Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, American Republics; Cuba 1961–1962; Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Volumes X/XI/XII, Microfiche Supplement

529. Memorandum for the NSC Executive Committee from Nitze, November 14¹

November 14, 1962

SUBJECT

• Relationship of Cuban Objectives to Present Decisions

1. Problem. To analyze the relationship between present decisions on what to do next re Cuba and long term objectives.

2. The Soviet Perspective.

a) Regardless of the motives behind the original Soviet initiative in emplacing missiles in Cuba, it seems reasonable to assume that a retention of the optimum foothold in Cuba remains, at this time, as an important objective. At this writing the Soviets probably see the situation in the following light:

1) The Soviet Union was overextended and did not wish to face up to a direct and full scale confrontation over Cuba.

2) Their withdrawal of IRBMs and MRBMs, coupled with their cooperation in the outgoing inspection, has defuzed the situation to eliminate whatever danger of immediate major conflict previously existed. Further, given the political context of the US, this move has stopped the US from immediate and outright invasion of Cuba.

3) The retention of IL 28’s in Cuba represents a politico-military tool for use in securing Soviet objectives. These can be bartered away to obtain concessions from the US, if they must be; or they can be used to soften the impact upon the Cubans of the Soviet retreat by turning the bombers over to that government, if circumstances permit. In the latter case the Soviets could be expected to use the IL 28’s to win certain concessions from Castro.

4) The US has the power to eliminate the Soviet presence in Cuba but must operate within constraints imposed by partial Soviet performance and by the realities of the power equation elsewhere.

5) Therefore the thrust of Soviet negotiations with the US and with Cuba must be to lay the foundations by a series of probes for possible posture for themselves in Cuba, without provoking the US to apply that degree of power which would deprive them of their Cuban base.

b) Ideally the Soviets want to retain in Cuba a capability for a wide spectrum utilization of their position. A listing of their objectives might have the following priority:

1) Retention of a Communist oriented regime in Cuba—the minimum requirement for long term utility for any purpose—their first significant advance beyond the Eurasian mainland and into the Atlantic Community.

2) Retention of a base for subversion of Latin America, disruption of OAS, and frustration of US objectives.

3) Retention for several reasons of a Soviet military presence.

4) Retention of US accepted “defensive weapons” including MIGs, Komars, antiaircraft artillery, etc.

5) Retention of Cuba as a potential submarine refueling and refit base.

6) Retention of bombers in Cuba.

c) Soviet strategy in the light of the foregoing considerations would seem to require the step-by-step surrender of the lower priorities above in order to retain the maximum number in the higher priority that US pressure will permit. It would seem further to require that every effort be made to insure the sovereignty and integrity of Communist Cuba by:

1) Resisting, or cultivating Cuban resistance to, on-the-ground inspection.

2) Resisting US aerial reconnaissance over Cuba.

3) Winning acceptance of the OAS and the US to some form of Soviet bases in Cuba.

4) Seeking to normalize the situation as soon as possible.

5) Winning a more effective and formal commitment against invasion.

d) None of the five points above would preclude Soviet tactical intransigence (e.g. publicly pressing the 5 Cuban demands, etc.) to provide a radical position from which to compromise with the US. Moreover, the Soviets would need to consider constantly what other pressures to bring to bear elsewhere in the world should the US press beyond a certain minimum on the priority list above.

e) Beyond the present confrontation the Soviet Union would undoubtedly be planning to place a “victorious” connotation on whatever settlement is achieved. If the bombers remain in Cuba their task in this regard will be an easy one.

3. The US Perspective.

a) The US, prior to the recent Cuban episode, had held that the presence of a Communist regime and a Soviet military presence in Cuba was not negotiable.

b) The discovery of missiles and bombers in Cuba, after US warning of the consequences, placed the USG in a position from which a resort to force, or the threat of it, became necessary. As a result the missiles were removed.

c) The fact that the bombers remain establishes a prima facie case in favor of continuation of the threat of force until their removal. However, internal and external pressures upon the government make a reconsideration of the importance of this objective a necessity.

d) If the US signs off on a post-crisis Cuba which not only retains its Communist regime and its on-the-ground territorial integrity, but also its bombers, the Communist bloc can make a plausible case before the world of a great “peaceful” victory for their cause. Cuba would have emerged from the crisis a more secure and stronger political base than it was before the missiles were emplaced. Moreover, the Latin American nations would see (in the increasing liaison between a Communist Cuba and their own Leftist parties) a real political threat in this situation which would weaken the US image and harm US objectives.

e) In actual fact, the retention of the bombers in Cuba presents a basis, in the post-missile environment, for a more forceful approach to our longer term goals—i.e., the elimination of the Communist regime and the restoration of Cuba to the hemisphere. Had the Soviet Union removed both bombers and missiles in the initial withdrawal, such complete acquiesence might have made it politically infeasible to do more than accept the return to status quo ante. In the present circumstances we have not only the need (as an immediate objective) but also the opportunity (for longer range objectives) to initiate action to carry us beyond that status quo ante. We should apply our threat of force or the force itself against the presence of the bombers in such manner as to advance these long term interests—i.e., removal of the Soviet presence from Cuba and reorientation of the Cuban regime.

4. US Objectives. The US objectives in view of the USSR and US perspectives discussed above should be as follows:

a) To obtain removal of remaining offensive weapons.

b) To obtain removal of USSR military presence (troops, MIG pilots, SAM personnel, etc.).

c) To obtain removal of Castro and/or reorientation of Communist regime.

Of the foregoing, our minimum goal at the present time should be the accomplishment of the first two objectives and actions taken should seek to insure this minimum. The achievement of these two objectives will place the US in a position where the accomplishment of the third can be a lower key matter to be accomplished over a longer-term period.

5. Recommended Action.

a) The carrot.

1) Continue to offer a return to the hemisphere to the Cuban people.

2) Seek to establish communications with the Cuban Government designed either to woo Castro away from the Soviets or to overthrow Castro.

3) Suspend the quarantine if the IL 28’s are removed, pending resolution of the problem of verification and adequate safeguards.

4) Seek to work out an acceptable denuclearized zone through modification of the Brazilian resolution. The minimum requirement for this approach is to have an arrangement which permits on-the-ground access to Cuba. The optimum is to have an arrangement which requires removal of foreign (non-hemispheric) presence and personnel from Latin American territory.

b) The stick.

1) Adhere to the original US demands.

(a) Removal of bombers and nuclear weapons.

(b) Adequate safeguards against re-entry of offensive equipment. The details of these safeguards are the subject of a separate paper. However, it is important to recognize the relationship between the accomplishment of our objectives and the degree of severity of these safeguards. For example, insistence on only a navicert or unilateral announcement by USSR for the nature of her incoming cargos would be much easier for her to accept than would US insistence on inspection of onloading in Soviet ports or offloading at Cuban ports. Also, the timing of our spelling out of the meaning of adequate safeguards is important. It is recommended that the US communicate no details until the bombers have been removed. At that time the USSR should be given a detailed plan best calculated to force her to give up, in combination with other pressures, her military presence in Cuba.

(c) Verification of removal of offensive equipment. Here again the details of verification are the subject of a separate paper, but the relationship between severity of US demands/timing and accomplishment of our first two objectives is pertinent. It is recommended that the US communicate no details until the bombers have been removed. At that time the USSR should be given a detailed plan best calculated to force her to give up, in combination with other pressures, her military presence in Cuba.

2) Continue aerial surveillance. The objective here should be to obtain full coverage and to extend the precedent but not to incite air defense retaliation. (That option should be reserved for later use, if needed.)

3) Tighten the blockade. This mechanism has been the instrument of force to date. In present circumstances the US has a plausible case before the world that the Soviet Government has provided only partial performance. The “hail and pass” procedures should give way to actual visit and search. If more force is needed the quarantine should be extended to POL. This tightening of the quarantine will keep up the US momentum while adding to the credibility of the US position.

c) The orchestration.

1) A combination of carrot and stick pressures should be so played as to force out the offensive weapons and Soviet military presence while weakening the Cuban Communist regime.

2) The focus of these pressures should shift primarily to Cuba if the USSR removes the IL 28’s.

3) If it appears to the USSR that we will insist on our original demands, including full and continuing safeguards and verification, they could have to evaluate Castro’s survival as extremely dubious. In that case their course would probably be to disengage their prestige and evacuate their people and sophisticated equipment with as much haste and dignity as the situation permitted.

1. Relationship of Cuban objectives to present decisions. Top Secret. 6 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 69 A 0926, Cuba 1962 (Sensitive).