Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, American Republics; Cuba 1961–1962; Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Volumes X/XI/XII, Microfiche Supplement

61. Airgram A–145 from Bogota, September 5¹

Bogota, September 5, 1962

SUBJECT: Transmitting Memorandum of Conversation.

There is transmitted herewith a memorandum covering a conversation concerning the violence problem in Colombia which I had with President Guillermo Leon Valencia on September 4, 1962.

Fulton Freeman

Attachment

SUBJECT

• The Violence Problem in Colombia

PARTICIPANTS

• President Guillermo Leon VALENCIA
• Ambassador Fulton FREEMAN

I called today at the President’s request to discuss with him the problem of continuing violence in Colombia. On several previous occasions, both prior to the elections and subsequent thereto, President Valencia and I had discussed briefly the violence question in Colombia and he had expressed the desire to hear what recommendations and suggestions I might have. During a small luncheon meeting with President Valencia and Mr. Chester Bowles, just prior to the inauguration, I had mentioned that the Embassy had conducted a fairly thorough study of the violence problem in Colombia and that we had come up with certain conclusions and ideas which might be of interest to the President. On that occasion the President had expressed keen interest in our ideas and he said that he wished to discuss the subject with me as soon after the inauguration as would be convenient.

On August 5th, 1962, the day prior to Valencia’s inauguration, I had the opportunity to speak briefly with President Lleras at a social function. Lleras said that he had found our paper on violence to be of considerable interest, that many of the recommendations were completely practicable, and that he intended to pass it along to President Valencia at the first opportunity. He said that he would explain the background of the paper to President Valencia and that he would caution him as to the desirability of keeping its origin secret.

I opened the conversation with Valencia by inquiring whether he had received this document from President Lleras and, if so, what opinion he might have formed. Valencia replied that he had discussed the matter with President Lleras, that he knew of the existence of such a paper and some of its general conclusions, but that he had so far not received a copy from President Lleras.

I took the opportunity to describe the background of the paper and to reassure the President that it was not our intention to interfere in any way in the internal affairs of Colombia. I explained that this had for the most part been an academic study, examined from the point of view of what we ourselves would do if we were to have the responsibility of eliminating violence in Colombia, and that the paper simply represented a summary of the conclusions, ideas and recommendations of the Embassy. Valencia assured me that he was very grateful for our interest in this matter and that he would examine the paper immediately and with the greatest care.

I explained that our paper gave no hint whatsoever as to its origin and was drafted in such a way that it might well have been written, for example, by a professor of sociology at the University of the Valle. I said that we were of course very anxious to avoid disclosure of the role of the Embassy in the preparation of this document, because such disclosure would of course be highly embarrassing both to us and to the Colombian authorities. The President appeared to appreciate and to agree with this point of view.

I explained that our paper contained four basic recommendations: (1) The need for coordination at the highest governmental level in planning and executing actions against violence; (2) the need for improving the intelligence capability of government entities; (3) the need for effective and appropriate law enforcement action by the armed forces and police, with adequate support of civilian authorities; and (4) the need for adequate, prompt and effective rehabilitation measures by civilian entities, including the utilization in civic fields of military resources. I also took the opportunity to read to the President the paragraph proposing an organization such as a “National Internal Security Committee”.

I then pointed out to the President that, in order to avoid any hint of origin, our paper contained no suggestions whatsoever of the areas where the United States Government might assist the Colombian authorities in the implementation of such a plan. As he was well aware, I pointed out that we were in fact willing and anxious to be of assistance in appropriate areas and I specifically mentioned the following: (1) Assistance in the intelligence field by training Colombian personnel in available U.S. training programs and in the provision of U.S. intelligence advisers through MAP; (2) support of military/police action against bandits by the provision through MAP of necessary equipment and advisory assistance; (3) USIS cooperation with troop indoctrination and education programs; (4) more extensive use of U.S. training programs and schools in both the U.S. and in the Canal Zone; (5) the temporary assignment of a small Civic Action Team to work with the Colombian Army in developing suitable projects; (6) assignment of a small Police Mission in order to advise the National Police on internal organization and training; and (7) support through AID and other appropriate agencies of the Colombian Government of efforts to conduct social and economic rehabilitation in the violence areas. In recapitulating this potential assistance, I placed particular emphasis on the Police and Civic Action Teams which I indicated were already prepared to depart for Colombia on fairly short notice should the President indicate to me that they were desired. Assistance in the other mentioned areas, I said, should be the subject of further close consultation between members of the Embassy staff and persons that the President might wish to designate.

The President said that he naturally wished to study the document in detail before commenting to me on it. He said that he did wish at the outset, however, to express his appreciation for our efforts to assist in eliminating the violence problem and that he did have some preliminary comments. As to the Police Mission and the Civic Action Team, he would take up these matters right away with the appropriate officials to see whether the necessary requests would be forthcoming. He gave every indication that this would be the case. With respect to the possibility of the establishment of a central coordinating group such as a “National Internal Security Committee”, the President expressed great interest in the idea and said that he wished to study the Constitution once more to see if this might not be feasible.

With respect to military/police action now being taken in Colombia and planned for the future, the President stated that he had recently been given a five-hour briefing on Plan Lazo and that he was quite satisfied with the detailed planning which had been carried out. He did state, however, that certain shortages in equipment were developing (he mentioned specifically radio and communications equipment) and he indicated that he might be submitting a request in the very near future for specific items of equipment. He recalled that when he was in Washington he had discussed the violence question with President Kennedy, and he stated that at that time President Kennedy offered to be of assistance in any appropriate way. Valencia said that he informed President Kennedy that he wished first to return to Bogotá and study the situation intensively, but that he had replied that he would quite probably be submitting a request for specific assistance in countering the violence problem. Valencia indicated that we would be receiving a note through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on this subject in the very near future.

Before my departure, President Valencia insisted on setting a date for a further meeting with me on the violence problem at which time he would present his opinion and comments on our paper. We decided to meet on Friday September 7 at 11 a.m.

1. Transmits September 4 memorandum of conversation between Ambassador Freeman and President Valencia on the violence problem in Colombia. Secret. 4 pp. DOS, CF, 721.00/9–562.