Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, American Republics; Cuba 1961–1962; Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Volumes X/XI/XII, Microfiche Supplement

525. Telegram 1762 from USUN, November 13¹

New York, November 13, 1962, 8 p.m.

Department pass White House. Eyes Only for the Secretary. Cuba. Following is summary of four-hour meeting today between customary SOV and US negotiators.

Kuznetsov began by reading protest against US reconnaissance flights over Cuba. He said continuation such overflights could only make negots about normalizing situation in Caribbean more difficult, that categorical objections on part of Cuba are well founded, overflights are violation of Cuban sovereignty and that it is reasonable to stop flights since all SOV commitments in exchange of correspondence between President and Khrushchev have been fulfilled. Stevenson replied by pointing out, in absence UN observation and supervision as provided for in exchange of correspondence between Pres and Khrushchev, no other means of verification available to US and that it would be necessary for US rpt US to continue overflights as long as other satisfactory means of verification unavailable. McCloy added that overflights reduce rather than increase tension since they to some extent reassure US and LA public as to what is transpiring concerning offensive weapons in Cuba.

Kuznetsov declared Khrushchev had agreed in principle to UN inspection of dismantling and removal of offensive weapons but had made clear in letter of Oct 27 this would be only with consent of Cuban Govt. However SOVs had taken many steps to satisfy US such as alongside inspection with uncovering of missiles, etc. obligations undertaken by Soviet Union had therefore been fulfilled. IL–28’s are not offensive weapons.

Stevenson read two numbered paras from President’s letter of Oct 27 and second sentence of second para letter of Oct 28 and urged quick settlement on basis of undertakings listed in these paras. Kuznetsov replied SOVs desire quick settlement but US lags behind. He reread second numbered para Pres’s Oct 27 letter but gave abbreviated translation of clause between dashes which seemed to imply only commitments which UN obliged to ensure relate to dismantling and withdrawal of missiles, which has already been accomplished. Therefore it is now up to US to fulfill its obligations under exchange of letters and to embody agreements and arrangements in document to be presented to SC. Kuznetsov agreed with Pres’s reference to “firm undertakings” in second sentence second para his letter Oct 28.

Stevenson outlined what in our view remains to be done by SOVs to bring about quick settlement:

(1) Remove IL–28’s,

(2) Give assurances all nuclear warheads and nuclear bombs have been removed,

(3) Obtain Cuban Govt agreement to observation and supervision of compliance,

(4) Give assurances against reintroduction of offensive weapons systems and present their suggestions as to suitable safeguards for ensuring against such reintroduction.

In response, as provided in Pres’s letter, we would lift quarantine and would give assurances against invasion. We added that we are in fact prepared to do more. If US receives from SOVs assurances that IL–28’s will be removed from Cuba within reasonable time, say, three weeks, we will promptly lift quarantine. McCloy emphasized that SOVs have not met all their commitments. They have not removed IL–28’s nor have they given assurances concerning removal of nuclear weapons or components other than those associated with missiles.

After reiterating SOV position that IL–28’s are defensive, Kuznetsov referred to his proposal of presentation of agreed document to SC and said it would be helpful if US could join in working out such document as foreseen in exchange of letters. He said that assurances against reintroduction of offensive weapons should be considered in that context along with other guarantees envisaged in correspondence. He emphasized Sov Union will strictly observe commitments made by Khrushchev in his letters to Pres. He said now is time to commence negots on long-term arrangements, to consider together all outstanding problems connected with Cuban question. He said SOVs would study new suggestion by US in regard to removal IL–28’s and lifting of blockade but that he could not at present do other than repeat SOV position that IL–28’s are defensive.

Stevenson noted Kuznetsov’s agreement to study proposal on IL–28’s and his reference to Khrushchev’s commitment against reintroduction of offensive weapons into Cuba and repeated our desire to hear SOV position on removal of nuclear bombs. He emphasized that US would adhere strictly to terms of Pres’s letter on assurances to Cuba against invasion. As to procedure before SC, when US and USSR have agreed on all outstanding points, including safeguards for future, US will make declaration in SC incorporating our agreements. We had assumed SOVs would wish to make similar declaration. We would be glad to discuss contents of declarations. However, he pointed out, if quarantine had already been lifted pursuant to proposal involving IL–28’s which he had just put forward, US declaration would need to deal only with assurances against invasion of Cuba. Wording of such declaration and question of action by other Western Hemisphere states are being considered in Washington.

In conclusion Stevenson summarized once again outstanding issues:

(1) Removal IL–28’s which would result in US lifting quarantine;

(2) SOV assurances of removal of all nuclear components;

(3) How compliance with undertakings is going to be verified in Cuba;

(4) Assurances against reintroduction offensive weapons and discussion of safeguards against reintroduction in future by any state;

(5) If blockade already lifted, all that remains on US side is declaration against invasion. We cannot now discuss language of such declaration but could in near future if SOVs also prepared to discuss how to complete their undertakings.

Kuznetsov did not comment on this summary other than to repeat once again he would report to his govt new US proposal on removal IL–28’s, however he must continue to emphasize SOVs consider this aircraft defensive.

Comment: While no new points were agreed, we feel this mtg was very useful in that all outstanding issues, particularly those with which we are most concerned, were very clearly identified and spelled out. There should henceforth be no room for misunderstanding and ground is cleared for real progress at next mtg if SOVs prove at all conciliatory.

Dept’s latest thinking on long-term safeguards and wording our assurance would be helpful.

Stevenson

1. Summary of 4-hour conversation between U.S. and Soviet negotiators on UN inspection and removal of offensive weapons from Cuba. Top Secret. 4 pp. DOS, CF, 737.00/11–1362.