Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, American Republics; Cuba 1961–1962; Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Volumes X/XI/XII, Microfiche Supplement

567. Telegram 2106 from USUN, December 4¹

New York, December 4, 1962, 7 p.m.

Department pass White House. Eyes Only Secretary. Re Cuba. Fol is report of latter part of mtg with Sovs this afternoon on Cuba.

Stevenson said that we had received just a few minutes before from UN Secretariat copy of declaration delivered to SYG by Cuban Amb of draft declaration which Cubans propose to make in SC. Stevenson said he was beginning to wonder whether under these circumstances there could be an SC mtg. If Cuba presented documents along these lines U.S. would have to object vigorously and prolonged controversy in SC would fol. Stevenson recalled that Mikoyan had in earlier mtg opposed controversy in SC and we had agreed. Stevenson said we had hoped that we could agree with Sovs on 2 declarations to be presented in SC but that he now fears that if Cuban declaration of this character is submitted any SC mtg on this subject would be unwise.

Kuznetsov did not reply directly except to say that he understood Cuban draft declaration contains same points as in draft Sov-Cuban protocol which Sovs of course support. They had favored protocol as means of solving crisis and preventing its repetition [illegible in the original] U.S. objected. Sovs did not insist but agreed to have 3 repeat 3 separate declarations. These should of course correspond to agreements between President and Khrushchev and also to statements made by Cuban Govt Oct 28 and Nov 26.

At yesterday’s mtg they had explained sort of document they considered necessary in order to reach agreement. So far negots had been very disappointing. U.S. draft declaration does not deal with some elements of agreement between Pres and Khrushchev and on other hand introduces new elements not found in that agreement. There is no sign on U.S. side of intention to expedite fulfillment of its obligations and completion of crisis. Sovs on their side have carefully fulfilled all obligations and wish to end crisis as soon as possible, work out declarations on basis agreement between Pres and Khrushchev and then submit these agreed documents to SC for its approval.

Stevenson inquired whether SOV draft declarations has yet been completed.

Kuznetsov replied that Sovs working actively on their draft but hoped in meantime U.S. will reconsider its own draft and take into account Sov comments.

Stevenson replied that if we could get inspection on the ground in Cuba there would be no serious difficulty in reaching agreement but in absence such arrangements U.S. will have to take its own measures. He feared we could not reach agreement on all details of 2 declarations and thought perhaps best we would be able to do is to make separate declarations outside UN and to file them with SYG. He added however that it may be too soon to reach such conclusion until we have seen Soviet draft declaration. We would of course study Soviet objections to our draft. He merely wished to suggest that we may not be able to reach agreement and have to agree to disagree. He hoped however this would not be the case.

Stevenson

1. Report of afternoon meeting with Soviets. Top Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 737.56361/12–462.