439. Supplement 8 to Joint Evaluation prepared by Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee, Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, and National Photographic Interpretation Center, October 281
NOTICE
This report is based primarily on detailed analysis of low-altitude photography taken on Friday, 26 October, as well as preliminary evaluation of the results of similar missions from Saturday, 27 October 1962 (Figure 1). The primary emphasis is placed here on a technical evaluation of force readiness, pace of construction, and changes in the deployment program (Table 1). This report does not attempt to estimate Soviet intent to attack the United States.
SUMMARY
1. We still have no direct knowledge of thermonuclear warheads in Cuba, but believe it prudent to assume that the Soviet missile force there is so armed.
2. We estimate that all 24 MRBM launchers are now fully operational, representing a capability to salvo 24 1000-mile missiles within 6 to 8 hours of a decision to launch.
3. The present and estimated operational capability of all Soviet defensive missiles in Cuba is summarized in Figure 2.
4. No new MRBM or IRBM sites have been detected in the past day, although we have not had high-altitude coverage appropriate for search since 23 October 1962.
5. Construction at the Soviet IRBM sites in Cuba continues at a rapid pace and missile support equipment is now being moved to the vicinity of Guanajay Site 1. No IRBM’s per se have yet been observed.
6. The entire missile-launching force at the Soviet MRBM sites in Cuba is being checked out on a rapid basis. This provides an increasing, integrated, operational readiness posture.
[Facsimile Page 3]7. Automatic anti-aircraft weapons and personnel trenches for protection against air attack are now evident at many of the MRBM sites. [Typeset Page 1259] These weapons have been introduced in the last few days and probably account for the ground fire now being noted on the low-level photographic missions.
8. Camouflage against aerial photography is being extended at the missile sites and is becoming more effective. Force dispersion is also evident.
9. A missile propellant offloading and transhipping facility has now been identified at the double-fenced area at Punta Gerada in Bahia Honda. This was suspected formerly of being a port of entry for nuclear weapons.
10. We now estimate an integrated operational capability for the SA–2 air defense network in Cuba [text not declassified].
[text not declassified]
12. The loss of the U–2 over Banes was probably caused by intercept by an SA–2 from the Banes site, or pilot hypoxia, with the former appearing more likely on the basis of present information.
13. Microwave relay towers have been noted at some of the MRBM and IRBM site areas covered on 27 October, indicating that an integrated microwave command and control communication system will be utilized in Cuba. However, the use of high frequency radio is also indicated by the presence of high frequency antennae at Sagua La Grande sites 1 and 2.
[Facsimile Page 4]14. Construction of probable nuclear storage facilities was continuing on 26 and 27 October. None of the bunkers observed at probable nuclear storage sites are yet believed to be in operation although that at Guanajay IRBM Site No. 1 is essentially complete.
15. A new, probable nuclear storage facility has been identified at Sagua La Grande MRBM Site No. 2. Construction materials were being moved into this area on 27 October. The existence of a second, probable nuclear storage area at the Sagua La Grande launch complex indicates that each launch site is probably intended to have individual, permanent nuclear storage.
- Soviet missile threat in Cuba. Top Secret. 4 pp. CIA Files: Job 80–R01386R, O/D/NFAC, Box 2, Cuba (23 Oct.–28 Oct. 1962).↩