Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, American Republics; Cuba 1961–1962; Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Volumes X/XI/XII, Microfiche Supplement

545. Telegram 1862 from USUN, November 19¹

November 19, 1962

Department pass White House. Eyes Only for Secretary. Cuba. Reference: USUN 1835.

I. We have given further careful thought to probable course negotiations with USSR to wind up current Cuban crisis. As a result we have come to fol conclusions:

1. That while it is conceivable USSR will within next few days agree to remove IL–28’s in return for lifting quarantine, we should continue to plan on assumption they will hold out for full agreement.

2. That USSR will, however, take out IL–28’s in connection with final agreement including appropriate declarations in SC, and it will not insist on Cuban demands being included.

3. That meaningful inspection or verification in Cuba can realistically be obtained only at price of some mutual inspection on invasion problem which would include inspection rights in continental US, Puerto Rico and Guantanamo, as well as in other Caribbean states.

4. That such inspection would probably be politically impossible for US and unacceptable to other Caribbean states, at least unless effectively under OAS control, in which case it would be unacceptable to Castro.

5. That therefore UN verification of withdrawal or UN long-term safeguards in Cuba re in fact most unlikely.

6. That if we can thereby assure removal of IL–28 bombers and obtain tacit SOV acquiescence in continued U–2 overflights, it would nevertheless be worthwhile for US to repeat an assurance, in appropriate qualified terms, against an invasion of Cuba, but not go beyond explicit terms contained in letters between President and Khrushchev.

7. That as price for our willingness to do this we might ask for USSR’s tacit acceptance of overflights in lieu of their failure to comply with their undertaking on verification. Means of carrying out this “tacit” acceptance might be removal of SAM’s and/or withdrawal SOV military personnel and technicians from Cuba. We would be willing to see this accomplished through private understanding rather than public commitment.

Therefore, end result of final negotiation initiated along lines USUN 1835 would be declaration on our part along lines Part II of this message.

II. Final declaration to which we would recede in accordance Section I this tel, including SOV acceptance of overflights, would be along fol lines:

In letters of Pres Kennedy on Oct 27 and of Premier Khrushchev and Pres Kennedy on Oct 28, 1962, firm undertakings were made regarding settlement of Cuban crisis.

These undertakings were stated in Pres Kennedy’s letter of Oct 27 along following lines:

(1) The USSR would agree to remove from Cuba, under appropriate UN observation and supervision, all weapons systems capable of offensive use and would undertake, with suitable safeguards, to halt further introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba.

(2) The US would agree—upon establishment of adequate arrangements through UN to ensure carrying out and continuation of these commitments—(a) to remove promptly quarantine measures now in effect, and (b) to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba; Pres expressed his confidence that other nations of Western Hemisphere would be prepared to do likewise.

The US notes statement made by Sov Union that all medium and intermediate range missiles, all nuclear weapons and components have been removed, that all IL–28 bomber aircraft will be removed from Cuba within four weeks, and that all sites for medium range and intermediate range missiles have been dismantled. We note also that the [illegible in the original]. It also notes statement of USSR that no weapons capable of offensive use will be further introduced into Cuba. We welcome these assurances.

Those aspects of undertaking for UN verification of removal of missiles and bombers and destruction of sites and for UN safeguards to ensure that there is no further introduction into Cuba of weapons systems capable of offensive use have not been accomplished. Minimum inspection procedure was arranged, however, under which US naval vessels have verified that SOV vessels leaving Cuba carried out number of missiles which USSR certified to US as having been in Cuba. The USSR has also agreed to similar verification of the withdrawal of the IL–28 bombers.

In absence of fulfillment of full undertaking for UN verification we will have no choice but to continue to be alert through our own resources about any possibilities that such assurances have not or will not in future be complied with.

Evidence directly available to US Govt does not at present lead us to conclude that any medium or intermediate range missiles or IL–28 aircraft remain in Cuba nor that any weapons with offensive capability are currently being introduced.

On condition that the SOV assurances are being and continue to be complied with, US herewith gives its assurance that it will not invade Cuba.

The quarantine has also been removed as of November 20.

Nothing herein contained impairs rights or obligations of US under Charters of UN or OAS or under Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.

III. If on other hand USSR should in next few days agree to removal of IL–28s in return for lifting of blockade, we will then face question of whether having already obtained satisfaction on bombers we given assurances in absence UN inspection. One possible solution under these circumstances would be to continue negotiating indefinitely and ultimately perhaps accept stand-off in which there was no inspection and no US assurances would be given. There would be number of advantages in fol this course of action. But we think it more desirable to close out present confrontation with USSR at early date and if this is conclusion reached, we would suggest continuing to press for agreement on SAM and/or SOV personnel removal as quid pro quo. Proposed declaration above could be easily modified to suit this situation.

IV. In meantime we also need have US proposals for verification measures on withdrawal and continuing safeguards to present together with initial declaration along lines USUN 1835 in first mtg with Russians. We suggest something along fol lines:

(1) SOV proposal for invasion inspection. We would reject SOV proposals for UN inspection on invasion issue as going beyond scope of verification agreed to in correspondence between Pres and Khrushchev.

(2) Verification of removal. We would propose one-time on-the-spot inspection by military observers under SYG in Cuba of all missile sites and of airfields capable of accommodating IL–28 bombers and of any places where SYG determines that substantial allegations have been received of possible concealment of missiles, bombers or nuclear weapons; such observation to be completed within period of four weeks from its initiation.

(3) Long-range safeguards against further introduction. We would propose stationing of UN military observer corps under SYG in Cuba at all ports and airfields with authority to inspect cargoes of incoming planes and ships to assure there is no further introduction of weapons capable of offensive use into Cuba, together with Cuban participation in denuclearized zone including other LA states and accompanied by mutually agreed verification (i.e., Brazilian initiative and no rpt no inclusion of US territory).

Stevenson

1. Probable course negotiations with USSR will take to wind up current Cuban crisis. Top Secret. 5 pp. DOS, CF, 737.56361/11–1962.