reconnaissance would not be productive because of the proximity of receiving warehouses to the dockside. On the other hand, if the ship docked at Matanzas or Mariel, low-level photography would be productive.
ACTION: DD/P should recruit all resources; CIA should ensure that the Navy is following the ship closely at sea; DCI should receive regular reports in order to approach the President for a policy decision.
It was agreed that DCI should make a public statement and that DIA should arrange a background briefing, and that CIA’s special committee chairman should be advised of the proposed public statement.
There followed a general discussion of the Cuban situation, the Common Market, NATO problems. Those interested in Cuba were excused and Ambassadors Dowling, Bruce and Kohler, Governor Herter and Dean Acheson attended this part of the meeting.
[Facsimile Page 2]The President raised questions and circulated a memorandum posing a number of penetrating questions on European affairs.
The President questioned whether the multilateral arrangements would in the final analysis prove satisfactory to any NATO country because of our right of veto. He asked that this be studied, feeling it would be better not to proceed too far down this road if, in the final analysis, it would meet objection from one or several NATO partners.
Ambassador Dowling commented on the Franco-German treaty, stating that this treaty will not be acted upon in Bonn for three or four months, that it can not be defeated but it might be amended if we exercise proper influence.
There was general discussion of the possibility of a British Common Market Association and its effect on U.S. economy. This was considered a definite possibility now that the British Common Market negotiations had been broken off. The President asked an appraisal of the economic implications of such a development.
- Meeting of the Executive Committee of the NSC re Cuban situation including overflights, incoming Soviet ship. Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80–B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 January–31 March 1963.↩