501. Notes from transcripts of JCS meetings; November 71

NOTES TAKEN FROM TRANSCRIPTS OF MEETINGS OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, OCTOBER–NOVEMBER 1962, DEALING WITH THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS (Handwritten notes were made in 1976 and typed in 1993.)

  • CJCS: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA.
  • CSA: Chief of Staff, Army. General Earle G. Wheeler.
  • CSAF: Chief of Staff, Air Force. General Curtis E. LeMay.
  • CNO: Chief of Naval Operations. Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr.
  • CMC: Commandant, Marine Corps. General David M. Shoup.
  • CONAD: Continental Air Defense
  • DIA: Defense Intelligence Agency
  • DJS: Director, Joint Staff
  • LANT: Atlantic
  • NORAD: North American Air Defense
  • OAS: Organization of American States
  • RCT: Regimental Combat Team
  • SAM: Surface-to-Air Missile
  • TAC: Tactical Air Command
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Wednesday, 7 November

JCS meeting at 0900:

CSA reports on his visit to Army units in the field: I have never seen more impressive and imaginative training.

Certainly, we could never be more ready.

Briefing by DIA: Thirty missile transporters have come into port areas. However, the assembly of IL–28s is continuing; four bombers are now totally assembled. We also know that the [Facsimile Page 2] Soviets took over the air defense of Cuba as of yesterday.

CJCS: At the ExComm meeting at 1700 yesterday, I said it was “now or never” for intensive reconnaissance if we wanted to know whether the missiles are actually loaded aboard the ships. Rusk opposed increased reconnaissance for political reasons. He won, and now verification is up to the Navy. The JCS recommended five U–2 flights and 14 low-level flights (an increase over the current level) to cover ports, the Isle of Pines, and seven caves suspected of being weapon storage sites.

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CSA: I talked to the President about OPLAN 316, and he brought up the same points that were in his memo of 5 November. He was concerned lest there be mistaken optimism “that one Yankee could always lick ten Gringos.” (sic) The public would never understand if we got a bloody nose in Cuba while there were three divisions in the United States.

CSAF: Air attacks alone would cause Castro’s popular support to collapse and make the invasion a “walk-in.”

  1. General Wheeler visit to Army units in the field; briefing by DIA; reconnaissance; OPLAN 316. Secret. 3 pp. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History.