Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, American Republics; Cuba 1961–1962; Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Volumes X/XI/XII, Microfiche Supplement

479. Memorandum prepared for the NSC Executive Committee, November 2¹

[less than 1 line not declassified]November 2, 1962

THE CRISIS
USSR/CUBA

THE SITUATION IN CUBA

Soviet offensive missile units are closing down their launch sites in Cuba and removing their equipment, but the assembly of IL–28 bombers is continuing.

Analysis of photography of 1 November shows that the missiles and basic launching equipment have been removed from all the MRBM launch areas. Camouflage has been taken down and support vehicles assembled for movement. The launch sites have been partially destroyed, apparently by bulldozing.

It is not yet clear from photography or other intelligence where the missile equipment is being taken.

Construction at the IRBM sites has stopped and some of the installations at Guanajay have been destroyed. Work on the probable nuclear warhead bunkers apparently has also ceased.

None of the Soviet cargo ships now in Cuba has hatches and holds suitable for handling IRBMs or MRBMs. The seven ships which we believe delivered the missiles to Cuba could return to Cuba between 16 and 25 November. Loading of the missiles after the ships’ return would probably take about a week.

The photography shows that in contrast to the dismantling of the missile sites, there has been further progress in the assembly of IL–28 bomber aircraft at San Julian airfield. One fully operational IL–28 was observed taxiing on the ground, and personnel were seen working on other bombers.

Monitors agree that Castro appeared nervous and hesitant last night during the major portion of his radio-TV speech, reading a transcript of his talks with U Thant. He was somewhat more confident and forceful in the concluding part when he spoke in his customary extemporaneous manner. Throughout the speech he appeared to belch frequently. As reported in the press, Castro reiterated his “five points,” stressing the demand for evacuation of Guantanamo; announced the USSR had “some time ago” canceled all Cuban obligations for arms; and claimed Cuba still has “powerful means of defense” since all but “strategic weapons” were to remain in Cuba. He said Khrushchev’s decision gave his regime “reason for discontent,” but added: “We respected the decision since these weapons were not under our command.” He confined Cuban refusal of inspection to the transcript of his talks with U Thant.

[less than 1 line not declassified] as of 31 October Soviet personnel were still active in the Cuban air defense system. [1½ lines not declassified] Cuban tactical aircraft were involved in takeoff and landing training, indicating some relaxation in the alert status.

During the entire crisis period, there have been only scattered and minor reflections [less than 1 line not declassified] of internal resistance or sabotage activities. One instance, reported [less than 1 line not declassified] 31 October, involved the cutting of a telephone wire from a Soviet “base” in Camaguey province, possibly a SAM site or related barracks area.

[text not declassified]

[less than 1 line not declassified] reported on 30 October that officials in the Cuban foreign ministry were “subdued,” and very sensitive to any mention of the Soviet role in recent events. [less than 1 line not declassified] three middle-rank officials in the Ministry of Industries appeared “outraged” at the ridiculous role Cuba had played and considered the offer by Khrushchev to trade Cuban for Turkish bases especially humiliating. They felt the whole episode showed the bankruptcy of Castro’s policies, and said Cuba would sooner or later have to come to terms with the US under a modified leadership. [less than 1 line not declassified] however, that less well educated Cubans are being influenced by Castro’s propaganda, which is seeking to make recent events look almost like a Cuban victory.

Cuban exile leaders report the Cuban community in Florida to be depressed, heartsick, and convinced that the only hope is to provoke Castro “into some mad action.”

Usually reliable sources in the Communist parties of Chile and Uruguay report continuing evidence of a decline in Soviet and Cuban prestige among Latin American Communists and other pro-Castro groups as a result of the events of the past week.

[2 lines not declassified] Castro might modify his rejection of international inspection in Cuba if such inspection were also to cover other territories in the Caribbean area where Cuban exiles might be training.

The 27 October Cuban message sent by an illicit station near Havana to an unidentified station outside Cuba, calling for the destruction of US property, was repeated on 28 and on 30 October.

BLOC DEVELOPMENTS

We have no reports as of 0700 EST on the New York conversations of Soviet First Deputy Premier Mikoyan.

There has been no significant change in Moscow’s propaganda treatment of the situation. Soviet media continue to emphasize that the USSR is strictly honoring Khrushchev’s pledges to President Kennedy. Moscow claims Cuba is ready to cooperate with the UN in working out a peaceful settlement, and continues to show sensitivity to foreign views that Khrushchev’s agreement to dismantle the missiles was a sign of weakness.

Moscow has denounced the resumption of the US quarantine and charged that “unprecedented war hysteria” still prevails in the US.

Soviet commentators yesterday became markedly warmer in support of Castro’s five demands, but they carefully avoided any suggestion that a settlement is contingent on US acceptance of these demands. A Moscow broadcast to Cuba endorsed Castro’s position that the US must halt the quarantine, economic sanctions, subversive activities, and overflights. Moscow hedged, however, on Castro’s demand for the return of the Guantanamo naval base, saying only that this question “should be decided by negotiations.”

The Chinese Communists have, in effect, urged Castro to resist Soviet pressures for an early settlement. A note delivered [less than 1 line not declassified] in Peiping rejected as an “imperialist viewpoint” the suggestion that Cuban demands should be ignored in a settlement between the “big powers.” Peiping promised resolute support “regardless of how complicated the circumstances may be.”

At a meeting of the presidium of the World Peace Council in Stockholm, the Chinese delegate is reliably reported to have characterized Soviet behavior in the Cuban crisis as “cowardly.”

[text not declassified]

[text not declassified]

[1 paragraph (1½ lines) not declassified]

BLOC MILITARY STATUS

No significant changes have been noted in the disposition or readiness posture of the major Soviet and satellite military forces.

[1 paragraph (2½ lines) not declassified]

The level of flight activity of Long Range Air Force units based in the western USSR continued to be lower than normal. Weather was probably a contributing factor.

Although much of the military force probably remains in a state of precautionary readiness, some signs of normalcy have been noted. Western attachés now have traveled through key rail junctions in Belorussia and from Helsinki to Moscow through Leningrad without observing any unusual military activity or rail movements. Some military personnel may be on leave in the Leningrad area. Elements of two Polish army divisions probably are continuing to aid in the harvest. There are continued indications that the Soviets may proceed with the normal year-end release of GSFG military personnel.

Out-of-area submarine activity continued at a comparatively high level in the Atlantic. The combined exercise continued in the Baltic. There are indications that a relatively large-scale exercise is impending in the Sea of Okhotsk, where submarines have deployed. At least three of the seven Northern Fleet ships which appeared in [less than 1 line not declassified] are moving southward along the Norwegian coast. Two of these are probably destroyers. [1½ lines not declassified] the ships might either move into the Baltic or exercise with Baltic Fleet units which have departed the Baltic.

SOVIET BLOC SHIPPING TO CUBA

Two bloc ships which have been lying dead in the water near the quarantine line have resumed their courses and now are within the quarantine zone en route to Cuba. These are the Soviet dry-cargo ship BELOVODSK, which is being accompanied by a US destroyer, and the Soviet tanker GROZNY. The Czech dry-cargo ship KLADNO, which stopped near the line for several days, has not returned from her rendezvous off Bermuda with the East German passenger ship VOELKERFREUNDSCHAFT. The Soviet tanker MIR crossed the quarantine line at about 0100 EST.

There now are 13 bloc ships en route to Cuba. The latest additions are the Soviet dry-cargo ship ZYRYANIN, with general cargo from the Black Sea, and the tanker BALAKLAVA, with a cargo of crude oil from the Baltic.

BLOC SHIPPING TO CUBA

Annex

November 2, 1962

NUMBER OF SHIPS REQUIRED TO REMOVE
SOVIET WEAPONS SYSTEMS FROM CUBA

1. We believe the main components of the Soviet offensive weapons systems now in Cuba (as defined by Presidential Proclamation 3504 of 23 October) could be returned to the USSR in a total of 20 to 25 shiploads.

2. The MRBM and IRBM equipment presents the most formidable shipping task. We do not know exactly how many trips were required to deliver the missiles now in Cuba, but believe that their return will require between five and eight trips with ships having hatches large enough to permit stowage of the ballistic missiles. The principal components of the missile systems probably would amount to about another four shiploads. Some of the supporting construction equipment such as bulldozers, trucks, and cranes probably would be left behind, inasmuch as Cuba is receiving such equipment as economic aid.

3. The 29 BEAGLE (IL–28) jet bombers known to be in Cuba probably were delivered by three ships, and could be returned by the same number.

4. The 12 KOMAR guided-missile boats now in Cuba arrived as deck cargo on four separate ships, two carrying two each, and two others carrying four each. Thus three or at the most four trips would suffice to evacuate this equipment; the missile and support gear would fit easily in the holds of the ships carrying the KOMARs on deck.

5. We believe the three identified cruise-type coastal defense missile installations could be sent back in three shiploads.

Missiles:	5	to	3
Missile installations:	4
Jet bombers:	3
KOMAR ships:	3	to	4
Coast Defense Missiles:	3
Total:	18	to	22 shiploads

1. The situation in Cuba; Bloc developments; Bloc military status; Soviet bloc shipping to Cuba; and one annex. Top Secret. 9 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Excom Meetings, vol. II, Meetings 6–11.