Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, American Republics; Cuba 1961–1962; Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Volumes X/XI/XII, Microfiche Supplement

48. Memorandum of conversation, February 25, between Lleras Camargo and Adolf A. Berle, Jr.¹

Bogota, February 25, 1961, 9:30 a.m.

In accordance with an arrangement made at dinner the night before, we met in President Lleras Camargo’s office this morning at 9:30 a.m. We had covered some of the background in very general conversation previously and I had presented President Kennedy’s personal greetings to the President at that time. Therefore, we started right in.

I said that my first hope was to develop our thinking regarding the lines of the program outlined by President Kennedy. We were studying the possibility of its presentation, rather than in the grand manner, as a hemispheric program. I said I thought that the first task was to find a philosophical common denominator, building around that rather than around money and economics, necessary as these were.

The President promptly agreed. I said that we were in a situation in which the attempted mystique of the Communists had to be met by something more definite than occasional expedients. It was clear that the time was ready for such an attempt. President Kennedy had captured the imagination of the great sector of the Latin American public opinion, and especially of the youth, and a philosophical statement would probably be of great importance. That could, of course, be supported by the practical structure, but the emphasis ought not to be on money or material accomplishments as it had been before.

We discussed a little philosophy of the good life and the good in the world and especially the necessity for free, individual development but within the framework of a society which made it possible.

The President pointed out that, in fact, economic conditions in much of Latin America, and notably in Colombia, were improving. Comparison of the standard of living today with that of twenty years ago showed the extent of the improvement. But, as men became liberated a little from their previous bonds, their perspectives grew, they wanted more. This was natural and had always been so in history. This was complicated by the fact that a very large increase in population (Colombia claimed the largest annual increase in the hemisphere—3.8%) meant that the economic necessities were going to be very great. I observed that the same thing was true in the United States.

Then we tackled the Caribbean crisis. I said that we considered that this was not merely a Cuban, but also a Caribbean crisis because it seemed as though three powers were coming to grips. We had information indicating that the Dominican Republic might explode as soon as the Dictator, Trujillo, realized he would not get a share of the Cuban sugar windfall. He had had meetings with Castro, who was in touch with him, and the Cuban propaganda machine had abruptly stopped attacks on the Dominican regime, though it had bitterly attacked both the Colombian and Venezuelan Governments, as well, of course, as ourselves. Trujillo agents in Moscow were apparently endeavoring to make some sort of deal with the Soviet Union; we considered that they might be quite egotistical enough to use them whatever their ultimate intent. No one could guarantee timing on such matters, the crisis could come up in April. In answer to the President’s question, I told him that it might be a variety of bloodbath or class war designed to make a left wing dictatorship—of course with Trujillo as the Dictator. As soon as that happened, we considered that there would be great danger from the Castro side who would at once wish to take over as enemies or friends as the case might be.

I then said that the Government of Haiti was increasingly unstable. We ourselves were doubtful how long it would last. The Duvalier regime—whatever might be Duvalier’s personal intention—was increasingly a regime of a group with arms or force in their hands moving more or less at will around Port-au-Prince. The regime had quarreled with the Church and quarreled with the students, and had quarreled with whatever labor organization there was, and apparently killing and torturing had been continuing. I personally thought that the time would come when Port-au-Prince would explode—somewhat as it had done in 1915 under the regime of Guillaume Sam. My guess was that if the Dominican Republic exploded, quite likely the Haitian regime would fall very shortly.

And finally, there was the question of Cuba. This was serious. I outlined the information we had as to the extent of Russian armament (350,000 tons), the number of technicians, some of whom at least were officers in disguise, arriving every week. The number might be three or four thousand by now. Even passing through Curacao, I had learned that every week a KLM plane comes in loaded with Russians and Czechs. We knew that the CUBANA planes were bringing great numbers by way of the Azores. I also told him that there were a hundred Cubans in training in Czechoslovakia to run long-range jets and we expected such jets would arrive—possibly MIG 17’s—very soon. The President was interested in the range. I told him I thought they had a radius of 1,000 miles, more or less, which would, of course, enable them to reach everything in the Caribbean.

The President inquired about Guantanamo. I said our feeling was that there would be no attack on Guantanamo; this was not a serious military threat to the United States. They would begin by making trouble all the way from the northern border of Mexico to Venezuela.

The President then inquired of the situation in Mexico. I stated to him most of the information we had; we thought that President Lopez Mateo was now hostile to the whole Cuban position but had political difficulties at home. The President smiled and said, “I would like to help you, but not publicly”, which of course is the fact. The President had also noted that there was a meeting coming up in Mexico in a couple of weeks sponsored by Cardenas.

I then said that we were now squarely moving toward some sort of crisis though the time was not certain, and we had to consider how this could be handled. The hemispheric machinery was there for that purpose. But, if the hemispheric machinery did not work, nothing could prevent the countries involved from taking care of themselves as best they could.

The President then took up the story. He said that the sympathy for the Castro revolution, which had been very great a year and a half ago, was undoubtedly falling. The principal feeling was that Castro had undertaken to invade other countries, and had become part of an extra-continental machine. He said most people believed this, though a good deal more discussed their opinions publicly without knowing what was taking place. He himself had no doubt about what was happening; the problem was to create a political atmosphere in the hemisphere. He then inquired what President Romulo Betancourt’s views were.

I told him that President Betancourt had authorized me to repeat to him the conversations we had had in Caracas. I said that Betancourt would also send his own Ambassador to explain his views, and I did not wish, therefore, to give a definitive statement in spite of President Betancourt’s authorization. Betancourt, however, had suggested that the way to handle the situation would be to deal with the Caribbean crisis, preferably the Dominican crisis first. He himself was prepared to send forces to maintain order and defend the Dominican Republic from Castro’s intervention as soon as the Trujillo regime broke up, and that he wanted to do this in company with Colombia, although my impression was that he was prepared to do it alone if need be. This, Betancourt believed, would precipitate a situation in which a consultation of Foreign Ministers would be productive and which would authorize measures of defense against all Caribbean aggressors, including Castro. President Lleras observed that you could not always time events so that they fell out entirely at your convenience. I agreed that this was so and for this reason I had personally hoped that there might be very rapid consultation which would authorize the kind of action which might have to be taken on all sides. There was no point in having consultation, I said, after the damage had been done.

President Lleras then suggested that he, together with President Betancourt, might send representatives to the various countries in the hemisphere to explain the need of independent action. Both these countries were principals, both were in line of fire, both had general resources and direct interest in what happened in the Antilles. It would help, of course, if they could produce proof that Cuba was mixed up in the matter.

I then gave to the President the draft list (CONFIDENTIAL) we had made up of the various Cuban actions which showed both her aggressor intent and the extent to which she was now in the hands of an extra-continental power. President Lleras said this was evident from the known facts, as did Castro’s recent speech threatening to export his revolution to other countries. He wished to read the document. I said that this was preliminary; we were gathering together the facts. I rather warmly approved his idea of sending someone around the hemisphere to explain the situation; it would come even with more force from Colombia and Venezuela than from the United States. In any event, the United States would be the last to be attacked.

We talked briefly of the proposed Inter-American Conference at Quito. I said that Betancourt felt it should be delayed; our own thinking was running along that line. Lleras said this would be difficult for the Ecuadorans to take, but that he would consider it further. Obviously an Inter-American Conference, once thought of as a great achievement for a country, could be a great curse. He added a bit wryly that Colombia had reason to know that remembering the year 1948. We did not reach a definite agreement on the point.

I reverted to the possible consultation regarding the Caribbean crisis. I said that the Dominican Republic obviously could not go there; that it was illogical to have Castro there. In 1945 we had had a special Inter-American Conference from which the Argentine Government had been excluded. There was precedent, therefore, for having a special consultation to which the two Governments involved were not directly invited. President Lleras agreed that this was logical. (I gathered that a somewhat similar procedure would be agreeable to Betancourt.)

President Lleras then opened the problem of the Brazilian point of view. He said his impression was that the Governments to the south were not neutralists in the usual sense; they merely thought the problem was far away; which would not hit them in another ten years; they were, therefore, not greatly interested. He did think, however, that Argentina would be definitely interested in the situation, as would also Peru. Chile might be very much influenced by the Brazilian point of view. President Quadros was quite a “mystery”; no one knew exactly what he would do.

I said I was going to Brazil and would endeavor to find out.

We then turned to some of the specific difficulties Colombia had with the United States. The Military Mission, Lleras thought, ought to be devoting its time to tactics for meeting guerrilla attacks rather than the statistics of the Normandy landings, etc. He noted that the Colombian Army was totally unable to cope with guerrillas. I noted marginally that Castro’s Army had not been able to deal with the guerrillas in the Escambray either.

President Lleras noted that the Inter-American Development Bank seems to be developing exactly the same rigidity which delayed the loan of the Export-Import Bank—credits granted 2½ years ago had not yet been drawn because of bureaucratic procedures. I said I had discussed that with the Embassy staff and had it on my mind. He noted especially that agrarian reform—which should be a part of any major Inter-American program, was partly blocked because the Americans seemed to want it done in accordance with a plan well understood but which would have little relationship to the realities here. I said I had discussed that in the Embassy and would endeavor to find out what could be done about it.

In closing the President reverted again to Cuba. He asked what was happening there. I told him from what information I had, I thought it was rather gradually coming to a climax. We had to contemplate full civil war in Cuba. Then we would have the problem of two Governments in Cuba, and some action would have to be taken. Lleras said that especially if we could have a rapid consulta of minds this situation would somewhat add to the possibilities. I said that in view of the situation we ourselves could not consider that we had no responsibilities towards the region as a whole; if the hemispheric machine did not work, the Caribbean countries in immediate danger would have to act, and we would, of course, support them. President Lleras agreed that this was entirely logical. He added that in placing the situation before the countries it would be well to talk about that because they might easily drop responsibility by leaving it up to the Caribbean countries to carry the whole weight.

I pointed out that we were merely formulating our policies at this point without any commitments until we had ascertained the views of the countries principally involved; but that this gave us the background of our thinking. President Lleras said he was extremely glad to have this exchange of views; it made them more concrete in handling the problems with which he had to deal.

I gathered the impression that if the chips were down, he would immediately be of help.

A.A. Berle, Jr.

1. General exchange of views including: economic conditions; Caribbean crisis; Government of Haiti; Cuba; Mexico. Secret. 6 pp. DOS, CF, 721.11/2–2561.