536. Telegram 1833 from USUN, November 161
Dept pass White House. Eyes Only for the Secretary. Cuba (Deptel 1288).
1. Yost saw SYG this afternoon to convey Dept’s comments on UN working paper in accordance reftel.
2. At outset of meeting SYG inquired about last night’s meeting with Kuznetsov. Yost filled him in along lines USUN 1818. SYG then said Kuznetsov had given him similar report with different emphasis. Kuznetsov had stressed necessity of Cuban participation in discussions and had asked whether SYG had given any thought to elaboration of UN role under Article 12. SYG said Kuznetsov still seemed to want protocol and did not yet appear to be convinced US had rejected idea. Yost said we had been very clear.
3. Re UN role as envisaged in Article 12, SYG said he told Kuznetsov that he had not yet worked out plan and would not put anything on paper until consent of parties had been obtained as to scope of responsibilities UN would have, e.g. whether one, two, all, or whatever number of elements referred to in protocol. In this connection SYG had pointed out that if UN responsibilities affected other LA govts their consent would be needed too. He outlined to Kuznetsov his general ideas, i.e. that there would be an observer group with headquarters in NY, that group would come from unaligned countries, and that its chairman would be of international eminence.
4. Yost then reviewed US difficulties with SYG’s working paper. He told SYG it included one package of three different things—verification of withdrawal, safeguards [Facsimile Page 2] against introduction of nuclear weapons, and assurances against invasion. On verification of withdrawal Yost said mutuality not involved or acceptable as this was SOV commitment in letters for on-site inspection of removal in Cuba only. On long-term aspects some form of reciprocity might be necessary, preferably something along lines of Brazilian denuclearized zone res although Cuban speech of today complicated things and posed unacceptable conditions. We could not accept limitations on our nuclear capability in US territory, including Puerto Rico, when other nuclear power (USSR) would have no obligations. Re long-range safeguards Yost said if reciprocity is to be involved, it should not relate to offensive weapons [Typeset Page 1446] throughout Caribbean area but to non-introduction of weapons into Cuba on the one hand and non-invasion on the other. Dept was considering how and whether general Caribbean security system along these lines might be established, including UN presence in Cuba. We hoped this might be available by Monday at which time we would discuss it with SYG.
5. Narasimhan felt it was unavoidable that some US territory be included in a UN presence in Caribbean covering the invasion problem. He thought we should consider long run advantages establishment of such system would have for US as precedent in other areas where we wanted inspection vis-à-vis communist countries.
6. Re USUN 1800 reporting yesterday’s meeting with U Thant, last para should be corrected to read “Lechuga also informed U Thant that the Secretary General’s letter to Castro proposing verification by non-aligned Ambs in Havana had been rejected. . .”.
- Report of Yost meeting with SYG on U.S. difficulties with UN working paper: verification of withdrawal, safeguards against introduction of nuclear weapons, and assurances against invasion. Top Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 737.56361/11–1662.↩