Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, American Republics; Cuba 1961–1962; Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Volumes X/XI/XII, Microfiche Supplement

612. Report prepared for the Executive Committee, February 5¹

February 5, 1963

SOVIET FORCES IN CUBA

Personnel

I. From a few hundred technicians in the summer of 1962, the Soviet military presence in Cuba has grown to include regular troops manning the tanks and other weapons of mobile army groups, radar and missile specialists in charge of an extensive air defense system, and a large number of communications, air force, naval, and other personnel.

A. Although some 5,000 to 6,000 troops associated with the offensive missile systems have left, we believe 17,000 Soviet military personnel remain.

1. These troops operate equipment which the Cubans are not yet able to operate or which the Soviets do not intend to give to Cuba.

2. They are a tangible expression of Soviet concern for the preservation of a Communist state in Cuba.

a. They help defend Castro regime against internal attack.

b. They may also serve as brake on Castro adventurism.

3. There are no indications of major Soviet troop withdrawals from Cuba, either planned or in train.

4. DETAILS: Major components and estimated strengths are:

a. Air and air defense: 7,500

SAM system—3,500

AAA and radars—3,100

MIG fighters—900

b. Army ground forces: 7,500

Armored groups—5,000

Headquarters, engineers, training—2,500

c. Navy: 2,000

Cruise-missile units—1,000

KOMAR guided-missile boats—200

Headquarters, communications, security—800

Air Defense System

II. To defend their MRBMs and IRBMs, the Soviets planned and largely achieved before the missile withdrawals an integrated air defense system employing both surface-to-air (SAM) missiles and jet fighters, backed by an extensive radar and communications net.

A. Efforts to improve the SAM system continue.

1. Since the withdrawal of the MRBM and IRBM units, three SAM sites have been involved in major relocations. In each case, the SAM site was moved away from the coast and closer to an important military objective.

2. On 30 January, a new SAM site under construction was photographed southeast of Havana near a military airfield. This may indicate that an existing SAM site near the coast in the same general area will shortly be moved.

3. DETAILS:

a. 24 operational SAM sites, each with 6 launchers and approximately 20 missiles. Total SAM missiles—approximately 500.

b. SA–2 missile (Guideline) has an estimated range of 25–30 n.m. with a 500-lb. HE warhead. The SA–2 is considered effective against aircraft operating between 3,000 and 80,000 feet, with limited effectiveness down to 2,500 feet and up to 100,000 feet.

c. The SAM sites appear to be manned entirely by Soviet personnel. Although some training of Cubans in operation of SAM equipment may be planned, there are no indications that this has begun.

B. To supplement surface-to-air missiles, the Soviets have brought in 104 MIG fighters.

1. Of these, 42 are MIG–21 (Fishbed) aircraft, manned entirely by Soviet personnel.

a. The MIG–21 is a highspeed (Mach 2) aircraft which can be used both for ground support and air defense. Its armaments includes infrared homing air-to-air missiles. It has a combat radius of 350 n.m.

b. The MIG–21 aircraft probably is capable of carrying nuclear weapons. [text not declassified]

c. If a nuclear weapon was attached to this aircraft, its radius of action would be seriously restricted, to about 200 nautical miles and then only under visual flight conditions.

d. There is no evidence, from our continuing photo-reconnaissance of Cuban airfields or other sources, of any special security or other activity which would take place if nuclear weapons for these aircraft were in Cuba.

1. The Soviets run their own communications with little or no help from the Cubans or Cuban facilities.

2. Cubans appear to work conjointly with Soviets in some reporting aspects of the air defense network. They have no controlling function over the missiles themselves.

3. DETAILS:

a. [text not declassified]

b. [text not declassified]

Cruise Missiles

III. Although the Soviets brought in approximately 150 coastal defense missiles during the build-up, they have thus far established only 4 operational sites.

A. The large number of cruise missiles which remain in crates suggests that the Cuban crisis interrupted a Soviet program to deploy several more sites.

B. DETAILS:

1. There are 4 operational units, with 8–10 missiles each, at Siguanea, Santa Cruz del Norte, Banes, and Campo Florida (a standby and training site). Total missiles: 32–40.

2. Cruise missiles are believed to be in crates observed at:

Guerra (just west of Mariel)—46

Mayari Arriba (in eastern Cuba)—48

Santiago de Cuba (west of Guantanamo)—21

a. This makes a total of 115 cruise missiles still in crates, enough to establish about 15 more sites.

3. The coastal defense missile observed in Cuba is a surface-launched version of the AS–1 air-to-surface, anti-shipping missile. In this version, it has an estimated range of 30 to 40 nautical miles, with a 2,200-pound conventional warhead.

Soviet Armored Groups

IV. In late August and early September, the Soviets established mobile armored groups at camps in the general vicinity of the offensive missile sites. These units were probably meant to provide local defense for these sites in event of US invasion or guerrilla sabotage attempts.

A. Each encampment—at Remedios, Santiago de las Vegas, Artemisa, and Holguin—contains about 1,500 officers and men and their organic equipment.

1. The four groups have a total of 40 heavy tanks, 340 medium tanks, and 15 amphibious tanks, as well as assault guns, mortars, and infantry rocket launchers.

2. There are about 24–32 FROG tactical rockets, an anti-personnel weapon with a range of about 50,000 yards.

3. The Soviet mobile armored groups are also equipped with 28 SNAPPER wire-guided anti-tank rockets.

Missile Patrol Boats

V. To complement the coastal defense capabilities of the cruise missiles, the Soviets brought in 12 KOMAR guided-missile patrol boats.

A. These units are being operated by mixed Soviet and Cuban crews.

B. DETAILS:

1. The boat is a Soviet P–6 motor torpedo boat hull modified to carry two missile launchers. It has a top speed of 43 knots with maximum range of 650 n.m. at 20 knots.

2. The missile has a range of 10–15 nautical miles (limited by radar line-of-sight) and carries a conventional warhead of about 2,000 pounds.

3. All 12 KOMAR’s are now in Mariel-Havana area, although 4 have operated out of Banes at times in the past.

Attachment

February 5, 1963

SUMMARY OF DCI’S STATEMENT TO MAHON COMMITTEE
ON SOVIET PERSONNEL IN CUBA

I. On 1 July 1962, shortly before the Soviet buildup began, we estimated roughly 500 bloc advisors and technicians in Cuba.

A. This was based on the extent of training programs underway and Soviet practice in other countries like Egypt and Indonesia.

II. After the buildup began, we added to this figure on the basis of arrivals of passenger ships known to be carrying military personnel, assuming they were normally loaded.

A. Our figures progressively rose to 2,000 on 1 August, 2,300 on 1 September, and 4,000 on 19 September.

B. We knew some additional Soviets had come on cargo ships, but could not say how many.

C. These estimates were what the intelligence community could agree on. We now know they were much too low.

III. Once we received the photography of 14 October, we were able to shift our methodology. By 22 October we had a rough estimate that a minimum of 8,000–10,000 Soviets would be needed to man the Soviet weapons systems then known to be in Cuba.

IV. At this time we were giving first priority to the strategic weapons systems. The question of personnel numbers was of lesser importance.

A. We were however, accumulating a mass of additional information from many sources. As time permitted detailed analysis, we progressively raised our estimate until we now believe there were about 22,000 Soviet military personnel in Cuba at the height of the buildup. (Apparently the passenger ships were troop loaded and substantial numbers came in on cargo ships.)

B. This figure included the four armored groups which were only identified in November.

V. Some 5,000–6,000 Soviets departed in November and December, leaving our present figure of 17,000 now there.

A. We think this figure is the best that can be reached. We have covered Cuba exhaustively.

B. Some individual sources have reported figures considerably higher than these. Recognizing that neither we nor anyone else can make a head count, we only report those figures which can be verified by available intelligence resources.

Annex A

SOVIET MILITARY EQUIPMENT IN CUBA

	1 July 1962	1 November 1962	1 February 1963
MRBMs	0	42	0
Tanks	160	345	395
Field artillery andAT guns	770	1,320	1,320
AAA guns	560	710	710
FROG rockets	0	24–32	24–32
Military vehicles	3,800	7,500–10,000	7,500–10,000
SAM sites	0	24	24
SAM missiles	0	500	500
Cruise-missile sites	0	4	4
Cruise missiles	0	150	150
Air defense radars	0	About 160	About 200
Jet fighters	35	101	104
Jet light bombers	0	42	0
Helicopters	24	About 70	About 85–100
KOMAR cruise-missile boats	0	12	12

Annex B

ESTIMATE AS OF DATE LISTED OF SOVIET MILITARY PERSONNEL IN CUBA (EXCLUSIVE OF CIVILIANS)

1 July 1962	500
1 August 1962	at least 2,0002
1 September 1962	at least 2,30022
19 September 1962	about 4,0002
22 October 1962	8,000–10,0003
1 December 1962	15,000–22,000 (present at height of buildup)
15 December 1962	17,000 (present after departure of missiles and bombers)
1 February 1963	17,000

1. Soviet Forces in Cuba. Top Secret. 12 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee Meetings, Vol. IV, 34–42.
2. Agreed intelligence community estimates based on known normal passenger capacity of ships.
3. Retrospective analysis shows 22,000 present at this time.