441. Notes from transcripts of JCS meetings, October 281

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NOTES TAKEN FROM TRANSCRIPTS OF MEETINGS OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, OCTOBER–NOVEMBER 1962, DEALING WITH THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS (Handwritten notes were made in 1976 and typed in 1993.)

CJCS: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA.

CSA: Chief of Staff, Army. General Earle G. Wheeler.

CSAF: Chief of Staff, Air Force. General Curtis E. LeMay.

CNO: Chief of Naval Operations. Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr.

CMC: Commandant, Marine Corps. General David M. Shoup.

CONAD: Continental Air Defense

DIA: Defense Intelligence Agency

DJS: Director, Joint Staff

LANT: Atlantic

NORAD: North American Air Defense

OAS: Organization of American States

RCT: Regimental Combat Team

SAM: Surface-to-Air Missile

TAC: Tactical Air Command

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Sunday, 28 October

JCS meeting at 0900:

CSAF: I want to see the President later today, and I hope all of you will come with me. Monday will be the last time to attack the missiles before they become fully operational.

CJCS: If you want a meeting, I will put in your request.

CSA: My people tell me that all MRBM sites are now operational. If the warheads are with the missiles, they can be made ready to fire in 2½ to 5 hours.

JCS discuss the low-level reconnaissance plan for today: six planes going over sites not defended by antiaircraft artillery, so they will not cover MRBM sites.

At about 0930, a tickertape of Moscow Radio’s broadcast was passed around: “I appreciate your assurance that the United States will not invade Cuba. Hence we have ordered our officers to stop building [Typeset Page 1262] bases, dismantle the equipment, and bring it back home. This can be done under UN supervision.”

SecDef, DepSecDef and AsstSecDef Nitze joined the meeting.

CSAF: The Soviets may make a charade of withdrawal and keep some weapons in Cuba.

CNO: The no-invasion pledge leaves Castro free to make trouble in Latin America.

SecDef, DepSecDef and AsstSecDef reply that withdrawal of [Facsimile Page 3] missiles leaves the US in a much stronger position than the USSR.

SecDef: Before Khrushchev’s message came in, I was considering additional actions to pressure the Soviets: extend tours of Army and Air Force personnel; set up a submarine intercept zone; add POL to the contraband list; and requisition shipping. CSAF still wants to go to the White House, but other JCS members decide to wait and see whether reconnaissance flights meet opposition and what their pictures show.

  1. Request for meeting with the President; MRBM sites operational; Khrushchev message (Moscow radio broadcast) that Soviets will stop building bases and dismantle equipment. Secret. 3 pp. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History.