Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, American Republics; Cuba 1961–1962; Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Volumes X/XI/XII, Microfiche Supplement

521. Notes from transcripts of JCS meetings, November 13¹

November 13, 1962

NOTES TAKEN FROM TRANSCRIPTS OF MEETINGS OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, OCTOBER–NOVEMBER 1962, DEALING WITH THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS (Handwritten notes were made in 1976 and typed in 1993.)

• CJCS: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA.
• CSA: Chief of Staff, Army. General Earle G. Wheeler.
• CSAF: Chief of Staff, Air Force. General Curtis E. LeMay.
• CNO: Chief of Naval Operations. Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr.
• CMC: Commandant, Marine Corps. General David M. Shoup.
• CONAD: Continental Air Defense
• DIA: Defense Intelligence Agency
• DJS: Director, Joint Staff
• LANT: Atlantic
• NORAD: North American Air Defense
• OAS: Organization of American States
• RCT: Regimental Combat Team
• SAM: Surface-to-Air Missile
• TAC: Tactical Air Command

Tuesday, 13 November

JCS meeting at 0900:

CJCS gives debriefing on the ExComm meeting of 12 November: At the morning meeting, Amb. Stevenson and Mr. McCloy said that the U.S. should present a negotiating package now, before the Soviet position solidifies. They recommended removing the quarantine and giving a no-invasion pledge in return for withdrawal of IL–28s and warheads. Rusk opposes offering the package immediately. What if the Soviets reject this package? SecDef favors a blockade. Including POL, and continued surveillance. The President opposed the SecDef, feeling that continued surveillance would be dangerous; President was alone in feeling this way. At the afternoon meeting, all agreed that the quarantine should be lifted if Khrushchev pledges withdrawal in, say, 30 days.

The JCS will meet with the President on 16 Nov.

JCS meeting at 1400:

CJCS gives a debrief of the ExComm meeting on the morning of 13 Nov: President was absent. The SecDef proposed:

1. If the Soviets agreed to remove the IL–28s, the U.S. would lift the quarantine, continue unannounced air surveillance, and withhold a no-invasion pledge until suitable safeguards are agreed upon (e.g., some international presence in Cuba and a reciprocal feature of inspection of suspected refugee training areas in Central America.)

2. If the Soviets refuse to withdraw IL–28s, continue a limited quarantine by boarding first Free World and finally Soviet ships, continue unannounced air surveillance, and treat the no-invasion promise as not being in effect.

Then ExComm members were shown a copy of Khrushchev’s latest letter: The IL–28s were obsolete and manned by Soviet not Cuban pilots. But, if the U.S. insists, you can take a gentleman’s word that they will be removed after we solve our other problems, which are: (1) removal of the quarantine; (2) mutual pledges in the Security Council; (3) guarantee of the sovereignty of Cuban air space and a no-invasion pledge; and (4) a post in the Caribbean for UN inspection, which would include denuclearization.

1. Chief JCS debriefing of November 12 and 13 Executive Committee meetings; UN negotiations; courses of action in Cuba crisis; Khrushchev’s letter. Secret. 4 pp. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History.