Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, American Republics; Cuba 1961–1962; Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Volumes X/XI/XII, Microfiche Supplement

494. Telegram 1200 to USUN, November 5¹

November 5, 1962, 10:59 p.m.

Eyes Only for Stevenson and McCloy. As indicated in Deptel 1194, we want to be able to see and count for ourselves departing missiles and associated equipment and there is promise in procedures suggested by Kusnetsov provided it is clear that reliable observation, not Soviet photography alone, is essential. In this connection, following is guidance, as followup suggestions by Kuznetsov, indicating kind of inspection procedure we believe would be necessary to check outgoing cargoes. Procedures worked out by inter-agency panel. We would strongly prefer QTE on board UNQTE procedure but prepared to accept QTE along side UNQTE procedure if necessary provided equipment is on top of deck. In discussing these procedures with Kuznetsov you should make clear our continued insistence on UN on-site inspection in Cuba to guard against hiding or reintroduction of offensive weapons.

1. Problem. Recommend a procedure which will provide adequate verification that the USSR has in fact removed offensive equipment from Cuba.

2. Background. Kuznetsov has communicated to McCloy the willingness of the Soviet Government to work out a verification procedure as follows:

a. If Castro should give his consent to an on-site inspection verification of shipments might be made at the docks in Cuba;

b. In the event that this procedure cannot be worked out, inspection at sea or other eventualities would have to be planned for;

c. The USSR is prepared to give U.S. photographs of the sites in dismantled form;

d. USSR is prepared to give the U.S. its schedule of removal of missiles to the ports and its shipping schedules;

e. USSR is prepared to permit U.S. vessels to come along side Soviet ships, the missiles loaded in such a way as to enable the U.S. to see and count the missiles;

f. USSR is further prepared to give the U.S. photographs of 42 missiles on the way out.

3. Frame of Reference

a. The USSR is expected to have complied fully with the commitments undertaken in paragraphs c, d, and f above.

b. In addition, it is expected that the USSR will have complied with the position of the U.S. Government that IL28s are also to be removed from Cuba as offensive equipment.

c. The commitment to remove missiles is considered to include the removal of such associated items as appear on the list at the end of this message.

d. Photos of weapon crates or empty missile sites can be falsified as to time or location and therefore, although of value, are not foolproof.

e. The U.S. Government needs to determine how Soviets propose to demonstrate no nuclear warheads or bombs remain in Cuba.

f. The question of fighter-bombers, KOMAR motor torpedo boats and missile fuel has not been answered.

4. Required Verification in Cuban Ports

a. Inspection of equipment prior to loading is much to be preferred over inspection after loading on board ship.

b. Although from the standpoint of verification it is preferable that inspection of all components should take place prior to crating, nevertheless, reasonable assurance of removal (which gives consideration to the concern of the USSR re espionage) can be achieved without inspection before crating.

c. Sufficient uncrating should be accomplished to permit inspection to the end that reasonable verification of the contents may be ascertained. This should include physical access and photography.

5. Required Verification at Sea

a. Loading of Soviet ships will be carried out in such fashion that visual inspection of each crate is feasible. As an alternative, there could be partial unloading at another designated port to allow visual inspection. In either event a loading plan for each outgoing vessel will be provided to facilitate inspection. This is to be a detailed plan giving location and identity of offensive weapons components.

b. Soviet ships will be instructed to rendezvous with U.S. inspection vessels and to have completed appropriate uncrating in advance of rendezvous. In the event weather makes such uncrating infeasible, a delay in time or change of rendezvous will be signalled by the inspecting ship.

c. Inspection on Board

(1) This form of inspection is much to be preferred over inspection from along side and should be requested.

(2) If the USSR has located any of its offensive equipment below deck, on board access to these ships will be mandatory in order to obtain adequate verification.

(3) Inspection will require sufficient uncrating to permit inspection to the end that reasonable verification of the contents may be ascertained. This should include physical access and photography. (There must also be sufficient uncreating of IL 28’s to reveal what components, by type and number, are contained therein.)

d. Inspection from Along Side

(1) It will not be possible to eliminate all possibility of spoofing without physical inspection on board. However, reasonable assurance can be obtained by alongside inspection, when coupled with other indications; to permit the USG to accept the mode as a fall back position.

(2) If the US is limited to inspection from along side a vessel, all items of offensive equipment must be located on or above main deck.

(3) Inspection will require sufficient uncrating to permit photographs and visual viewing, in order to identify from among the components listed on the attached inventory, the specific component involved. (There must also be sufficient uncrating of IL 28’s to reveal what components, by type and number, are contained therein).

(4) Hovering helicopters above the inspected vessel must be authorized in order to permit more comprehensive visual and photographic coverage.

6. Expertise. Each inspecting US Navy ship and boarding party will contain experts able to identify components of offensive equipment.

[illegible in the original] OF SIGNIFICANT SPECIAL MISSILE EQUIPMENT

TO BE USED IN MAKING UP A CHECK-OFF LIST

1. Missiles and missile transporter

2. Tracked prime mover for transporter

3. Erector vehicles

4. Fuel tank trailers

5. Wheeled prime movers for fuel vehicles

6. Oxydizer tank trailers

7. Tracked prime movers for oxydizer trailers

8. Launch stands

9. Power generators

10. Electronics vans

11. Theodolites on Pedistals

Rusk

1. Guidance for procedures for adequate verification that USSR has removed offensive equipment from Cuba. Top Secret. 6 pp. DOS, CF, 737.56361/11–562.