Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, American Republics; Cuba 1961–1962; Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Volumes X/XI/XII, Microfiche Supplement

58. Memorandum of conversation, December 17, between President Kennedy and President Lleras ¹

Bogota, December 17, 1961

SUBJECT

• Developments in the Dominican Republic
• Planning for Foreign Ministers’ Meeting on Cuban Problem

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.

  • President Kennedy
  • Mr. Chester Bowles, President’s Special Assistant
  • Ambassador Moscoso
  • Assistant Secretary Woodward
  • Deputy Assistant Secretary Goodwin
  • Ambassador Freeman
  • Mr. Henry Dearborn, Counselor of American Embassy, Bogota

• Colombia

  • President Camargo Lleras
  • Foreign Minister Castilla Caicedo
  • Minister of Finance Mejia
  • Director of National Planning Dept. Gutierrez

President Kennedy called at President Lleras’s office at 5:30 p.m. on December 17. Each President was accompanied by advisers as recorded above. Press photographers were invited in and pictures taken. President Kennedy then suggested that the group sit down for conversations and the Presidents, together with their advisers, held a discussion for over an hour.

Developments in the Dominican Republic

President Kennedy had just been handed a cable from the Consul General in Santo Domingo with information on developments there and the Dominican situation was the first item of conversation. He gave President Lleras information from the cable to the effect that President Balaguer had agreed to announce his withdrawal from the presidency before the end of February, actually intending to leave on January 26. Balaguer had agreed in the meantime to set up a Council of State consisting of Jose Maria CABRAL Bermudez as First Vice President, Dr. Rafael Bonelly as Second Vice President and with the following as members: Monsenor PEREZ Sanchez, Sr. Amiama Tio and Sr. Imbert. Presidents Kennedy and Lleras and others present discussed the characteristics of this group and it was generally agreed that the information in the telegram was encouraging.

Planning for Foreign Ministers’ Meeting on Cuban Problem

The Presidents devoted most of their conversation to the pending Foreign Ministers’ Meeting to consider the Cuban problem. The points discussed were: 1) the timing of the Meeting; 2) the place where it should be held; 3) the need for additional support; and, to some extent, 4) the substance of the resolutions to be presented.

President Kennedy raised the question of timing. President Lleras stated that before President Kennedy went to Venezuela and Colombia he favored holding the Meeting on January 10, as proposed earlier. Since the visits, and owing to their extraordinary success, he was even more firmly opposed to postponement. He thought the momentum derived from the visits should not be lost. President Kennedy agreed and said that preparations should be aimed at an early holding of the conference. He said that Ambassador Woodward and Mr. Goodwin would remain in Bogota for another day to join Ambassador Freeman in an effort to reach an agreement with Foreign Minister Caicedo and President Lleras on the texts of the resolutions to be presented.

In considering where the Meeting might be held, President Lleras stated that he was not one of those who was worried about adverse reactions if Washington should be chosen as the site. He remarked that no one could reasonably say that because the Meeting was held there, its action would be dictated by the U.S. Government. Washington was, after all, the seat of the OAS and what could be more logical than for important questions to be considered there. He doubted, for example, that many really believed the UN was under the domination of the United States because its headquarters was in New York. If the Meeting could be held elsewhere, President Lleras suggested that Bariloche in Argentina would be a good place. He added that Montevideo, Santiago, or “even Brasilia” would also be acceptable. He did not think El Salvador would be satisfactory, but he was in favor of Costa Rica if that Government were amenable. It was agreed that a site must be chosen before the end of the week, and it was the consensus that if no other place were available Washington should be the place.

President Lleras expressed the opinion that at least one other country should be brought into the group of those favoring action since Uruguay was doubtful. He believed that of the countries which abstained on the vote of December 4, Chile would be the most easily won over. He said he knew that President Alessandri was 100 per cent in agreement with him and that the reason why Chile had abstained was that Alessandri had lost the last elections and had bowed to political pressure. Argentina, Dr. Lleras thought, might be brought around, especially if it could be made to appear that the Argentine Government was playing a leading role. He asserted that he would be glad to have Argentina think it invented “the whole thing” if only it would adopt a constructive attitude. Dr. Lleras urged that President Kennedy work on President Frondizi, President Alessandri and also on the Bolivian Government. Mr. Woodward noted confidentially that Mexico had let the United States know that it would break relations with Cuba if all the other American States did so. President Kennedy replied that the United States would work especially on Presidents Frondizi and Alessandri and would do what it could to influence Brazil, Bolivia and Ecuador. He also urged President Lleras to concentrate consultive efforts on these Governments.

Regarding the substance of the resolutions, President Lleras emphasized that he thought the word “sanctions” should not be used as this would draw all manner of objections from various countries. He favored simply noting at the chosen time that the Cuban Government had identified its interests with the Sino-Soviet bloc and had reneged on its inter-American commitments, and therefore the nations of the inter-American system were breaking off relations with it. President Kennedy stated that he would prefer not to give Cuban relations with the Sino-Soviet bloc as a reason for the break, but rather that the Cuban Government was engaged in subverting the democratic governments of the western hemisphere in implementation of the policies of Moscow. President Lleras enthusiastically supported this suggestion.

President Lleras explained that Colombian strategy would be to hold firmly at first to an insistence that a special vigilance committee be set up to follow Cuban performance and to report to the COAS. He wished to assure President Kennedy, however, that Colombia would ultimately agree to having the COAS itself to perform this function. He said Colombia was adopting this strategy in order to sidetrack the numerous changes in the resolutions which other countries might propose. He hoped they would devote their efforts to convincing Colombia to give up its vigilance committee, thereby diverting them from seeking changes in more vital parts of the resolutions. Dr. Lleras suggested that the United States might inform other Governments that it was working on Colombia to dissuade it from insisting on a vigilance committee. He urged President Kennedy to meet with President Frondizi on the latter’s way home from the Far East, but also urged that Colombia’s strategy on the vigilance committee not be divulged. President Kennedy suggested that the U.S. might suggest that Argentina too attempt to convince Colombia to give up this committee idea.

President Kennedy asserted that it was now urgent to reach an agreement on the draft resolutions with Colombia and that he hoped this could be done the following day. Then consultations with the other Governments could begin promptly. He stressed again that a definite time and place for the Meeting should be set before the end of this week. Dr. Lleras was entirely in agreement and an appointment was set up for Mr. Woodward, Ambassador Freeman and Mr. Goodwin to meet with Foreign Minister Caicedo and President Lleras on December 18. Mr. Jamison, who had just arrived in Bogota for these conversations, would be present. President Kennedy stressed that the strategy should be to draft fairly strong resolutions and then modify them if necessary.

1. Developments in the Dominican Republic; planning for Foreign Ministers meeting on Cuban problem. Confidential. 5 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Colombia, January 1962.