485. Memorandum for the record, November 31
SUBJECT
- Executive Meeting of the NSC, 10:00 A.M., 3 Nov ’62.
Just to summarize the situation briefly, I went over your summary. I explained [less than 1 line not declassified] report on the caves. I showed the (first) and the map that you gave me and stated that we could by no means be sure that these caves were not used to hide missiles; missiles and their launching devices and whole complex of equipment could be hidden in one or more of the large caves which were in the vicinity of the various sites we have seen. I said that we did not put too much confidence in this fellow [less than 1 line not declassified] nevertheless the use of the caves was by no means (. . .). And I also said that there was some suitable absence of traffic on the roads as indicated by various agent reports which gave us concern. I called their attention to the (Paris) Manufacturing Company. I told them we are working with the FBI on that. Maybe we should follow through on that. Someone should be assigned to do that right away.
I then went into the Annex I, the Cuban SAM program, and its unprecedented nature, pointing out the differences between what had been done in other countries, and I think this should be highlighted in a paper which I’ll tell you about. I think that we ought to check this pretty carefully to see whether we could make a statement. We’re going to have to make a statement this afternoon to open up a meeting between the Washington group and the whole UN group who are coming down. The purpose of this discussion is to prepare for that.
I emphasized the fact that we had not seen the Eastern part of the country (. . .). I then reviewed the effect of the quarantine as stated in Annex II. I spoke about the caves and highlighted this paper and then I went over the Watch Committee report. And then went into some considerable detail on what we observed in the IL 28 buildup because of the statement which had come from someplace, whether it was out of the UN or elsewhere, that there was some [Facsimile Page 2] question as to whether photography had clearly demonstrated that the work was continuing on the IL 28s. Rusk took a very strong position. He felt the buildup of the IL 28s was alarming and that we must overfly San Julian every [Typeset Page 1341] day to tell them what’s going on. He didn’t have any doubt in his mind, nor did anybody else, that the IL 28s were building up.
I then went over supplement 13 of the Joint Evaluation and I read paragraph 9, pages 3 and 4, but emphasized that we couldn’t tell whether the stuff was discharging or there for loading. . . .
That was about the sum and substance of the meeting. Now, McNamara reported on his overflights program for today. It was decided there would be three (. . .) planes, targeted on San Julian, Banes and San Fuegas and the U–2 would be flown on peripheral flight although he didn’t think . . . but they want to see what happened anyway.
Then Rusk brought up the question of the inspection arrangements. He said they were pursuing International Red Cross on inspecting incoming cargo and that the ground inspection had not been settled.
The President raised the question then as to whether we’re going to inspect outgoing cargo and Johnson expressed the view that this was being worked on and he thought that perhaps if we inspected the outgoing cargo by merely counting the cases in the cargo and taking a sample look, that that would be sufficient. I, at that point, brought up the objection stating that we felt from our analysis of the incoming cargo there might very well be 48 missiles in Cuba.
We’ve seen some 33 missiles and we have stated publicly that there were in the order of 30, that therefore if they loaded up 30 cases (. . .) missiles, this didn’t give us a guarantee. President then asked what to do about it, and I said I saw no security except in continually developing a mosaic of the country at regular intervals and the entire ground inspection which might not locate these things if they were hidden out in caves but at least would protect any movements through usable areas. This is about all we could do—we needed both.
[Facsimile Page 3]Rusk at that point said that he was extremely concerned that there was too much currency being given to this “no invasion” and he said he thought that we should be alert to the fact that the Soviets and the Cubans have not lived up to their part of the bargain and that we had no obligation whatsoever on this point and this was his concern over the position of the United Nations and it was at this point that it was agreed that the only thing we could do would be to get the United Nations personnel down and give them a good thorough face-to-face set of instructions, not by a cable, not by sending Gilpatric and Ball up, but by getting them down and having the President look them right in the eye and tell them flatly. The President facetiously said I guess I ought to handle this fellow at the UN, scare them that we in Washington go off and do something without them knowing about it. There was no defense around the table as to the seriousness of the situation and the fact that we have to take a hard line. I at this point brought in this paper of yours, Ray, which was most useful, on the [Typeset Page 1342] speed with which these things could be put in operation. I referred to the tempo that we observed and from our analysis of the progressive (. . .) and came to the conclusion if MRBMs and all of the complex of launchers, missiles and fuel trucks and so forth, were concealed in the caves that they might be moved onto a prepared site, preparation of which we could not detect from either ground inspection or aerial inspection and the thing could become operational missiles within 24 hours (and to Ray Cline: actually your estimate was 18 hours; I say 24 hours). I said there is the (. . .) to the problem. This is added to what is already a pretty solid position. Now, what we’ve got to do is three things. They’d like me to present a paper on the situation, what we know, what we can find out from various intelligence sources, what we recommend as to inspection procedures and how secure they are and how dependable—that they will give to us a dependable appraisal of just what’s being removed and all the rest. We want to bring in any related things, indications that the Soviets are on the one hand dismantling missiles and on the other hand are doing various things which indicates some intention to continue the utilization of Cuba for defensive purposes and projecting their doctrines into Latin America. Or (complete) any evolving information such as these communications facilities without disclosing the sensitivity of it. So what has happened, on the one hand, they’re going to remove them; on the other hand they are doing some other things that are quite ominous in view of our defense and the US delegation at the UN must appreciate this. And this paper, I think [Facsimile Page 4] it can be pulled together; it doesn’t have to be very long—two or three pages—a short paper I want to read. The second paper is being prepared by Alexis Johnson and McGeorge Bundy and that is an analysis of the interchanges between Kennedy and Khrushchev on just what the commitments are. This is the paper you did; and I gave Alexis Johnson a copy of your paper and he’s working on it and I offered to have somebody work with him but they thought with your paper and with their knowledge of it, it wouldn’t be necessary.
Third, is a set of instructions as to just what we expect and what we’re going to do because it’s very likely that we’ll find ourselves in three days from now in just as bad a spot as we were before except the missiles will be in caves rather than—. And the IL 28s will be further along. (Question: Has anyone asked the Russians why the IL 28s are still being—?) DCI answers: Well this is part of the problem in really getting these things right out in front of Kusnetsov and Mikoyan—. . . that definitely we mean business because you say “talk,” and you find out they haven’t said very much and so forth. I would like in this paper if you have a chance, a paragraph devoted to this SAM business, the unprecedented nature, how it differs from—(Tape broke [Typeset Page 1343] here so part missing.) and our conclusion that the army operated by the Russians and why. I think we have to be careful because not everybody is cleared—you see I think the only two people that are cleared for all phases of contact with Stevenson and McCloy (. . .) Yost and (. . .) so we have to be a little careful from that standpoint. . . . From my experience, apparently the way Stevenson operates is that he—Here the tape was cut off.
- NSC Executive Committee meeting including discussion of hidden missiles in Cuba; Cuban SAM program; effect of quarantine; overflight program; inspection arrangements; no invasion guarantee. Top Secret. 4 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80–B01258A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 July 1962–31 December 1962.↩