Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volumes X/XI/XII, Microfiche Supplement, American Republics; Cuba 1961–1962; Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath

540. CIA memorandum prepared for the Executive Committee of the NSC, November 19¹

November 19, 1962

THE CRISIS
USSR/CUBA

THE SITUATION IN CUBA

The only US photographic mission over Cuba Sunday, carried out at high altitude, returned without incident in spite of evidence that the Cubans have decided on a concerted effort to shoot down reconnaissance planes.

Preliminary analysis of Sunday’s mission provided little new information. Vehicles and equipment at the Soviet encampment at Remedios included two probable FROG rocket launchers, six probable FROG missile transporters, nine probable SNAPPER rocket launchers, and 192 trucks. No significant change from previous missions was noted at the Remedios IRBM site, at the Sagua la Grande MRBM sites, or at the two SAM sites observed. There were still about 50 vehicles at Sagua la Grande site 1, and the concrete bunker had not been dismantled, but there was no noteworthy activity at the other bases covered.

[text not declassified]

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We have [1 line not declassified] no indication that Cubans control any of the SAM sites capable of reaching the high-altitude missions.

[text not declassified] All foreign commercial aircraft coming to Cuba were required, beginning yesterday, to file flight plans 24 hours in advance of departure.

[text not declassified]

Photographic reconnaissance missions of 16 November reveal that the SAM site closest to Guantanamo—13 nautical miles away—has apparently been abandoned. A new SAM site is under construction about 23 n.m. from the base. It is probable that the equipment noted at the new site was taken from the abandoned one. Other SAM sites in Cuba have been moved previously. There is no indication that proximity to the base dictated this change.

Cuba has apparently acquired three Soviet-made IL–18 transports for its civil airline. Cubana flights between Prague and Havana had frequently been cancelled due to the poor condition of the Britannias now in service. Cuban authorities are seeking authorization for overflight of West Germany and Belgium and for technical stopovers in Ireland and Iceland between 19 and 25 November.

SOVIET POSITION

In his meeting on 18 November with Mr. McCloy, Kuznetsov indicated no movement from the USSR’s position that while it is prepared to consider removing the IL–28s, this must be done in connection with the settlement of other problems relating to Cuba. Moscow, he said, would like to have removal of the bombers coincide with a final Cuban solution.

Kuznetsov again charged that the US was stalling in the negotiations in order to avoid giving formal assurances against an invasion of Cuba. He said the US should undertake to stop overflights of Cuba at the time the IL–28s were removed. Kuznetsov also pressed for US acceptance of U Thant’s proposal for reciprocal UN observation in the US as well as in Cuba.

The meeting closed with no definite agreement on future meetings. Kuznetsov said he had no definite word on Mikoyan’s plans for leaving Cuba.

The public quarrel between Moscow and Peiping over Khrushchev’s handling of the Cuban crisis continued with major articles in Pravda and People’s Daily on 18 November. Boris Ponomarev, a secretary of the Soviet party central committee, replied to direct Albanian and indirect Chinese charges of Soviet appeasement by asserting that the Albanians had “openly taken a course of disrupting peaceful coexistence and pushing humanity to a thermonuclear war.” Peiping charged that the claim that the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba had saved the peace is “pure nonsense.” A People’s Daily editorial said “Tito and his like” had tried to force Cuba to “accept terms which impair its rights and sovereignty so as to meet the insatiable aggressive demands of US imperialism.”

BLOC MILITARY STATUS

There has been no significant change in the disposition or alert status of major Bloc forces.

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SOVIET SHIPS RETURNING MISSILES FROM CUBA
(as of 0700 EST 19 November)

Five of the Soviet ships—carrying a total of 28 ballistic missiles—returning to the USSR from Cuba are en route to the Black Sea. Two, possibly three, others—transporting the remaining 14 missiles—now appear to be headed for Soviet ports in the Baltic Sea. In addition the three ships hauling associated equipment for the missiles probably are en route to the Baltic.

Ship	Cargo	En Route
DIVNOGORSK	4 MRBM’s	Black Sea
FIZIK KURCHATOV	6 MRBM’s	Black Sea
LABINSK	2 MRBM’s	Black Sea
LENINSKY KOMSOMOL	8 MRBM’s	Black Sea
METALLURG ANASOV	8 MRBM’s	Black Sea
VOLGOLES	7 MRBM’s	Baltic Sea (?)
BRATSK	2 MRBM’s	Baltic Sea
IVAN POLZUNOV	5 MRBM’s	Baltic Sea
ALAPAEVSK	Associated equipment	Baltic Sea
ALEKSANDROVSK	Associated equipment	Baltic Sea
[illegible in the original]	Associated equipment	Baltic Sea

1. The situation in Cuba. Top Secret. 5 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, CIA—Cuba.