I am passing on the attached memorandum which Ray wrote immediately after
Khrushchev’s proposal. I
think you will find this analysis of Soviet motivations and likely
course of action of real interest.
Attachment
SUBJECT
- The Khrushchev Proposal for a Turkey-Cuba
Tradeoff
Khrushchev now recognizes
that his position is weak. The whole Soviet play with Cuban missile
sites was probably based on a three-level course of action.
First, the Soviets hoped for, and probably expected, US acquiescence
in the buildup of a Soviet missile complex in Cuba which would
substantially augment Soviet strength in negotiations over Berlin,
and in general. The appreciable military gain, while not seriously
affecting the strategic military balance, could have been converted
into a high card at the negotiation table.
Second, as a first-line fallback position, the Soviets could react to
a US blockade or similar pressure short of direct military invasion
or attack on the bases by proposing a trade of the Turkish, Italian,
and UK IRBMs for those in Cuba. It
is the lower end of this range of action to which the Soviets have
now fallen back.
Third, at worst, the Soviets would react to US military action
against the bases by whatever forms of political protest were
warranted by world reactions—even up to breaking diplomatic
relations. The Khrushchev
message of October 27 strengthens the conclusion that the USSR would not resort to direct
military confrontation or reprisal—on the seas, in Cuba, or in
Turkey. To date, the world reactions have not been what Moscow had
hoped for; in particular, the unanimous OAS action must have been a severe disappointment.
The third course is still the remaining Soviet recourse if we reject
their offer at the second level. The Soviet statement clearly evades
any commitment to military action if the US should decline its offer
and eliminate the missile site by unilateral military action. It
states that the missiles in Cuba are in Soviet hands and would be
used only if there were (a) an invasion of Cuba, or (b) an attack on
the Soviet Union or any of her allies. It can scarcely be an
oversight that the contingency of a strike to neutralize the
missiles is not included in this commitment. The Soviets can
probably still be compelled to withdraw the missile bases if they
see the only alternative will be our destruction of them. However,
even that outcome would almost certainly not provoke even limited
Soviet military escalation.
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The Turks have already made abundantly clear that they do not want to
be compared with the Cubans, used as a pawn, or shorn of the
Jupiters which have always been to them a proud symbol of their
ability to strike back if they are hit. Hasty surfacing of long-held
US
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military evaluations of the obsolescence of the Jupiters would be
ineffective in meeting these strongly held views. The Jupiters are
not important as a military-strategic asset—but, then, neither is
Berlin. Yet both have elemental significance as symbols of the
integrity of the Alliance and especially of our commitment to stand
by the interests of each of its members.
The United States can, while solving the Cuban base question with
determination, forcefully reaffirm its readiness to reach agreements
on arms control and disarmament. We could thus indicate our pursuit
of peace at the same time that we disposed of the latest Soviet
disruption of the peace.
The United States has a unique opportunity to deal a major setback to
the Soviet leaders, and once and for all to disabuse them—and
others—of any illusion that the alternative to any Soviet gamble for
high stakes will be not fallback advantages, but a defeat. Precisely
such an outcome is the way to discourage such ventures in the
future.
