Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, American Republics; Cuba 1961–1962; Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Volumes X/XI/XII, Microfiche Supplement

471. Telegram 1153 to USUN, October 31¹

October 31, 1962, 11:09 p.m.

Info: AmEmbassy, Moscow. Subject: Cuba: New York Negotiations. Confirming telcon, following for record, are approved changes in instructions communicated DEPTEL 1147.

1. Section No. 3 should now begin as follows:

INITIAL TWO-PHASE PROGRAM.

The US envisages multiple phases in the UN verification program, each requiring specific control measures.

2. Insert at end of Section No. 3 QUOTE Arrangements for the third and final phase relating to commitment of the Soviets not to reintroduce offensive weapons will be covered in subsequent instructions UNQUOTE.

3. Insert in Section No. 4 as new third sentence QUOTE One possibility might be aircraft manned by nationals, presumably impartial, designated by UN. Another possibility might be reconnaissance using crews consisting of a representatives of the US, Soviet Union, Cuba and UN representatives under UN aegis. UNQUOTE

4. In Section No. 4, second paragraph, insert QUOTE would be prepared UNQUOTE in lieu of QUOTE will wish UNQUOTE.

5. In Section No. 4 paragraph 4 insert QUOTE in phase 1 UNQUOTE before QUOTE visual monitoring UNQUOTE.

6. In Section No. 4 paragraph 5 second sentence, after QUOTE accept UNQUOTE add at end of sentence QUOTE not only because SYG will probably not regard Canadians as sufficiently neutral but also because RF–101 is a military aircraft. UNQUOTE

7. In following sentence same paragraph, replace words QUOTE two week period trained UNQUOTE by QUOTE two to six week period could check out already trained multi-engine UNQUOTE.

8. In same paragraph insert new penultimate sentence QUOTE Australia may therefore also have some capability UNQUOTE.

9. Entire following paragraph, i.e., Section No. 4 paragraph 6, should be removed and replaced by following:

QUOTE A reasonably satisfactory substitute would be the F–27 which could be modified to provide the necessary high and low photographic capability. Crews experienced with F–27s might be obtained from a number of countries, including Ireland, Switzerland and Luxembourg. Modification to incorporate the necessary photographic equipment could be completed in ten days after a decision to employ them. UNQUOTE

10. Section No. 5 QUOTE Incoming Cargoes UNQUOTE should be replaced entirely by following:

QUOTE As indicated Deptel 1136, we prepared accept ICRC inspections incoming cargoes on all ships of whatever flag embarked from bloc ports. According to our projection, the USSR will need to schedule a total of about 100 ships shortly to arrive in Cuba during the next 3–4 weeks in order to accomplish removal of dismantled equipment. (In addition to 60 ships normally used for offensive equipment, USSR would have to adapt about 40 others for purpose). Number Red Cross inspectors required to do job will be about equal whether inspection on sea or shore. At sea less inspectors required per ship because cargo holds cannot be penetrated and surreptitious off-loading not possible but more inspectors in transit shuttling between vessels at sea. In port, transit time eliminated but more inspectors required to watch for surreptitious off-loading and to examine in detail cargo coming out of holds. Because port inspection much more comprehensive, every effort should be made to obtain authorization to inspect in port. Estimate ten personnel needed for each ship entering each port per day. Personnel should be of adequate technical competence to recognize offensive equipment.

We expect thorough inspection, including at least selective examination of cargoes aboard to assure that no weapons we consider offensive will enter Cuba. Inspection should provide for masters of incoming ships to notify their cargoes to UN inspectors well in advance of arrival at port. This would expedite checking and clearance and help make entire inspection process more effective.

We believe inspection of incoming cargoes should continue until entire verification process completed (i.e., through end of Phase Two), in order to give us assurance all offensive weapons withdrawn and related facilities dismantled. During this period, enforcement of quarantine would be suspended, but US ships would remain on duty stations. Incoming ships would not be stopped or searched by US, but we would keep a watching brief on all traffic, noting outbound missile-carrying ships and assisting UN inspectors in assuring they informed of all incoming traffic. US would thus be in position to renew immediately the enforcement of the quarantine if circumstances required such action. UNQUOTE

11. In Section No. 6 paragraph (a) first sentence insert QUOTE including storage facilities UNQUOTE after QUOTE any other area UNQUOTE.

12. In Section No. 6 paragraph (b) sentence 4 insert after QUOTE 60 men UNQUOTE add (QUOTE in addition to airport personnel) equipped UNQUOTE.

13. Paragraph No. 6 (c) first sentence after QUOTE nations UNQUOTE replace QUOTE who UNQUOTE by QUOTE which UNQUOTE.

Rusk

1. Instructions for New York negotiations on Cuba. Secret. 4 pp. Department of Defense, OSD, Historical Office, Secretary of Defense, Cable Files, Cuba, Oct 25–31, 1962.